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ΙΔΡΥΜΑ ΜΕΛΕΤΩΝ ΧΕΡΕΟΝΗΣΟΥ ΤΟΥ ΑΙΜΟΥ
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CONTENTS

ARTICLES

ATHANASSIOS E. KARATHANASSIS, <i>Some Observations on the European Cartographers with regard to 15th-18th century Macedonia</i>	5- 17
E. MAVROUDIS, <i>Philhellenism in Poland during the Greek Revolution, 1821-1828</i>	19- 21
ATHANASSIOS CHRISTOU, <i>Thema: "Der Nachlass Thierschiana I und seine Bedeutung für die Griechische Geschichtsschreibung"</i>	23- 33
PAUL D. QUINLAN, <i>The Importance of Queen Marie in Romanian History</i>	35- 41
SONIA VATEVA, <i>Les positions des partis politiques principaux en Yougoslavie et en Grèce face à la question agraire après la première guerre mondiale</i>	43- 58
IOANNIS KAKOULIDIS, <i>La contribution des Hébreux à l'histoire du parti socialiste-ouvrier de Grèce (1918-1924)</i>	59- 69
VLASIS VLASIDIS, <i>The "Macedonian Question" on the Bulgarian Political Scene (1919-23)</i>	71- 88
IRENA STAWOWY-KAWKA, <i>L'Europe du sud-est dans la politique économique du Troisième Reich (1933-1939)</i>	89-105
N. G. L. HAMMOND, <i>The Allied Military Mission in Northwest Macedonia, 1943-44</i>	107-144
EVANTHIS HATZIVASSILIOU, <i>The Lausanne Treaty Minorities in Greece and Turkey and the Cyprus Question, 1954-9</i>	145-161
KIRIAKOS D. KENTROTIS, <i>Die Entwicklung der griechisch-bulgarischen Beziehungen (1989-1991)</i>	163-169

REVIEW ESSAYS

CONSTANTINE PAPOULIDIS, <i>Greek manuscripts in Moscow</i>	171-177
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BOOK REVIEWS

CH. SYMBONIDIS, J. Zaimov, <i>Bălgarski Imennik (Părva část: Lični imena u Bălgarii ot VI do XX vek. Vtora část: Familni imena ot čužd proizhod)</i>	179-183
CHRISTOS G. PATRINELIS, Paskhalis M. Kitromilidis, <i>Η Γαλλική Επανάσταση και η Νοτιοανατολική Ευρώπη</i>	183-184
IOANNIS A. PAPADRIANOS, M. Stojanović, <i>Antologija Novogrčkog Narodnog Pesništva</i>	184-185
DANIEL BARBU, Paul Mihail, <i>Jurnalul călătoriei de studii în sud-estul Europei (1931)</i>	186

ATHANASSIOS E. KARATHANASSIS

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE EUROPEAN CARTOGRAPHERS
WITH REGARD TO 15th-18th CENTURY MACEDONIA*

The dawn of the European Renaissance, the Fall of Constantinople, growing interest in the cultivation of classics in the West, the Ottoman Empire's subjugation of the Greek people, and concern in certain quarters for the fate of the enslaved Greeks all prompted a number of travellers to visit what Greek scholars term the Greek Levant. The rivalry between Holland, England, and France for control of the searoutes also generated no little European interest in the Greek islands and littoral.

Many of the European travellers came to Greece¹ filled with visions of ancient Greek culture; they turned a blind eye to the wretched situation which obtained at the time, and showed little, if any, concern for the fate of the *rayahs*. Very few European travellers were genuinely saddened by the enslaved Hellenism's tragic lot, for which, it must be said, Europe bore no small share of the blame. It had been a bitter pill for the Greeks to swallow: having systematically sucked the mediaeval Hellenic Empire dry, the West lost all interest in it and turned its attention toward the Ottoman Empire, from which it anticipated considerable gains. Nor was it disappointed. In the writer's personal view, European interest in Greece began to manifest itself after 1674, when Nointel and Spon-Wheler² first gave a clear picture of it. It was an incomplete picture, however, because, without exception, all the European travellers and cartographers focused their attention on the Greek islands and coastal areas, while the hinterland remained unknown and virtually inaccessible. On returning home, most of these travellers aspired to publish the impressions they had gained from their journeyings, frequently accom-

* The author wishes to express his gratitude to Messrs Savvas Demerdzis and Yannis Eftychiadis for permitting me access to their collection of maps.

1. Κυριάκος Σιμόπουλος, *Ξένοι ταξιδιώτες στην Ελλάδα, 333 π.Χ. - 1700* (Foreign Travellers in Greece, 333BC-1700AD), vol. I, Athens 1984.

2. Λουκία Δρούλια, «Ο Spon και άλλοι ξένοι στην Αθήνα» (Spon and Other Foreigners in Athens), in *Περιηγήσεις στον ελληνικό χώρο* (Travels in the Area of Greece), Athens 1968.

panying the texts with maps of the places they had visited and woodcuts of what they considered to be the principal monuments. In this way much valuable evidence has been preserved about the places visited, and this evidence also provides indirect sources for a historical approach to the complex web of problems posed, even today, by each and every area of Greece³. Naturally, it was not only the travellers who took an interest in these matters: the consuls too, the missionaries, and agents of various kinds all had their own reasons for charting large and small areas of what we term the Greek Levant.

Many of the various travellers' reports to their superiors are now in European archives. From 1500 onwards they frequently include maps, drawings, and itineraries, many of which are real works of art. Nor was Greek interest in the subject entirely absent, though in this case its purpose was to keep their enslaved land alive in the hearts of the Greek people. One such scholar (whom I shall mention again later on) was a Corfiot named Nikolaos Sofianos (early 16th c.), who was interested in Ptolemaic geography (Ptolemy was discovered in Europe by Greek Byzantine scholars of the Renaissance, who brought about the so-called Ptolemaic Renaissance in Geography). Sofianos wrote a study of the astrolabe and constructed a map of the Hellenic territories, in which he correlated the ancient Greek and modern place-names, thus linking the ancient and modern Greek worlds.

As far as the mapping of Hellenic territory is concerned, there were a number of schools: the Italians, the Germans, the French, the Dutch, and the English all produced maps, which were Ptolemaic as a rule and with Greece sketched in very roughly: the borders confused and indistinct, the coastline clumsily depicted, the sea represented by parallel wavy lines. The principle type of map of Greece was the *Decima et Ultima Europa Tabula*⁴. With the appearance of modern maps, the numerous errors of the Ptolemaic versions were corrected, and the new type gave a much more accurate depiction of Greece. The new maps were based on such data as travellers' writings, information provided by merchants, and scholarly texts. Giacomo Castaldi produced one such map in 1545, and a number of well-respected later geographers (Ortelius, Mercator, Blaeu) based their own maps on it. These form the main body of the present edition.

3. H. Ommont, "Athènes au XVII^e siècle", *Revue des Etudes Grecques*, 14 (1901), 270-294.

4. Χρ. Ζαχαράκης, *Έντυπη χαρτογράφηση του ελληνικού χώρου από τον 15^ο μέχρι τον 18^ο αιώνα* (Printed Cartography of the Area of Greece from the 15th to the 18th Century), Nicosia 1976, p. 10.

It was out of these two types of map that comparative geography and cartography developed (and it was only to be expected that maps of ancient and modern Greece —*Graecia Antiqua* and *Graecia Nova* or *Graecia Moderna*⁵— would be produced). Hence, in the series *Graecia Antiquae Tabula Nova*, ancient place-names are correlated with modern ones, using the Latin words *nunc* (now) and *olim* (before)⁶. Needless to say, the ancient and modern names provide valuable documentation of places which have disappeared and place-names which are no longer used. But there are also many instances of complete misunderstanding and confusion, because the mapmakers use Latin or Italian for place-names which are Greek or Turkish (e.g. Salonichi, Iskup). The older maps tend to use rudimentary symbols, but after the end of the sixteenth century elaborate ornamentation became the norm, with little pictures, allegorical drawings, emblems, and trophies. The basic drawbacks, however, were the erroneous mathematical calculation of the lines of latitude and longitude and the depiction of towns in the form of tiny caricatures. It was such famous geographers as Blacu, Laurebergius, and Dural at the end of the seventeenth century who were the first to divide maps up and produce more detailed charts of smaller areas; but still place-names were corrupted and the maps were decorated with little drawing of castles and towns.

The first, Ptolemaic, map of Greece was printed in Bologna in Italy in 1477. All subsequent maps (of ancient Greece) faithfully reproduced the ancient Greek borders, albeit with distortions arising from a lack of the necessary aids. In the many geographies containing chapters on Greece, the place-names used range from ancient Greek right through to contemporary forms, being based for the most part on comments by ancient and Byzantine writers in lexicons and other texts, rather than on personal inspection of the places concerned. One presumes that the research was all conducted in the work-room, rather than on the spot.

Another characteristic of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was the inclusion of Ptolemaic texts in atlases, and in other works, which were then characterised as *Antiqua*, *Nova*, *Vetus*, *Neoterica*, or *Moderna*⁷, and heralded the rebirth of general geography: a combination of physical geography, astronomy, and history. It was not a new idea; in antiquity Ptolemy

5. Κωνστ. Θ. Κυριακόπουλος, *Μελέτιος (Μήτρος) Αθηνών, ο Γεωγράφος (1661-1714)* [Meletios (Mitros), Bishop of Athens, Geographer, 1661-1714], vol. I, Athens 1990, p. 453.

6. Ζαχαράκις, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 20.

and Strabo, for instance, had given geographical studies a mathematical and a historical dimension respectively; and nowadays too, as studied and taught chiefly in foreign universities, geography is a multi-dimensional discipline. The important geographers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries included Gerhard Mercator (also known as the New Ptolemy), Abraham Ortelius (1527-1597), Petrus Appianus (1495-1522), D. M. Niger (c. 1490), Philipp Cluverius (1580-1622), G. A. Magini (1555-1617), I. B. Riccioli (1598-1661), and Vincenzo Coronelli. Their maps reveal their own personal interests (mathematics, history, economics, etc.), and include accounts of historical events, natural boundaries, distances, economic data, memorabilia, admirabilia, and propria, all designed to enhance the pleasure of geographical study⁸. All the same, even these capable mapmakers produced their share of errors and omissions.

Earlier on I mentioned the name of Nikolaos Sofianos. Let us now take a brief look at Greek ideas about geography in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It is as well to remember that the Byzantines were particularly fond of geography, as we learn from chronicles, lives of saints, and other official and ecclesiastical documents. Much later, a Renaissance scholar named Georgios Trapezountios⁹ translated Ptolemy into Latin, and Georgios Amiroutsis¹⁰ published the translation. Georgios Gemistos Plethon drew up land surveys and lists of toponyms and read and studied Pausanias¹¹, whom the celebrated humanist Markos Mousouros¹² also systematically studied. Many scholars in the Ottoman period also turned their attention to geography: Georgios Alexandrou, Pachomios Roussanos, Ioannis Tarchaniotis, Thomas Diplovatatzis, and of course, the chief of them all, Nikolaos Sofianos. Other outstanding figure was Chrysanthos Notaras, later Patriarch of Jerusalem, who in 1700 helped Ioannis Komninos to draw the map of Wallachia¹³ and attempted himself to draw a map of the world¹⁴. He also translated N. Mile-

8. Κυριακόπουλος, *op. cit.*, p. 445.

9. Κ. Ν. Σάθας, *Νεοελληνική Φιλολογία* (Modern Greek Philology), Athens 1868, p. 41.

10. Θωμάς Ι. Παπαδόπουλος, *Ελληνική βιβλιογραφία (1466 ci-1800)* (Greek Bibliography, ci. 1466-1800), vol. I, Athens 1984, p. 27.

11. Κυριακόπουλος, *op. cit.*, p. 462, note 664.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 462, note 665.

13. Olga Cicanci - Paul Cernovodeanu, «Contribution à la connaissance de la biographie et l'oeuvre de Jean (Hierothée) Comnène (1668-1719)», *Balkan Studies*, 12/1 (1971), 174-175.

14. Χρύσανθος Νταράς, *Εισαγωγή εις τα Γεωγραφικά και Σφαιρικά* (Introduction to Geography and Sphaerics), Paris (s.d.), f. 4^v.

scu's excellent *Description of China*¹⁵. It is no accident that Notaras studied astronomy at Paris under the great Cassinis he constructed his own astrolabe, and wrote works which included *Interpretation and Recording of the Quadrant and Introduction to Geography and Spheres*¹⁶. The same line of study was followed by Dimitrios Georgoulis-Notaras (Chrysanthos' nephew), Methodios Anthrakitis (1660-1730), and Meletios Mitrou (1661-1714), a Metropolitan of Athens, whose *Geography Ancient and Modern* was published in Venice in 1728¹⁷.

As far as Macedonia is concerned, it is interesting to note that according to the cartographers it extended as far as Mount Skardos (Šar Planina), which lies south of Skopje. This means that Skopje was outside the boundaries of historical Macedonia. Similarly, in the numerous maps of Modern Greece drawn when Greece was still under the Ottoman yoke, the country's borders are considerably extended both northwards and eastwards, which points to a significant Greek presence beyond the present borders of Macedonia and the River Evros, towards northern Macedonia, Northern Epirus, Eastern Thrace, and Asia Minor. In the two basic types of map (Ptolemaic and Sofianos'), Macedonia's eastern border is the River Nestos, its southern border Tempe, and it frequently includes Albania as its westernmost part. Both types of map show Greece as including Dalmatia, Moesia Superior (Serbia), Moesia Inferior (Bulgaria), the Pontus, Bithynia, Lycia, much of Pamphylia and Galatia, Thrace, Epirus, Macedonia, Albania, the Aegean Islands, Crete, and the Ionian Islands (for practical reasons Cyprus is not included). In the minds of the European cartographers, they were depicting the actual extent of Hellenic territory, corresponding, that is, to the broad spread which it maintained until 1922). In some maps Constantinople is presented as the capital; on the other hand, their *cartouche* allegorically depict Greece as a woman dishonoured by the Ottoman conqueror. The *Graecia* of the European maps embraced a vast area, which spread west to the Adriatic and Ionian Seas, south of Crete to the Egyptian and Syrian coasts, east of the Salty Desert in Asia Minor and sometimes as far as Romania and its coast, and to the north it reached the Albanian Alps and Mount Skardos. In other

15. Αθανάσιος Ε. Καραθανάσης, *Οι Έλληνες λόγιοι στη Βλαχία* (Greek Literary Men in Wallachia), Thessaloniki 1982, p. 118; Μ. Θ. Λάσκαρις, «Ο Χρυσάνθος Νοταράς και η Κίνα» (Chrysanthos Notaras and China), in *Ελληνική Δημιουργία*, 6 (1950), 435; Πηνελόπη Στάθη, *Το ανέκδοτο οδοιπορικό του Χρυσάνθου Νοταρά* (The Unpublished Itinerary of Chrysanthos Notaras), p. 127.

16. Καραθανάσης, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

17. Κυριακόπουλος, *op. cit.*, pp. 490-500.

words, the northernmost natural boundary of Hellenic territory (and therefore the northernmost boundary of Macedonia) was marked by Mount Skardos, as Strabo himself pointed out when he wrote "from the north, the imaginary straight line of Mount Bertiscus and Scardus and Orbelus and Haemus" (*Geographica*, Epitome, 329).

Rhigas Pheraios also portrayed this situation in a series of maps of Hellenic territory, which he produced in 1796-7, accompanying them with drawings of coins and prosopographies of famous figures from ancient history, culminating in that of Alexander the Great. Rhigas went with the current of his times, though he added an extra historical and ethnic dimension to his maps and went beyond the various artistic trends which were currently predominant in European mapmaking, and which included elaborate decoration, a manifest artistic sensibility, and the depiction of mythological scenes.

The most noteworthy feature of these maps, as far as Macedonia is concerned, is that in the minds of the cartographers this region of Northern Hellenism comprises, ultimately, the major portion of Hellenic territory; to such an extent, indeed, that in some cases, as in Sebastian Münster's (Basel 1540), *Macedonia is identified with the whole of Greece*¹⁸. In all maps concerning Ancient or Modern Greece, Macedonia, being the largest Greek region, is mentioned on top of all other provinces of Greece. It should be noted that the historical Greek identity of Macedonia is stated on the *verso* of many maps of the region. A further observation is that in these maps Macedonia borders on the neighbouring regions of Epirus, Thessaly, and Thrace as *Graecia pars Septentrionalis* — which is to say, Northern Greece. Also the maps of Macedonia are frequently accompanied by a headpiece depicting Alexander the Great. Finally, the cartographers call the Skopje region *Dardania* and always place it outside the bounds of northern Macedonia, beyond Mount Skardos. This mountain range also forms the border between Macedonia and Illyria to the west. Generally speaking, with their place-names, their fanciful drawings, their mythological references, and their depiction of the extent of Hellenic territory both ancient and mediaeval, these maps not only opened European eyes to the wretched situation of the inhabitants of contemporary Greece, but also filled the Greeks themselves with hopes and dreams — or at least the informed Greeks of the Diaspora and the very few who might have made use of them within Turkish-occupied Greece.

Portolans are navigation manuals, and their chief characteristic is that they are based on the cartographers' personal observations: islands, islets,

18. See maps 1-6.

shelves, reefs, ports, and havens are therefore marked with the greatest possible accuracy. Nor are they lacking in other information, concerning history, economies, folklore, and commerce, and they are thus valuable documents for our knowledge of coastal Greece. The *isolaria* belong in the same category and give accurate information about the natural geography and the wealth of place-names of insular Greece. The place-names they give are ancient, medieval and modern, and are accompanied by copious information about the history, mythology, economy and tradition of the area.

These maps were the basic means by which Renaissance and post-Renaissance Europe was introduced to the Greek world; consequently they are for us today first-class sources for an understanding of various issues and problems relating to the broader Hellenic territories in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. Regarding the maelstrom of ethno-racial strife in the Balkans after the middle of the nineteenth century, the maps also have another role to play; for, particularly when they were drawn by European cartographers and ethnologists, they were considered to portray the true ethnological situation in the Balkans. One striking example is that of Heinrich Kiepert, who drew an ethnological map of Eastern Europe in 1876, which was so full of errors prejudicial to Greek interest that it aroused the immediate protests of K. Paparrigopoulos. The Austrian cartographer and ethnologist was obliged to revise his views two years later in view of the crucial Berlin Congress¹⁹.

19. Μαργαρίτης Δήμιτσας, *Έλεγχος της αρχαίας γεωγραφίας Ε. Κετπέρτου ως προς την Μακεδονία* (A Critical Survey of H. Kiepert's Ancient Geography with Regard to Macedonia), Athens 1897; see also the paper by Κωνσταντίνος Σβολόπουλος, «Ο Κωνσταντίνος Παπαρρηγόπουλος και η χαρτογράφηση της χερσονήσου του Αίμου από τον Χάιντριχ Κίπερτ» (Constantine Paparrigopoulos and Heinrich Kiepert's Map of the Balkan Peninsula), to be published in *Αφιέρωμα εις τον Κ. Βαβούσκη*.



1. Claudius Ptolemy, *Geographia*, ed. G. Mercator - J. Hondius, Leyden 1618, Map of Ancient Greece.



2. P. Claverius, Introductionis in Universam Geographiam, Map of Macedonia and Thessaly.




3. J. C. Welgel, *Atlas scholasticodoeoporicus*, 1708, Map of *Graeciae Septentrionalis Pars*.



4. G. Hornius, *Hellas seu Graecia Sophiani*, 1654.



5. N. Sanson and Family, *Atlas Nouveau*, Paris 1636.



6. G. Delisle, *Atlas géographique et Universel*, 1700.

E. MAVROUDIS

PHILHELLENISM IN POLAND DURING THE GREEK
REVOLUTION 1821-1828

The Greek Revolution of 1821-1828 against the yoke of the Ottoman Empire generated a strong current of philhellenism in many countries, including Poland.

In Poland the situation was peculiar. Indeed, the Polish people was living at that time, under the rule of Prussia, Russia and Austria that were absolutist powers against any idea of revolution. The pro-Greek feeling of the Polish people was contrary to the attitude of the authorities.

Polish people expressed their pro-Greek sentiments mainly through the press that published correspondence from revolutionary Greeks together with warm comments, but also through the work of various writers. Last but not least we should mention the Poles who fought and died for the independence of Greece.

The entire Polish press, mainly of Warsaw, Krakow and Vilnius, where the right of free expression was less restricted, ranked among the friends of Greece. Correspondence about the revolution was printed abundantly. Special articles were published, about the slaughter of the Chios islanders, the destruction of Psara island, the victory of Dervenakia, the achievements of heroes like Miaoulis and Kanaris, the battle of Peta, the naval battle of Navarino...

"From the one side bigotry causes slaughter, from the other misfortune aims either to victory or death" reports the newspaper "Bee of Krakow" (2nd volume p. 296). "The residents of the island (Chios), this peace-loving people, became victims of the barbarian Ottoman hordes" according to "Warsaw Voice" (1822 A/35).

Although news from Greece was not abundant, the papers enriched it with comments and information about the traditions, the history and the culture of the Hellenes.

Together with the newspapers literary journals also published special supplements about Greece. One of the most interesting among them is the journal *Rszczolka Krakowska* (1822). A number of historical books were

published also e.g. the one "The Rebirth of Greece" by W. Krug and "Theodora" by A. Scaden. Borkowski, a well known translator, writer and poet, published "The 19 Byronic hymns" about the Greek revolutionaries and the poem "The Ship". I. Oposzko wrote the poem "In Memoriam of Lord Byron". The future national poet of Poland Adam Mickiewicz, young then, was influenced by the revolution, as was the famous poet Slowacki. His works "The Journey", "Ode for Freedom" and the poem "Lambros" were inspired by the struggle of Greece for freedom. We may also cite the poets Krasinski and Norwid although the works of the latter about Greece were published later.

The Professor of ancient greek at the University of Vilnius, Groddeck, wrote a number of works about Greece influencing the literary and political circles of his time. We may also mention the young poets Coszczynski, Spitznagel and especially F. Morawski. From the poem of the latter "Fever for fight during the Greek war", I cite the following verses: "Hellenes, Hellenes, sons of glory / Who govern the world history / Why in the name of God a Pole / Cannot assist you in your struggle?".

Answering the question, a number of Polish volunteers went and fought for the independence of Greece. Captains Zurowski and Garnowski fought together with the head of the revolution Alexandros Ipsilantis who deserved the name of the Macedonian ancestor that he carried. J. Dzierzawski took part in the siege of Messolonghi. The Polish major in the Russian army Grabowski was distinguished in many expeditions in the Morias. Polish officers Drowski and Molodowski survived the massacre in Peta (July 4th, 1822) but others did not. Mierzejewski, Dabronowski, Koulsewski, Molodowski perished together with 9 other Polish heroes. Officer Miodowicki was distinguished during the siege of Tripolitsa. Jerzawski fought against the Ottomans until the final victory.

During the revolution, especially after the defeat at Messolonghi fund raising was organised in enslaved Poland for the struggle of Greece to buy arms, ammunition, medicines etc.

Poles who strove through pen or sword for Greek independence, strove also for their own freedom. The independence of Greece was the harbinger of independence for Poland. The bonds linking the two nations originated from the contacts with the Polish Commonwealth and were strengthened even before 1821 when Greek immigrants who escaped the Ottoman rule settled in Poland. A number of Poles also took refuge in Greece after its liberation, especially after the revolutions of 1830, 1848 and 1863. The two nations fought together in both the two World Wars.

Today, in the new Europe, Poland has a significant role to play. In the framework of the emerging Europe the traditional Greek-Polish friendship will certainly be strengthened for the benefit of the two countries, Europe and all the world.

ATHANASSIOS CHRISTOU

THEMA: "DER NACHLASS THIERSCHIANA I UND SEINE BEDEUTUNG FÜR DIE GRIECHISCHE GESCHICHTSSCHREIBUNG"

Einer von den wichtigsten Ausgangspunkte der Forschung für den Historiker der ottonischen Periode und genereller der bayerischen Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts ist der Nachlaß von Friedrich von Thiersch in der Handschriftenabteilung der Bayerischen Staatsbibliothek München unter dem Namen: Thierschiana I (TI).

Die Bedeutung und der Wert des Werkes von Thiersch sind für Deutschland und besonders für Bayern —daher auch der Titel *Praeceptor Bavariae*— einzigartig, was zur Folge hatte, daß einige Aspekte dieses Beitrags besonders untersucht wurden. So können die Biographie Thiersch's von seinem Sohn H. W. J. Tiersch¹, die Monographien von H. Loewe², die Doktorarbeit³ und die letzte Monographie⁴ von H. M. Kirchner und andere als sehr gute Arbeiten betrachtet werden. Ferner konnten viele Forscher aus der Thierschiana I teilweise Informationen beziehen, da ihr Thema indirekt mit dieser Periode verknüpft war⁵.

1. H. W. J. Thiersch, *Friedrich Thiersch's Leben*, Leipzig-Heidelberg 1866, 2Bde.

2. H. Loewe, *Friedrich Thiersch. Ein Humanistenleben im Rahmen der Geistesgeschichte seiner Zeit*, München-Berlin 1925, Dersg., *Friedrich Thiersch und die griechische Frage. Programm des Kgl. Maximiliansgymnasiums*, München 1913, Dersg., *Die Entwicklung des Schulkampfes in Bayern bis zum vollständigen Sieg des Neuhumanismus*, Berlin 1917, Dersg., "Friedrich Thiersch's Lebenswerk. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Idealismus", in: *Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum, Geschichte und deutsche Literatur und für Pädagogik*, Bd. 40 (1917), S. 366-386, Dersg., "Weltanschauung und Erziehungsgedanken. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Neuhumanismus in Bayern", in: *Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Erziehung und des Unterrichts*, Bd. 11-13 (1921-1923), S. 73 ff., Dersg., "Der Lehrplan von 1829. Die Geschichte seiner Entstehung", in: *Bayerische Blätter für das Gymnasialschulwesen*, Bd. 60 (1924), Dersg., *Friedrich Thiersch und die Universität München 1828*, München 1926.

3. H. M. Kirchner, *Friedrich Thiersch. Seine geistige Welt und seine kulturpolitischen Bestrebungen*, München 1955.

4. H. M. Kirchner, *Friedrich Thiersch. Ein Philhellene und Kulturpolitiker in Bayern*, München 1990 (Manuskript).

5. E. Turczynski, *Die deutsch-griechischen Kulturbeziehungen bis zur Berufung König Ottos*, München 1959, siehe auch J. A. Petropoulos, *Politics and Statecraft in the Kingdom*

Hierbei muß natürlich betont werden, daß der große Wert dieses Nachlasses einerseits auf den vielschichtigen Aktivitäten des bayerischen Gelehrten und auf den Zeugnissen, die er hinterlassen hat, basiert. Andererseits beruht sein Wert auf der Tatsache, daß er drei Generationen von bayerischen Königen geprägt hat, beginnend mit Max Josef I^o, übergehend zu Ludwig I^o und schließlich zu Maximilian II^o gelangend.

Zweifelsohne hat die deutsche Geschichtsschreibung das Werk des Praeceptor Bavariae ausreichend gedeckt; ein Titel, den sich der bayerische Professor ehrenhaft durch seine dynamische Teilnahme an den Bildungsreformen Bayerns (1827, 1829) und den Bildungsprogrammen in fast ganz Deutschland verdient hat. Das gleiche kann leider nicht über die griechische Geschichtsschreibung gesagt werden, ohne daß dies natürlich einen Mangel an Interesse für diese Periode oder die konkrete Person bedeuten soll. Im Gegenteil, man kann sogar sagen, daß die Wertschätzung von griechischer Seite für das Werk des bayerischen Philhellenen recht groß war und ist, so daß dies zu einer vielschichtigen historischen Annäherung verleitet.

Wie erklärt sich dann aber der Widerspruch, daß es einerseits ein großes Interesse an Thiersch gibt und andererseits keine wesentlichen Studien über seinen Beitrag zur griechischen Nationalsache vorhanden sind? Die Lösung dieses Problems liegt in der Untersuchung des Umstandes, wie die Griechen, aber auch einige deutsche Historiker das Werk von Fr. v. Thiersch: "De l'état actuel de la Grèce" ("État") Leipzig 1833 sahen und einschätzten. Hielten sie also den "État" für das A und O der politischen Einstellung und Ideologie von Thiersch über den neugriechischen Staat, oder aber schätzten sie es als einen Anfang für eine weitergehende Forschung? Im konkreten Fall meinen wir, daß wohl eher ersteres überwogen haben muß. Eine Tatsache, die bis zu einem gewissen Grade auch die griechische Einstellung belegt.

Sicher ist der "État" ein gut geschriebenes Buch, welches das vollständigste und genaueste Bild über den griechischen Staat und seine Möglichkeiten in der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts gibt. Dies bedeutet aber

of Greece (1833-1843), Princeton 1968 und auch H. Gollwitzer, "K. D. Schinas und die "ottonische" Ara Griechenlands. Aus einer neuen Quelle zur Geschichte des griechischen Königreichs und der deutschen-griechischen Beziehungen", in: *Festschrift für Max Spindler zum 75. Geburtstag*, München 1969, S. 709-742.

6. Siehe über Max Joseph (1799-1825) allgemein M. Spindler (Hrsg.), *Bayerische Geschichte im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (1800-1970)*, München 1974, Bd. 1, S. 3 ff.

7. Über Ludwig I (1825-1848) siehe M. Spindler (Hrsg.), *a.a.O.*, Bd. 1, S. 89 ff.

8. Über Maximilian II (1848-1864) siehe M. Spindler (Hrsg.), *a.a.O.*, Bd. 1, S. 228 ff.

keineswegs, daß man allein durch das Studium dieses Werkes den Menschen und Gelehrten Thiersch ganzheitlich begreifen kann, wie auch seinen gesamten Beitrag zur griechischen Sache von 1812 bis 1860. Leider setzte die griechische Geschichtsschreibung bis noch vor einigen Jahren den Beginn der philhellenischen Aktivitäten des bayerischen Akademikers erst mit dem Ausbruch der Revolution von 1821⁹ fest. Ihr war und ist immer noch sehr wenig über sein Werk nach 1833 bekannt.

Ferner dürfen wir nicht außer acht lassen, in welchem Zeitraum der “État” geschrieben wurde, nämlich sofort nach der Rückkehr Thiersch’s aus Griechenland, und auch in welcher Absicht das Werk veröffentlicht wurde. Das heißt, das Werk gab auch auf gewisse Weise Antwort auf die Frage seiner Ausschließung aus dem Regentschaftsrat. Weiterhin stellte es auch eine Art von politischer Botschaft in verschiedene Richtungen dar — vom Regenten bis hin zu Ludwig und auch den Großmächten.

So hatten einerseits die Überschätzung der Rolle und des Wertes des “État” und andererseits die Schwierigkeit der griechischen Historiker¹⁰, an die Quellen der Thierschiana zu gelangen, als Ergebnis, daß es auch noch heute in der griechischen Bibliographie eine Lücke gibt.

In bezug auf den Wert des Nachlasses für die neugriechische Geschichte sollten wir einen kurzen Blick auf das Material der Thierschiana I werfen. Ein Material, das wir in Kürze in dem uns verbleibenden Raum beschreiben wollen. Selbstverständlich halten wir es für überflüssig, jene Punkte einzeln hervorzuheben, die den Wert des Nachlasses für die bayerische Geschichte offenbaren. Denn der versteht sich gewissermaßen von selbst, und außerdem haben die deutschen Historiker das Material ergiebig erschöpft.

Ferner erübrigt es sich an dieser Stelle, die Aktivitäten von Thiersch auf jeder Ebene gesondert zu wiederholen. Eine Bezugnahme und Analyse haben wir ausführlich in einem anderen Artikel vorgenommen¹¹, und zwar in Zusammenhang mit seiner Biographie und seiner ersten Bekundung von Interesse für die Griechen.

Der Nachlaß Thierschiana I enthält 108 gebündelte Urkunden (Konvolute) oder Dossiers, von denen viele in einzelne kleinere aufgegliedert sind. Das Material kann in folgende vier thematische Einheiten gegliedert werden:

9. Ch. Skalissianos in: *Neues Enzyklopädisches Lexikon*, Athen (o.J.), Bd. 9, S. 521.

10. Die Quellen sind in altdeutscher Schrift geschrieben.

11. A. Christou, “Die Regentschaftsgeschichte von Fr. v. Thiersch”, in: *Sitzungsberichte des 10. Panhellenischen Historikerkongresses*, Thessaloniki 1989, S. 99-108.

- a) Die wissenschaftlichen, amtlichen, schriftstellerischen und journalistischen Aktivitäten von Thiersch (Dossier Nr. 1-64)
- b) Urkunden und Zeugnisse über das Leben von Thiersch (Dossier Nr. 65-85)
- c) Briefe (Dossier Nr. 86-90)
- d) Varia (Dossier Nr. 91-108)

Die erste Einheit ist unterteilt in folgende vier Untergruppen:

- I. Die wissenschaftlichen Aktivitäten Thiersch's (Nr. 1-39)
- II. Die amtlichen Aktivitäten Thiersch's (Nr. 40-53)
- III. Die schriftstellerischen Aktivitäten Thiersch's (Nr. 54-58)
- IV. Die journalistischen Aktivitäten Thiersch's (Nr. 59-64)

Zu der ersten Untergruppe:

A.I. Die wissenschaftlichen Aktivitäten von Thiersch¹² (Nr. 1-39)

Hierin sind fast alle Entwürfe enthalten, die provisorischen Aufzeichnungen und Handschriften mit den Korrekturen und Ergänzungen des wissenschaftlichen Werkes des bayerischen Gelehrten. Das Verzeichnis seiner Arbeiten deckt eine weitgefächerte Palette gnostischer Gegenstände, von der altgriechischen und lateinischen Philologie, der Ästhetik, der Kunst bis zur Archäologie und zur Geschichte reichend. Stellvertretend sollen hier einige dieser Werke (mit den entsprechenden Nummern der Dossiers) aufgeführt werden, die in direktem Zusammenhang zu den klassischen Wissenschaften stehen:

- 1. Materialien zu einer Vorlesung über die Enzyklopädie der Wissenschaften (Entwurf)
- 9.10. "Ästhetik". (Vorlesung, Reinschrift von fremder Hand). - je 2 Konv.
- 15.a. "Über die neuesten Untersuchungen des Erechtheums auf der Akropolis von Athen" (München 1853; Sonderdruck)
- 15.c. "Reiseskizzen: 1. Erechtheum. 2. Vorstellungen betr. hellen. Akademie der Wissenschaften und Entwürfe. 3. Tagebuch vom 3. Oct. - 29. Okt. 1852", (eEntwurf), (Für e = eigenhändig)
- 16. "Zur Kunstgeschichte" (Vorlesung; e Notizen). - 2. Konv.
- 19.a. "Geschichte der griechischen Literatur" (Vorlesung; eEntwurf). - 2. Konv.

12. BStB, *Nachlaß Thierschiana I*, Repertorium, S. 8-13,

- 23.a. Griechische Grammatik (Entwurf, teils eigenhändig, teils von fremder Hand)
- 24.a. Aeschylus: Agamemnon (Vorlesungsmaterialien; eEntwurf). - 12 Konv.
- 25.a. Aeschylus: Die Eumeniden (griechischer Text mit eKommentar)
- 26.a. Sophokles: Antigone (griechischer Text mit eBemerkungen u. 1 Kommentar von fremder Hand)
- 27. Plato: a) Gorgias (griechischer Text mit eRandbemerkungen)
- 27.b. Symposion (griechischer Text mit eRandbemerkungen und Kommentar von Thiersch)
- 28.a. Thykydides (eKommentar)
- 28.b. Pindar: Werke (griechischer Text mit umfangreichen eRandbemerkungen), 4 Bde.
- 29.a. Cicero: Werke (lateinischer Text mit eRandbemerkungen)
- 31. “Materialien zu einer Grammatik des Homerischen Dialects” (eEntwurf)
- 33.-35.a. Miscellanea (Exzerpte, Abschriften und Entwürfe zur Philologie, Geographie, Archäologie und Kunstgeschichte; größtenteils von Thiersch’s Hand)
- 38.a. “Theorie der Geschichte der politischen und gerichtlichen Beredsamkeit unter den Griechen und Römern”. - “Geschichte der politischen und gerichtlichen Beredsamkeit unter den neuen Völkern”. - “Staatsreden des Demosthenes erklärt und mit einer Einleitung begleitet”. - “Virgilis Georgica” (Vorlesungen von Thiersch in einer Nachschrift von R. Junge gebunden).

A.II. Die amtlichen Aktivitäten von Thiersch¹³ (Dossier Nr. 40-53)

In dieser Untergruppe kann man alles antreffen, was mit der Arbeit von Thiersch in verschiedenen öffentlichen Posten und Ausschüssen, die er im bayerischen Staat innehatte, zu tun hat. D.h. also in der Zeit als er Professor am Philologischen Seminar, Professor und Rektor (1829/30, 1847/48) an der Münchner Universität, Vorsitzender der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften und Mitglied in verschiedenen Bildungsausschüssen in Bayern und anderen deutschen Ländern war.

Hier interessieren uns wiederum auszugsweise:

13. BStB, *Nachlaß Thierschiana I*, Repertorium, S. 13-23.

- 40.I.d. Briefe von Thiersch an Otto I von Griechenland 1850 (1).
- 40.II.c. "Über das Königtum der Griechen" (eEntwurf)
- 40.IV.a. Griechische und Römische Klassiker: Materialien zu einer Edition (z.T. eEntwürfe)
- 40.V. "Über die Errichtung eines Museums der attischen Altertümer in Athen". (2 Entwürfe; davon 1 Entwurf von Thiersch).
- 42. Rückführung der von Napoleon geraubten Kunstschatze.
- 43.III. Rektoratstätigkeit 1847-1848.
- 43.III.b. Gedichte an Lola Montez (z.T. von Ludwig I.)
- 43.III.c. Die Studentenunruhen des Jahres 1847/48.
- 45.b. "Griechische Grammatik" und "Über gelehrte Schulen": Rezensionen und Stellungnahmen (Zeitungsartikel) 1814-1855.
- 50.a. Vereine zur Unterstützung der Griechen 1821-1827
- 50.b. Griechische Gedichte
- 50.c. Erziehung junger Griechen in Deutschland 1821-1854: Entwürfe Thiersch's, amtliche Schreiben, Zeugnisse sowie Briefe von verschiedenen.

A.III. Die schriftstellerischen Aktivitäten von Thiersch¹⁴ (Dossier Nr. 54-58)

Auch wenn die Grenzlinie zwischen den schriftstellerischen und den journalistischen Aktivitäten des bayerischen Gelehrten nicht klar umrissen sind, so wollen wir dennoch kompromissbereit diese Trennung in diese zwei Gruppen akzeptieren. In der ersten Gruppe findet man allgemeine Elemente seiner schriftstellerischen Leistung. Besondere Beachtung sollte hierbei dem "Tagebuch" geschenkt werden, das Thiersch während seines Aufenthaltes in Griechenland führte (1831-32), und welches eine Art Entwurf darstellt, auf den er sich beim Schreiben des "États" stützte. Und obwohl wiederholte Versuche vorgenommen wurden, es zu entziffern hatten diese — aufgrund der schwerleserlichen Schrift — keinen Erfolg.

Es sind die folgende drei Dossiers, die hier interessant erscheinen:

- 54. Gedichte von Friedrich Thiersch in deutscher, lateinischer und griechischer Sprache 1797-1851 sowie Gedichte von Schülern der Schulpforta 1833-1843. - 2 Konv.
- 55. Dramen von Fr. v. Thiersch: Abdallah und Balsora (1807); Das Fest im Gebirge (1826); Antiope (1840; 2 Ex.); Drama ohne Titel (2. Ex.) - 2 Konv.

14. *BSStB, Nachlaß Thierschiana I*, Repertorium, S. 23-24,

57. “Tagebuch einer Reise nach Griechenland” 1831-1832 (eigenhändig; 4. Teil vgl. 63 XI). - 2 Konv.

In Microfilm vorhanden und schätzungsweise circa 400 Blätter.

A.IV. Die journalistischen Aktivitäten von Thiersch¹⁵ (Dossier Nr. 59-64)

Diese Untergruppe ist eine an Material, welches mit der griechischen Sache zu tun hat, am reichhaltigsten. Es fällt uneingeschränktes Licht auf Seiten des nationalen Unabhängigkeitskampfes und auf die Dimensionen der Organisation des neuen Staates, die bis zum heutigen Tage noch nicht ausreichend untersucht wurden. Aufgrund der vielseitigen Beziehungen des bayerischen Philhellenen zum bayerischen Hof, den Regenten und politischen Persönlichkeiten in Griechenland, sind Quellen erhalten geblieben, deren spezielles politisches Gewicht besonders wichtig ist.

In den Dossiers 59-62 stößt man auf Material, das die Auseinandersetzungen zwischen Katholiken und Protestanten in Bayern, den versuchten Mordanschlag auf Thiersch (1811) und die öffentliche Diskussion über das Thema der Kniebeugung in Bayern (1844) betrifft.

Das Dossier 63 enthält 12 kleinere Dossiers und ist ausschließlich Griechenland gewidmet. Verbleiben wir bei den Wichtigsten:

Im 63.II.d. gibt es einen Entwurf zu dem Werk “Histoire de l'établissement de la Régence Royale en Grèce” (eEntwurf), vielleicht der wichtigste Beweis für den organisatorischen Versuch der Regenten in Griechenland¹⁶.

Von Wichtigkeit sind ferner:

- 63.II.e. Die Situation Griechenlands 1843-1854: Entwürfe Thiersch's, Denkschrift für Kronprinz Maximilian von Bayern (von Thiersch), griechische Berichte
- 63.II.f. Der Streit zwischen G. L. v. Maurer und Fr. v. Thiersch
- 63.II.g. Die griechische Regierung 1832: Akten, Berichte, Flugblätter (deutsch, französisch und griechisch)
- 63.III.a. Die orientalische Frage 1853-1854: Entwurf Thiersch's gegen Girardin und Ubinini.
- 63.III.c. Aufstellung einer deutschen Legion für Griechenland 1821-1826.
- 63.III.e. K. Schinas an Fr. v. Thiersch: “Quelle est la Dynastie qui convient à la Grèce?” 1852/53

15. BStB, Nachlaß Thierschlana I, Repertorium, S. 24-30.

16. A. Christou, *Friedrich von Thiersch und die Regentschaftsperiode in Griechenland (1832-1833)*, Thessaloniki 1990 (Manuskript).

- 63.III.f. Die Lage der christlichen Griechen im Osmanischen Reich 1853-1854: offiziell Schreiben u. Berichte
- 63.III.g. Die Kirche in Griechenland 1852
- 63.III.h. Griechische Kunst und Kultur 1832-1852
- 63.IV.a. Zum Aufbau der Griechischen Monarchie
- 63.IV.b. Materialsammlung für Thiersch's Buch "État"
- 63.IV.c. Die griechische Regentschaft 1832-1835
- 63.IV.d. Die finanzielle Lage Griechenlands 1830-37
- 63.IV.e. Frey in Griechenland 1837
- 63.IV.f. Über die griechische Thronfolge 1852
- 63.IV.g. Griechenland 1843
- 63.V.a. Bevölkerung, Wirtschaft und klimatische Verhältnisse in Griechenland 1815-1832
- 63.V.b. Die Seeschlacht von Navarino
- 63.IV. Thiersch, Fr.: "Über mein Benehmen in der griechischen Sache und seine Gegner, als Einleitung zu einer Beschreibung meiner Reise nach Griechenland" (Reinschrift von fremder Hand mit eKorrekturen)
- 63.VIII.b. Kritik Thiersch's an G. L. v. Maurers Buch über das griechische Volk (eEntwurf)
- 63.IX.a. Reise von München nach Triest 1831
- 63.X. Thiersch, Fr.: "Histoire de l'établissement de la Régence Royale en Grèce pur servir de complement à l'ouvrage de l'état actuel de la Grèce" (Abschrift)

B. Urkunden und Zeugnisse über das Leben von Thiersch¹⁷ (Dossier Nr. 65-85)

Wie bereits der Titel verrät, enthält die zweite Einheit all jene Angaben, die sich auf das private Leben des bayerischen Gelehrten beziehen, und die unbekannte Seiten seiner Aktivitäten offenbaren, wie z.B. die finanzielle Situation der Familie Thiersch, seine berufliche Karriere, das 50-jährige Jubiläum seiner Doktorarbeit, seine Familiengeschichte, seinen Tod und andere Angaben.

Einige dieser wichtigsten Beweisstücke sind:

- 65.b. Promotionsurkunde, gedruckte Dissertation "Specimen editionis Symposii Platonis"

17. *BStB, Nachlaß Thierschiana I*, Repertorium, S. 30-37.

- 66.c. Lebenslauf Fr. v. Thiersch's 1825 (Reinschrift von fremder Hand)
- 71. Porträts der Familie Thiersch und Karl Löfflers sowie Briefe von verschiedenen.
- 72. Gedichte an Thiersch und die Mitglieder seiner Familie zu den verschiedensten Anlässen 1816-1866
- 74. 50-jähriges Doktorjubiläum Thiersch's im Jahre 1858
- 76. Geschichte der Familie Thiersch 1792-1940
- 77. Tod Fr. v. Thiersch's 1860
- 83.a. Lexikonartikel über Thiersch, Teildruck der Thierschbiographie von Heinrich Thiersch sowie Rezensionen des Werkes 1865-1868

C. Briefe¹⁸ - (Dossier Nr. 86-90)

Thiersch verdankte sein objektives und lückenloses Wissen in verschiedenen Bereichen, wie zum Beispiel in der griechischen Angelegenheit der umfangreichen Korrespondenz mit Menschen aus verschiedenen Berufen, sozialen Schichten und Nationalitäten. Es ist erstaunlich, daß er es schaffte, der Einhaltung seiner Pflichten an der Universität, in verschiedenen Ausschüssen und Vereinen, in denen er Mitglied war, nachzukommen. Auch dem Schreiben von Artikeln für die „Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung“ (AAZ) und der Erziehung der Königskinder, gerecht zu werden.

Es ist bemerkenswert, daß der bayerische Gelehrte seine Informationen, die er durch die Korrespondenz erhielt, durch andere Quellen bestätigte und auf diese Weise sich eine so umfangreiche Einsicht in die Dinge schaffte, wie nur irgend möglich. In der Folge sandte er einen Artikel nachdem er das Thema entsprechend analysiert hatte, zur Veröffentlichung an die AAZ. Wenn man also seine reiche Korrespondenz studiert, gelangt man zur Einsicht, welcher der Briefe ihm den Impuls aber auch das Wissen zum Niederschreiben einiger seiner Artikel gegeben hat.

In dieser Gruppe sind fünf Kategorien von Briefen vorzufinden, entsprechend nach dem Absender und dem Empfänger eingeordnet. In der ersten¹⁹ (Dossier Nr. 86) ist Thiersch der Absender, und Empfänger sind ungefähr 10 Personen, wie Armansperg, Vlastos, Wrede, Zeller und andere.

In der zweiten²⁰ (Dossier Nr. 87), größer und interessanter, ist Thiersch der Empfänger, und Absender sind circa 1200 Personen, wie auch öffent-

18. BStB, *Nachlaß Thierschiana I*, Repertorium, S. 38-339.

19. BStB, *Nachlaß Thierschiana I*, Repertorium, S. 38-58.

20. BStB, *Nachlaß Thierschiana I*, Repertorium, S. 59-272.

liche Träger und Anstalten. Unter diesen zählen wir 246 (dabei 658 Briefe) griechische Intellektuelle, Politiker, Kleriker, Militärpersonen, Kämpfer der Revolution, Händler und andere. Hier trifft man Namen an wie P. Argyropoulos, I. Varvakis, I. Venthylas, die Gebrüder Vlastou, A. Gazis, K. Mpotsaris, Th. Vrysakis, die Akademie von Chios, K. Christidis, A. Christopoulos, A. Deligiannis, N. Dóukas, G. Gingas, G. Glarakis, den Metropoliten Ignatios, F. Ioannou, I. Kapodistrias, K. Karatzas, K. Koumas, I. Kolettis, A. Korais, S. Koumanoudis, A. Londos, I. Makrigiannis, A. Mavrokordatos, A. Miaoulis, K. Oikonomou von Oikonomon, Ch. Perrevas, A. Polyzoidis, A. R. Rangavis, K. Schinas²¹, G. S. Sinas, A. Soutsos, S. Trikoupi und andere.

Es wäre nicht übertrieben zu behaupten, daß es ein seltenes Phänomen ist, daß ein einziger Mensch eine so große Korrespondenz mit Ausländern solch unterschiedlicher gesellschaftlicher Herkunft und Berufe führt. Ein Umstand, der einerseits, die Vielbeschäftigung von Thiersch und andererseits den Drang der Griechen, nicht nur die Meinung, sondern auch die Einmischung von Fremden in ihre Angelegenheiten zu suchen, bestärkt.

In den folgenden zwei Kategorien²² (Dossier Nr. 88 und 89) gibt es Briefe von und an seine Ehefrau Amalie Thiersch, während in der letzten²³ (Dossier Nr. 90) Briefe Dritter an diverse Empfänger vorhanden sind.

*D. Varia*²⁴ (Dossier Nr. 91-108)

In den vierten und letzten thematischen Einheit trifft man auf Merkmale, die mit verschiedenen Seiten des Lebens von Thiersch in Zusammenhang stehen, wie Erinnerungsstücke der Familie, Gemälde, Skizzen von Reisen, Gedichte und anderes.

Einige von diesen sind:

- 92. Schimperiana (Karl Friedrich Schimper) 1837-1867: Zeichnungen, Gedichte, Tabellen
- 94. Duplikate einiger Schriften Thiersch's, Buch- und Zeitschriftenangebote

21. A. Christou, "Die politische Korrespondenz Thierschs mit Konstantin Demetrius Schinas", in: *Friedrich Thiersch und die Entstehung des griechischen Staates aus der Sicht des 20. Jahrhunderts*, Athen 1990, S. 141-156.

22. *BStB, Nachlaß Thierschiana I*, Repertorium, S. 273-319.

23. *BStB, Nachlaß Thierschiana I*, Repertorium, S. 320-339.

24. *BStB, Nachlaß Thierschiana I*, Repertorium, S. 340-341.

- 95. Gedichte aller Art sowie Zeichnungen 1815-1856
- 96. Das Theresienmonument in Bad Aibling 1834: amtlicher Schriftwechsel
- 99. Zeichnungen zur Reise nach Griechenland, Detailstudien von Köpfen, Händen usw.
- 101. Profilansicht von Thiersch (Gipsabdruck)
- 102. Totenmaske Thiersch's (Gipsabdruck)
- 103. Ansicht von Thiersch's Haus in der Karlstraße sowie Fotografien von seine Silberplaketten, Gedicht zum Abriß des Hauses 1878
- 105. Familienbibel der Amalie von Thiersch. Gedruckt Halle 1785.

Wir meinen, daß nach dieser groben Beschreibung der Quellen des Nachlasses Thierschiana I ihr Reichtum und ihr Wert bezüglich des politischen Lebens in Griechenland in der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts bis zu einem gewissen Grad offenbart wurde.

Natürlich erfolgte die Auswahl der Quellen aufgrund persönlicher Kriterien und mit dem Ziel, alle Ebenen der vielfältigen Aktivitäten des bayerischen Gelehrten und Philhellenen so vollständig wie eben möglich zu decken. Gleichzeitig wurde versucht, im höchstmöglichen Grad interessante historische, philologische, archäologische, politische, journalistische und andere Interessen zufriedenzustellen, in der Hoffnung, daß dadurch Anstöße für eine weiterführende Forschung gegeben werden.

So glauben wir, mit diesem Artikel eine zusammenfassende Darstellung der Thierschiana I, eines Nachlasses von größtem Interesse und größter Wichtigkeit für die Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts, gegeben zu haben.

PAUL D. QUINLAN

THE IMPORTANCE OF QUEEN MARIE IN ROMANIAN HISTORY

Who was the real Queen Marie?

When I first thought about writing a brief article on the importance of Queen Marie in Romanian history, at first I thought it would be so obvious I could do it off the top of my head. But after giving the question serious thought it became increasingly clear that there is still a great deal historians do not know about the real Queen Marie. Finally, I had to conclude that she is really as much of an enigma as her equally puzzling son, King Carol II of Romania. Consequently, in this brief article I will present a sketch of this elusive Queen, mention some of her accomplishments, and in the process probably raise more questions than anything else.

Why do I feel Queen Marie is such a puzzle? During her own lifetime she was one of the best known and admired royal figures in Europe, if not the world. She will probably go down in history as one of the most popular queens of the twentieth century. Yet, since her death in 1938, historians have largely overlooked her. This is especially true of contemporary Romanian historians, who occasionally give her a passing glance, if they even bother to mention her at all, in writing about the first three decades of the twentieth century. Western historians have paid more attention to her, but still the elusive Queen seems to have evaded their grasp. Part of this is because until recently it was difficult, if not impossible, to get at the relevant material in the archives in Romania.

But this is only one side of the story. The Queen herself did an excellent job of covering her own tracks over those aspects of her life she did not want known, both in her published and unpublished diary. Moreover, like many people who keep a diary, especially one meant for publication, the Queen portrayed herself as she wanted to be remembered by posterity, regardless of the historical accuracy. The two most recent biographers of the Queen, Terence Elsberry and Hannah Pakula, relied heavily on the Queen's diary in their studies. So it came as no surprise to me that their overall views of the Queen were similar. The Pakula biography, entitled *The Last Romantic*, is clearly the best study done so far of the Queen and the only study to use the

Queen's unpublished diary. Yet, unfortunately, Pakula does not read German or Romanian, so the sources in those languages, both published and unpublished, were virtually ignored. And to make sure that Pakula understood the "truth" about the fairy-tale Queen and prevent her from flirting with heresy, two self-appointed guardians of the sacred legend of Queen Marie, George Duca, an old friend of the Queen, and Princess Ileana, the Queen's youngest daughter, supplied her with information and, at times, worked closely with her. In short, a definitive biography of Queen Marie still waits to be written.

What was Queen Marie really like? Her family credentials were impeccable. Marie Alexandra Victoria, Princess of Great Britain and Ireland, was born in 1875, the eldest daughter of Alfred, the Duke of Edinburgh, the second son of Queen Victoria of England, and Marie Alexandrovna, the only daughter of Tsar Alexander II of Russia. She was brought up under the close supervision of her stubborn, independent, somewhat eccentric Russian mother, who was determined to make her a queen. Her mother's determination resulted in Marie marrying at the early age of seventeen and to a man she hardly knew and did not love. The man was Crown Prince Ferdinand of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, the heir to the Romanian throne, who himself had been forced to give up a girl he had been madly in love with only shortly before. The uniting of the Romanian throne with those of England and Russia enhanced the prestige of the Romanian royal family and, for better or for worse, set the course of Marie's future life. It is also interesting to note that the reason Marie's mother rushed her daughter into marriage at this time was to head off another suitor, the future King George V of England. In essence, Queen Marie of Romania came within a razor's edge of becoming Queen Marie of England.

As Crown Princess of Romania, Marie was a classic fairy-tale princess. Highly intelligent, charming, outgoing, fluent in several languages, along with a gorgeous figure, golden hair, the bluest of eyes, and a beautiful face, the Crown Princess was considered one of the most beautiful women in the world. If there was one area Marie's critics were in agreement on it was her beauty. "She was the most beautiful woman I ever saw," wrote one acquaintance¹. The Empress Frederick described her as "a dream of beauty. I have seldom seen so lovely a creature. ... She is a perfect picture"².

1. Princess Anne-Marie Callimachi, *Yesterday Was Mine*. (New York: McGraw Hill, 1949), p. 64.

2. Sir Frederick Ponsonby, ed., *The Letters of the Empress Frederick*. (London: Macmillan, 1929), pp. 312-313.

Although when she married she did not even know where Romania was, gradually she developed a deep love for the country and its people. Artistic and hardworking, Marie helped to popularize Romanian folk art, skillfully decorated the interiors and gardens of several Romanian royal palaces, designed her own clothes, and wrote more than fifteen books. Typical of Marie's exotic and provocative interior decorating was her bedroom at Cotroceni, described by one viewer as a "cross between the inside of a church and a harem".

All of this helped to popularize the Romanian royal family both within and outside the country. To millions of poor, illiterate, Romanian peasants she was a living Cinderella. Pakula wrote that it was partly due to Marie's popularity that the peasants "remained faithful" to the dynasty and "did not succumb to the revolutionary frenzy raging around them" during 1918 when it appeared Romania had lost the war³.

Marie once said she wanted to put Romania on the map — a goal she certainly achieved. Undoubtedly, she earned her greatest praise for her tireless and heroic efforts among Romania's sick and wounded during the Balkan Wars and especially during World War I. Wearing the white uniform of a Red Cross nurse, in all kinds of weather and with almost no consideration for her own personal safety, she visited hospitals and cholera camps to pass out cigarettes, to comfort, to encourage, and to console thousands of wounded and dying Romanian soldiers. As R. W. Seton-Watson wrote: "For months she courted danger daily amid the epidemics of the hospitals and the overcrowded city, and set an example of calm and confident endurance which many Romanian women were proud to follow, and which did much to uphold British prestige in South-east Europe"⁴. To the Western Allies she was "the beloved symbol of her country".

Yet, like Cinderella, there was another side to the fairy queen. She was remarkably vain and enraptured with her own beauty. At times she talked about herself as if she was describing the Mona Lisa. In order to have photographs of herself for relatives and friends, she posed for over two straight days, having over four hundred photographs taken from the simple to the sublime. On one occasion, when one of her nephews asked for a portrait, she "signalled to a lady-in-waiting who immediately produced a salver piled with photographs". Marie examined them one by one: "This one is divine. ... Oh!

3. Hannah Pakula, *The Last Romantic*. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), p. 230.

4. R. W. Seton-Watson, *A History of the Roumanians*. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1934), p. 505.

those eyes. ..." One relative claimed that "many people (and probably herself included)" believed her "to be a re-incarnation of Theodora, Empress of Byzantium"⁵.

Far more difficult to access was Marie's political influence. From the outbreak of World War I she was an outspoken champion of the Western Allies, especially her beloved England. To the Germans, Marie "represented the Entente in Bucharest". With old King Carol I, Marie had little, if any, influence, and despite what she wrote in her diary, archival material makes it clear the King never really cared for her. It was the opposite, however, with her weak, indecisive husband. No doubt the strong and constant pressure she put on her husband was an important factor in Romania finally joining the Western Allies in 1916.

Highly ambitious, once Marie got a taste of power she could not live without it. At times she found being a queen and not the king extremely frustrating. "If only he could really be a master, our country needs it so much now", she wrote about her husband. "Oh! Why am I not king! I would go everywhere and see everything and talk to the troops. ... They would adore me. ... I would be a reality amongst them not just a name!"⁶.

Shortly after the war broke out in 1914, there was talk that King Carol I might abdicate and take the Crown Prince with him rather than see Romania intervene against his beloved homeland. Marie made it quite clear to the opposition that if this happened she would remain behind to rule with her eldest son, Prince Carol. In the late winter of 1918, as the despondent King Ferdinand was about to sign the humiliating preliminary peace treaty of Buftea and take Romania out of the war, Marie frantically tried to get her husband to abdicate in favor of Carol again. She failed this time, but her overall efforts to bolster the King's morale helped him to persevere as long as he did. Marie herself always claimed that she never lost her confidence in an Allied victory. Pakula claimed that Marie played an important part in pushing her husband into granting universal suffrage and land reform for the peasants. Through her stamina and devotion to Romania, Marie must be counted as one who helped the country win the war and paved the way for a united, modern Romanian state.

But did the Queen really control the King as Pakula asserted? Apparently

5. Infanta Eulalia, *Courts and Countries after the War*. (London: Hutchinson, 1925), pp. 234-235.

6. Marie, Queen of Romania, "Diary", Casa Regala, Dos. III, Nr. 103, Arhivele Statului, Bucuresti, pp. 69-70.

she did, at least this was the view of those who lived closest to the royal family. Romanian royalists liked to think of Ferdinand and Marie working together as a team. The Queen acted as a liaison with powerful politicians, diplomats, opposition leaders, and with the heads of the Liberal Party, who she was on intimate terms with and shared their ideas. Her outgoing, forceful personality, eloquence and poise, gainfully offset the reticence, shyness, and indecisiveness of the King. Often she worked closely with her husband, listening to his ideas, and providing him with a shoulder to cry on. But it seems the dominant partner of the team was the Queen, especially in the postwar years. She told one visitor to Cotroceni that "it had been 'the throne's salvation' that I had taken the fiddle out of Ferdinand's hands — a habit I could never break once I had tried it"⁷. Eugeniu Buhman, who lived with the royal family for over forty years as secretary to King Carol I, King Ferdinand, Queen Marie, and later King Carol II, said that "in most instances" the King "echoed the ideas of the Queen, and, to a great degree, his actions were determined under her influence. Even in the intimate household of the royal family, measures and decisions once made by the Queen were approved by the King with much or little resistance"⁸. Interesting, powerful, ambitious women acting behind the scenes have become a characteristic of modern Romanian politics. The details of Marie's influence on day to day Romanian politics, however, will have to wait until her definitive biography is written.

Another side of Marie involves her rumored extramarital affairs. Of what interest is a person's love life to history? Should historians even get involved with such a topic? Some say no. Yet, in the case of Queen Marie, her affairs had extensive ramifications and, like a Helen of Troy, helped to change the course of modern Romanian history.

For years contemporaries and later historians have speculated on the juicy topic of Marie's love life. It was common gossip among the European aristocracy of her day that she was unfaithful. Historians, however, such as Elsberry and Pakula, have been more kind, accepting Marie's assertions in her diary that she was completely innocent and simply the victim of slanderous stories. "For many", Marie wrote, "I was 'la Princess Lointaine', living in a country near the Rising Sun; this fired the imagination, and the moment a woman is spoken of as 'pretty' people want to know all about her, she ex-

7. Hamilton Fish Armstrong, *Peace and Counterpeace from Wilson to Hitler*. (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 286.

8. Eugeniu Buhman, "Diary", Copy of the unpublished manuscript in the possession of the author, p. 170.

cites interest more than anything else and gossip would have it that I was tremendously gay, whilst in reality our life was curiously austere and circumscribed. ... I was innocent and truthful. I saw no evil in anything, nor did I imagine others could do so"⁹. Unfortunately, neither Pakula nor Elsberry read German or Romanian; if they did, they would have discovered a wealth of documents showing just the opposite.

Marie had numerous lovers. As a result, scandal after scandal exploded behind the thick, protective facade of Cotroceni and Castle Peleş. One of the most shocking involved the birth of Marie's third child, Princess Marie (Mignon), at the turn of the century. It was whispered among the crowned heads of Europe that Mignon was not Ferdinand's child. In her diary Marie deftly sidetracked the scandal for posterity by tying it into her quarrel with one of Prince Carol's governesses, a certain Miss Winter. Historians, like Pakula, have simply accepted Marie's explanation, even rallying to the defense of the good Queen's name. But the reality of the situation was quite different. In her diary, Marie described her cousin, the Russian Grand Duke Boris, as being "gay, irresponsible", "carefree", and "full of fun". He certainly was all that, along with apparently being the father of her third child. Never mentioned in her diary was the blowout she had with old King Carol several weeks before Mignon was born. According to Buhman, she told the despondent King, right to his face, that Boris was her lover, that the baby was his, and that if Ferdinand refused to accept the child as his own she would divorce him¹⁰. Poor Ferdinand! In order to save the dynasty from a scandal and to avoid the problem of remarrying and having a second family, he gave in. In the final analysis it was perhaps more luck than anything else that saved the Crown Princess from becoming an ex-Crown Princess. Unfortunately, Prince Carol was not as lucky as his mother.

King Carol I, his Queen, Elisabeth, and numerous other figures at the Romanian court who Marie did not get along with took a sound drubbing in her diary. But what Marie failed to tell her readers was that the chief source of her problems with other members of the royal family was not that she was English and young, or that King Carol I was a Germanic disciplinarian who could not stand to see people having fun, but her own infidelity.

But perhaps the greatest tragedy of Marie's affairs was their ramifications on her son and heir to the throne, Prince Carol. As a young boy Carol

9. Marie, Queen of Roumania, *The Story of My life*. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934), p. 439.

10. Buhman, "Diary", p. 172.

greatly admired his mother to the point where it became, as Pakula stated, Oedipal love. Perhaps not surprising, the women Carol fell madly in love with had many of the same personality traits as his mother. As Carol matured and became aware of his mother's lovers, especially Prince Barbu Știrbey, his feelings towards her manifested a sharp dichotomy of love and hate. What was Carol to think? His mother was constantly with Știrbey. Știrbey lived with the royal family. In addition to his official position at court, he was the Queen's special political adviser as well as liaison with the King for the Liberal Party and its leader, Ion Brătianu, who happened to be his brother-in-law. Marie had her own private suite at Buftea, Știrbey's estate, and he had his own apartment at both Cotroceni and the royal palace in Bucharest. Their lengthy affair was so well known among the palace staff that Marie and Știrbey hardly bothered to hide their feelings for each other within the confines of the royal palaces. Certainly a questionable atmosphere for a young, intelligent, highly sensitive boy to be brought up in.

As Crown Prince, Carol came to detest Știrbey and, to a lesser degree, Brătianu. His attitude towards Știrbey, undoubtedly, helped to turn Carol against the Liberal Party.

Interestingly, Marie's attitude towards Carol was also a curious mixture of love and hate. Just after World War I the Queen saved her son from being removed as heir to the throne as a result of his marriage to Zizi Lambrino, a commoner. But six years later she sided with Brătianu in persuading the King to allow him to go to London to attend the funeral of Queen Alexandra, perhaps thinking that he would stay abroad and give up his rights to the throne so he could marry his latest mistress, Elena Lupescu. Being denied a seat on the Regency following her husband's death in 1927, she had mixed feelings about the possibility of Carol returning. She hoped to be the power behind the throne once more. But after Carol returned and it became clear that he was not going to allow her to play the same role with him as King that she played with Ferdinand, she angrily turned against him and became involved in several attempts to remove him from power. As Constantin Argetoianu pointed out, during Carol's first year and a half in power, when he had much of the country behind him, instead of trying to solve the serious problems which faced the nation he spent too much time dealing with intrigues within the royal family, especially the schemes of his ambitious mother.

In summary, who was the real Queen Marie? Was she, as Pakula claimed, the "last romantic", or is this just for those who believe in fairy princesses? Was she a twentieth century Catherine the Great, or a Romanian de Medici? Perhaps, when all is said and done, it was Marie's own vision of herself that comes closest to reality — a modern Theodora, Empress of Byzantium.

SONIA VATEVA

LES POSITIONS DES PARTIS POLITIQUES PRINCIPAUX EN YUGOSLAVIE ET EN GRÈCE FACE À LA QUESTION AGRAIRE APRÈS LA PREMIÈRE GUERRE MONDIALE

La Première guerre mondiale ne résoud pas les problèmes territoriaux et nationaux des petits Etats balkaniques, mais les changements énormes, arrivés après sa fin, déterminent d'une manière durable les tendances du développement économique et sociale ultérieur de ces Etats. La Grande guerre provoque de déplacements considérables des couches historiques. Elle amène à la disparition des unions territoriales et politiques, à la formation de nouveaux Etats et à l'émigration de groupes de population ethnique.

Après la découpe consécutive de la carte européenne, sur la Péninsule balkanique apparaît le nouvel Etat des Serbes, des Croates et des Slovènes. Il est né à la suite de la désintégration de l'Autriche-Hongrie, ce qui représente un résultat direct de la victoire des Pays alliés dans la Première guerre mondiale. De même, les forces centrifuges dans l'empire de l'Autriche-Hongrie engendrées par la lutte pour l'indépendance nationale des peuples slaves, se trouvant à ce temps-là sous sa domination, jouent un rôle important dans ce sens.

Le Royaume des Serbes, des Croates et des Slovènes (RSCS) se heurte, dès le début de son existence, à deux problèmes politiques principaux d'ordre intérieur —la question sociale et la contradiction de caractère nationaliste— conditionnés d'un côté, par la structure économique de la société yougoslave et, d'autre côté, par le mécanisme de la fondation du nouvel Etat. L'acuité du problème social se détermine par les positions opposées des Forces politiques dans le Royaume par rapport à la conservation (et à la suppression) de l'ordre économique et social existant. De sa part, la question agraire représente un aspect important de ce problème social aigu. Quant aux contradictions nationales intérieures dans l'Etat uni, elles percent d'une force permanente sa vie politique durant toute la période de l'entre deux guerres.

Après la fin de la Première guerre mondiale la Grèce, ainsi que le RSCS, s'avère parmi les vainqueurs et elle obtient la Trace de l'Est (sans Constantinople) et le droit de souveraineté dans toute la région de Smirna¹. Or, ces

1. Treaty between the principal allied and associated powers and Greece. Signed at

acquisitions territoriales, d'une portée positive pour le développement de l'économie grecque, se rendent une des causes principales pour l'éclatement de la guerre sanglante entre la Grèce et la Turquie en Asie Mineure. A la suite de la défaite lourde dans cette guerre, l'Etat grec est dressé devant une catastrophe nationale. Après 1922 le trésor public s'avère vide et l'affluence d'un grand nombre de réfugiés (plus d'un million et demie) provoque une crise sociale grave dans le pays. Dès ce moment le problème des réfugiés se maintient un des points les plus névralgiques de la réalité économique et politique d'après guerre en Grèce. En même temps la nécessité de distribuer des terres aux centaines de milliers de réfugiés reflète clairement sur les positions des partis politiques grecs face à la question agraire.

Un des traits caractéristiques de la vie sociale et politique en Grèce représente le système biparti durable, conditionné par l'évolution historique de la société grecque moderne. La lutte entre les deux partis politiques les plus importants dans le Pays —le Parti conservateur et le Parti libéral— représente un reflet du conflit classique entre les forces conservatrices vieilles et la bourgeoisie libérale jeune, cherchant de chemins nouveaux à sa prospérité économique. Pendant la première moitié des années 20 ces deux partis se relayent l'un après l'autre au pouvoir et ils dominent la vie politique en Grèce.

A la différence de la Grèce, le développement politique du RSCS se caractérise par l'existence d'un grand nombre de partis. Par exemple, après 1918 dans le nouvel Etat sont enregistrées plus de trente organisations politiques². Or, la plupart d'eux sont faibles et ne jouent aucun rôle important dans la vie politique du Royaume, respectivement — dans la lutte pour la résolution de la question agraire.

Les particularités de la vie politique des pays balkaniques étudiés, ainsi que le volume limité de cet article, n'imposent dans ce cas que l'analyse des positions des partis politiques principaux qui sont au pouvoir en Yougoslavie³ et en Grèce après la guerre et qui, à cause de cette circonstance, jouent un

Serve, 10, 1920. London, 1920, 199-200; Voir aussi Driault E. - M. Lheritier, *Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce*, v. 5, Paris, 1926, 335-386.

2. Pisarev Ju. A., "Položenje krest'janstva v Serbo-horvato-slovenskom gosudarstve i agrarnaja reforma v 1919" (L'état des agriculteurs dans le Royaume des Serbes, des Croites et de Slovènes et la réforme agraire en 1919), *Učene zapiski instituta slavjanovedenija*, t. 4, M., 1951, p. 167.

3. Royaume des Serbes, des Croites et des Slovènes, c'est le nom officiel de l'Etat jusqu'au coup d'Etat du 6 janvier 1929. Dans l'exposé présent est utilisé aussi le nom Yougoslavie, connu largement dans la littérature historique,

rôle déterminant pour la réglementation législative (plus tard au cours de la mise en pratique aussi) de la réforme agraire yougoslave et grecque. Il importe aussi à marquer que l'essence de la question agraire est exprimée en général par la nécessité d'une répartition nouvelle de la propriété foncière. C'est dans ce sens que la notion "question agraire" est employé dans l'exposé présent.

La tendance durable de l'approfondissement des contradictions dans la vie sociale en Yougoslavie et en Grèce qui s'impose après la Première guerre mondiale a pour résultat l'ébranlement du prestige des partis politiques dans ces pays. Au milieu de l'instabilité sociale, économique et politique générale c'est le rôle de l'Etat qui s'augmente. Une prémisse favorable dans ce sens est le comportement de la bourgeoisie locale dont la faiblesse économique contribue à l'approfondissement du processus d'étatisation pendant des années 20. Cette bourgeoisie ne pouvant pas résister, même sur son propre territoire, à la concurrence des entreprises fortes étrangères a besoin de protection en vue du développement de son activité économique. Or, la protection d'Etat pour l'économie rurale yougoslave et grecque est soumise pas tellement aux buts économiques que aux buts politiques des partis dirigeants dans ces pays. Ce phénomène se manifeste plus clairement dans le RSCS où les nationalités différentes mènent une lutte acharnée pour la prépondérance politique dans le nouvel Etat.

Un des traits caractéristiques de la vie politique yougoslave représente le fait qu'après 1918 la plupart des partis existants gardent leurs physionomies politiques et leurs structures d'organisation dans l'Etat uni et ils continuent à développer leur activité suivant le principe territorial et national. Mais le mécanisme de la formation du RSCS les empêche à participer à parts entières au gouvernement du pays. Au contraire, ce mécanisme contribue à l'augmentation du rôle d'hégémonie des partis serbes bien que les Serbes représentent 39% à peine de toute la population du nouvel Etat⁴.

A cause de l'approfondissement des contradictions sociales le prince Alexander Karagueorguiévitch s'adresse au peuple avec la Proclamation du 6 janvier 1919 où l'on dit: "Je veux qu'on commence sans delais la résolution juste de la question agraire et que les rapports "kmet"⁵ et les grands domaines

4. *Istorija Jugoslavii* (Histoire de la Yougoslavie), t. 2, M., 1963, p. 37.

5. Après la fin de la Première guerre mondiale dans les rapports agraires des regions yougoslaves du Sud existent des survivances de formes semi-féodales de gestion de la terre dont la plus répandue est nommée "kmetchina". Le nom provient du nom "kmet" dont le sens s'approche du nom de paysan dépendant qui paye avec une partie de sa récolte, avec de l'argent ou avec son travail le droit de cultiver un lot de la terre seigneuriale. Sur cette

foncières soient abolis. Dans ces deux cas doit être parcellée parmi les agriculteurs pauvres contre une indemnisation juste pour les anciens propriétaires⁶.

Peu de temps après cette Proclamation une commission est formée avec la tâche de concrétiser les manières de mise en pratique de la nouvelle répartition de la terre. La commission élabore un Projet en vue de la mise en pratique de la réforme agraire, nommé "Règles préliminaires à propos de la préparation de la réforme agraire" et publié le 27 février 1919⁷. Ce document réglemente le changement des rapports agraires, déjà commencé par le partage violent des grands domaines de la part des paysans pauvres. Le projet doit assurer à ceux-ci l'annulation définitive des rapports "kmet" et "kolonat"⁸, de même que tous les rapports analogiques contre une indemnisation juste pour les anciens propriétaires des terres.

Les Règles préliminaires représentent un pas important sur le chemin de l'abolition des survivances semi-féodales dans les rapports agraires de l'économie rurale yougoslave. Après leur publication se dégagent peu à peu les positions des partis et des organisations politiques face à la question de la nouvelle répartition de la propriété foncière.

Parmi les partis politiques les plus forts du RSCS, qui en réalité gouvernent le nouvel Etat durant les premières années d'après guerre, sont le Parti populaire radical et le Parti démocratique.

Le Parti populaire radical de la Serbie (Nicola Pachitch en tête) est le parti des radicaux, dites "vieux"⁹, à la différence du Parti des "jeunes" radicaux

question voir en détail Ivšić M., *Les problèmes agraires en Yougoslavie*, Paris, 1926, 88-96; Fritšer L., "Jugoslavijal", *Agrarna revolucija v Europe* (La révolution agraire en Europe), sous dir. M. Zeringa, M., 1926, 92-96.

6. "Službene novine" od 23 januara 1919. — Cité d'après Erić M., *Agrarna reforma u Jugoslaviji 1918-1941* (La réforme agraire en Yougoslavie 1918-1941), Sarajevo, 1958, p. 153.

7. *Agrarna reforma. Uredbe, Naredbe i Raspisi* (La réforme agraire Règlements, décrets, circulaires), t. 1, Beograd, 1920, 12-18.

8. Une autre forme d'exploitation et de gestion semi-féodale de la terre représente le "kolonate", répandu en général de la côte adriatique yougoslave — Dalmatie et Primorie de Croatie. Voir en détail Ivšić M., *op. cit.*, 276-279; Fritšer L., *op. cit.*, 96-98; Dejanova M., "Agrarni problemi v balkanskite strani" (Les problèmes agraires dans les états balkaniques), *Archiv za stopanska i Socialna politika*, C., 1935, kn. 3, 194-195.

9. Le parti des vieux radicaux est créé en 1881. Ses leaders sont N. Pachitch, M. Protich, M. Vesnitch, L. Novakovitch, Drachkovitch et d'autres. Depuis 1903, le Parti populaire radical est presque sans relâche au pouvoir à l'exception des cas rares où les représentants des autres partis serbes réussissent à tenir pour un certain temps le gouvernail de l'Etat. — Voir *Istorija srpskog naroda* (Histoire de la nation Serbe), 6/1, Beograd, 38-42; Čulinović F., *Jugoslavija između dva rata* (Yougoslavie entre les deux Guerres mondiales), t. 1, Zagreb, 1961, p. 282.

(Lubomir Davidovitch en tête), qui se détache du Parti des "vieux" en 1901. Après la Première guerre mondiale le Parti populaire radical se lie encore plus étroitement qu'auparavant au pouvoir royal. Les radicaux ont une grande influence parmi le peuple grâce à la fin favorable de la guerre mondiale pour la Serbie lors du gouvernement de ceux-ci¹⁰.

Après 1918 dans les rangs du Parti populaire radical entrent des groupes politiques différents du nouveau territoire du Royaume. En résultat, ce Parti s'agrandit et acquiert dans une certaine mesure une caractère général yougoslave. La force et le grand nombre du Parti populaire radical lui permettent de jouer un rôle déterminant dans le gouvernement du pays. Ce Parti est une des rares organisations politiques de la Serbie qui garde et même raffermi ses positions dans la vie sociale après la guerre mondiale.

Le Parti populaire radical n'a pas d'opinion unanime sur la question de la répartition des terres. Cela est conditionné de sa composition hétérogène, d'une part, et de son rapport face à la paysannerie, d'autre part. Un des plus grands adversaires de la réforme agraire se déclare le groupe des radicaux de Voïvodina avec J. Lalochevitch en tête. Ils désapprouvent même l'apparition des Règles préliminaires. Or, la plupart des membres du Parti populaire radical apprécient la réforme en tant qu'une mesure nécessaire pour le moment et ils considèrent qu'elle doit toucher surtout les terres d'Etat, d'église et les terres communales. Ils défendent fermement la grosse propriété foncière privée¹¹. Mais dans les conditions révolutionnaires d'après guerre les radicaux ne peuvent pas opposer catégoriquement aux aspirations des paysans pauvres du parcellement des grands domaines.

C'est pourquoi le Parti populaire radical, étant à ce temps-là une force dominante dans le premier gouvernement de coalition de Stojan Protitch, considère la question de la répartition des terres de manière plus radicale que celle qui imposent les intérêts de la plupart de ses membres. Il se rend compte du profit qu'il peut tirer de la question agraire et il s'efforce à utiliser celle-ci en vue de ses intérêts politiques. Les buts du Parti populaire radical détachent mieux à cet égard au cours de la conférence du 25-28 septembre 1920 quand le programme de parti subit certaines corrections et compléments. Dans ce

10. *Centralen dāržaven istoričeski arhiv [CDIA]*, f. 176, op. 4, a.e. 1812, l. 2-3. [Archives historiques nationales centrales] — Lutzkanov, secrétaire de légation de la Légation bulgare royale, de Belgrad au Ministère des Affaires étrangères et des cultes à Sofia, le 19 octobre 1922.

11. Gadješa N., *Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Sremu. 1919-1941* (La réforme agraire et la colonisation à Srem, 1919-1941), Institut za izučavane istorija Vojvodine, Novi Sad, 1975, p. 53.

programme sont marqués les points principaux qui révèlent dans une certaine mesure la position du Parti sur la question agraire, à savoir :

1. Abolition des rapports féodaux et livrer les terres à ceux qui les cultivaient auparavant dans les conditions de "kmetchina" ou bien de rapports similaires.

2. Mise en pratique d'une colonisation systématique intérieure des volontaires de la guerre, des parents des soldats tués et des paysans sans terres en tenant compte des intérêts d'Etat, surtout des intérêts nationaux.

3. Distribution des terres aux paysans sans terres et aux parents des soldats tués qui ne possèdent pas de terre ou n'en ont pas assez.

4. Parcellement de la terre de l'Etat avant la répartition des domaines privés dans la mesure où ils sont atteints de l'effet de la loi de la réforme agraire.

5. Ces propriétaires qui sont privés de leurs terres doivent recevoir une indemnité pour cause d'expropriation, payée par l'Etat.

6. La mise en pratique de la réforme agraire doit s'effectuer par des moyens légaux.

7. Détermination légale du maximum de la propriété possédée¹².

L'analyse du texte montre que la plupart des exigences mentionnées ci-dessus sont formulées de manière qui permet leur interprétation par rapport à la situation concrète. Donc, lorsque le moment de la prise de position du parti vient, sa direction s'efforce que cette position soit conforme aux intérêts des gros propriétaires fonciers, ainsi qu'à ceux des adhérents de la répartition des grands domaines. De cette manière, les dirigeants du parti visent à garder leurs électeurs et à éviter la scission au sein du parti. Leur position paraît compréhensible se rendant compte aussi du fait que la conférence nationale du Parti populaire radical se tient à la veille des élections parlementaires (pour Skoupchtina).

La conduite de l'autre parti politique principal du RSCS — le Parti démocratique¹³ avec L. Davodovitch en tête est analogue. Le programme du parti souligne le lien étroit qui existe entre la question nationale et la question sociale dans le Royaume. Le parti lance l'idée d'établissement d'une collaboration harmonique des classes sur la base de la "solidarité nationale"

12. Erič M., *op. cit.*, 193-195.

13. Le Parti démocratique se forme en résultat de l'union de quelques vieilles associations politiques bourgeoises; le Parti démocratique de Sv. Pribitchevitch, le Parti indépendant radical de Lub. Davidovitch, le Parti serbe progressiste dont le leader est M. Novakovitch et le Parti populaire avec St. Ribaratch en tête. — Voir Čulinovitch F., *op. cit.*, 278-279.

et au nom de l'union et de l'affermissement du peuple yougoslave. D'après ce programme, l'Etat en tant "qu'organisation qui ignore les classes sociales", doit réconcilier les classes dans la société¹⁴. Or, les principes mentionnés ci-dessus sont violés souvent de la part des démocrates lorsqu'ils prennent le gouvernement de l'Etat. Alors ils défendent l'ordre social existant par tous les moyens possibles que le pouvoir d'Etat leur offre.

Dès la création du Parti démocratique (le 15 février 1919) en elle se forment deux groupes principaux qui se distinguent par leurs conceptions différentes par rapport à la nouvelle répartition de la terre. D'une part, ce sont les représentants de la bourgeoisie serbe nommée "pretchane"¹⁵ pour laquelle la réforme agraire représente une mesure de valeur primordiale, non seulement pour le développement de l'agriculture mais aussi pour l'établissement d'une paix sociale dans l'Etat uni. De l'autre côté se tiennent surtout les représentants des gros propriétaires foncières qui ne partagent pas l'idée de la répartition de la terre.

Sous l'influence du groupe "pretchan", le Parti démocratique manifeste une activité soulignée face à la question de la répartition des terres dans RSCS. Grâce à sa position, les Règles préliminaires pour la préparation de la réforme agraire sont adoptés et publiés malgré la résistance d'une grande partie des radicaux. Le premier ministre du Ministère nouvellement créé de la réforme agraire, Franjo Poljak, est un membre du Parti démocratique.

La position du parti face à la question agraire se dégage plus claire au projet de programme, annoncé en 1920 où il est écrit:

1. Le Parti démocratique approuve la mise en pratique de la réforme agraire et la régulation définitive des rapports agraires en tant qu'une partie positive du programme national d'union.

2. La liquidation du droit féodal doit s'effectuer sans aucune indemnité.

En même temps, le Parti démocratique déclare qu'au nom de la justice sociale et des intérêts nationaux, l'Etat doit assumer la responsabilité pour tous ces propriétaires féodaux qui perdent leurs droits¹⁶.

Les moments essentiels du projet de programme du Parti démocratique montrent que face à la question agraire le parti prend une position plus radicale que celle du parti de N. Pachitch. De même, les démocrates admettent aussi l'imprécision de leur conception par rapport à la réforme agraire. Au

14. *Ibid.*, p. 279.

15. Bourgeoisie nommée "pretchane": c'est la bourgeoisie d'origine serbe qui habite le territoire des terres slaves du Sud de l'ancien empire de l'Autriche-Hongrie.

16. Erič M., *op. cit.*, 197-198.

cours de leurs campagnes électorales ils lèvent même le slogan de "l'expropriation gratuite des grands domaines au profit de ceux qui cultivent la terre"¹⁷. D'autre part, dans le projet de programme, l'opinion concrète des démocrates par rapport à la grosse propriété capitaliste est passée sous silence, c'est à dire, ainsi que les radicaux, ils gardent la possibilité de manoeuvrer en rapport avec la situation politique. Par conséquent, la position du Parti démocratique face à la question de la nouvelle répartition des terres peut être caractérisée en tant qu'un compromis entre les conceptions des différents groupes dans le parti.

La question agraire devient le problème essentiel lors des débats entre les deux groupes parlementaires principaux — celui du Parti populaire radical et celui du Parti démocratique — dans la Skoupchtina (le parlement yougoslave). Comme conséquence vient le fait que la manière de mise en pratique de la réforme agraire devient une condition en vue de la collaboration politique des radicaux avec le Parti démocratique. Les représentants du Parti populaire radical au parlement yougoslave luttent pour la limitation de l'envergure de la réforme et pour la remise des actions pratiques après l'adoption de la nouvelle constitution. De leur part, les démocrates soutiennent le principe, établi par les Règles préliminaires d'une mise en pratique immédiate de la réforme dans le but de limiter l'élan du mouvement paysan¹⁸.

Malgré les contradictions entre le Parti radical et le Parti démocratique, ils mènent une activité pareille par son orientation dans la vie politique. Le profit du pouvoir les unit et chacun de ces deux partis est prédisposé à faire un compromis sur ces points de leurs programmes qui sont en désaccord catégorique avec ceux du Parti opposé. Par exemple au printemps de 1920, les démocrates prennent une position d'attente par rapport à la manière de la nouvelle répartition des terres. En principe, ils ne sont pas d'accord avec la restriction de la réforme agraire, imposée par le gouvernement de St. Protitch, mais ils n'entreprennent rien en réalité pour le changement de la situation. Le 18 mai 1920 un gouvernement, connu sous le nom de gouvernement de la concentration nationale, est formé avec Milenko Vesnitch en tête. Le rôle principal dans ce gouvernement jouent les représentants du Parti démocratique et du Parti populaire radical. N. Krijman, membre du Parti démocratique, est nommé ministre de la réforme agraire¹⁹.

17. CDIA, f. 176, op. 4, a.e. 1812, l. 3.

18. Gligorijević Br., *Demokratska stranka i politički odnosi u KSHS* (Le Parti démocratique et les relations politiques en KSHS), Beograd, 1970, 119-120; Gadješa N., *op. cit.*, 58-60.

19. Gligorijević Br., *op. cit.*, 160-166.

En pratique politique, le Parti populaire radical, tout comme le Parti démocratique, pose au premier plan la résolution du problème national dans le Royaume. En tant que représentants de la bourgeoisie serbe surtout, ces deux partis deviennent des alliés naturels et d'après le secrétaire de la Légation bulgare royale à Belgrade, Lutzkanov, ils représentent cette "concentration bourgeoise" qui en réalité gouverne la Yougoslavie²⁰.

Le Parti populaire radical et le Parti démocratique ne sont pas les seuls promoteurs du pouvoir d'Etat dans le Royaume. D'autres formations politiques prennent part aussi au gouvernement du pays et à la résolution des problèmes sociaux et politiques. Tel est par exemple le Parti populaire de Slovénie qui représente le parti bourgeois clérical, le plus fort du Royaume. Son leader, Anton Korochetz, est un ancien prêtre. Cette organisation politique manifeste clairement son caractère national. Par rapport à la question agraire, sa direction soutient dans une grande mesure la politique des radicaux. Anton Korochetz est nommé vice-premier ministre et ministre des forêts et des mines au premier gouvernement de coalition de St. Protitch²¹.

Le Parti populaire de Slovénie apparaît très souvent comme défenseur des intérêts paysans. Le parti se déclare pour la répartition des grands domaines et leur distribution parmi tous ceux qui ont envie de cultiver la terre. En réalité, il s'efforce à restreindre la portée de la réforme agraire, défendant ainsi les intérêts des gros propriétaires fonciers. Le rapport du parti face à l'indemnité pour cause d'expropriation des gros domaines exprime une tendance de réconciliation. Le rançon payé doit être moyen pour satisfaire en grande mesure les paysans et les gros propriétaires fonciers. Après la publication des Règles préliminaires le Parti populaire de Slovénie les accepte. Mais plus tard, lorsque la vague révolutionnaire d'après guerre s'écoule, la direction du parti insiste sur l'exclusion de la grosse propriété cléricale des cadres de la réforme agraire à Slovénie et réussit même à remporter une victoire²².

Il est évident que la position du Parti populaire de Slovénie par rapport à la nouvelle répartition des terres soit en liaison étroite avec les conditions nationales spécifiques à Slovénie.

L'organisation yougoslave musulmanne est l'autre groupe politique qui mène son activité à la base du régionalisme national. C'est le parti des pro-

20. CDIA, f. 176, op. 4, a.e. 2489, l. 23.

21. Sagadin St., "Državna uprava" (Administration publique), *Jubilarni sbornik života i rada SHS., 1.12.1918-1.12.1928*, Beograd 1928, p. 99. Voir aussi Gligorijević Br., *Parlament i političke stranke u Jugoslaviji 1919-1929*, Beograd, 1979, 40-41.

22. Erič M., op. cit., p. 201. Voir aussi Gligorijević Br., *Parlament i ...*, p. 41.

priétaires fonciers musulmans et de la bourgeoisie urbaine et paysane à Bosna et en Hertzegovina. Son but principal s'avère la conservation des rapports sociaux existants et de la grosse propriété foncière. Mehmed Spaho devient le promoteur de cette position du parti en tant que ministre des forêts et des mines au gouvernement de St. Protitch de pair avec Anton Korochetz²³. Dès l'élaboration des Règles préliminaires pour la préparation de la réforme agraire, dans le gouvernement éclatent de grandes contradictions qui aboutissent le 23 février 1919 à la démission de M. Spaho se déclarant contre la publication imminente de ce document²⁴.

Après l'analyse des faits disponibles s'impose la constatation que les partis politiques qui viennent au pouvoir dans le Royaume juste après la Première guerre mondiale font les efforts pour la résolution de la question agraire sous l'influence du mouvement paysan. Pour atténuer les secousses sociales éventuelles ces partis sont obligés à céder au détriment des intérêts d'une grande partie des gros propriétaires fonciers. En ce sens, les paroles d'Anton Korochetz qui oppose la propagation des idées bolchévistes sur la propriété à l'idée de réformes et non pas à la violence, résonnent d'une façon éloquente²⁵.

Mais la nécessité de la nouvelle répartition des terres et de la liquidation des survivances semi-féodales découle de la logique même du développement capitaliste de la société yougoslave. Les représentants de la bourgeoisie dans le nouvel Etat sont intéressés à la création d'un vaste marché intérieur capable de recevoir la production de l'industrie capitaliste en développement. Cette idée exige d'une part l'unification des régimes agraires dans les différentes régions yougoslaves et de l'autre l'augmentation du capacité d'achat des paysans moyennant la distribution des terres. Cette aspiration à la création de conditions favorables pour le développement ultérieur du capitalisme est reflété dans les programmes des partis politiques traditionnels ainsi que dans les projets agraires des représentants différents de la bourgeoisie libérale du RSCS²⁶.

Or, les partis politiques dirigeants s'occupent dans leur pratique politique surtout de la question de l'arrangement intérieur centralisé ou fédéraliste de l'Etat, négligeant dans une grande mesure les problèmes sociaux et économiques. Par conséquent, les documents de gouvernement par rapport à la nou-

23. Čulinović F., *op. cit.*, p. 286.

24. Gligorijević Br., *Parlament i ...*, p. 43.

25. Erić M., *op. cit.*, p. 201.

26. Pour les projets agraires des différents représentants de la bourgeoisie libérale du RSCS, voir en détail Pisarev Ju. A., *Položenje krest'janstva...*, p. 168 etc.

velle répartition de la terre sont inconsistants, incomplets et démagogiques²⁷. Ces documents sont élaborés de façon à apaiser les paysans et à éviter le mécontentement des gros propriétaires fonciers économiquement forts. En même temps tous les partis venant au pouvoir essayent à utiliser la question de la nouvelle répartition des terres pour leurs buts politiques. Ainsi, dès le début de la réforme agraire dans le Royaume, les motifs de parti, politiques et nationaux, sortent au premier plan devant les principes sociaux et économiques bien que ces derniers soient beaucoup plus essentiels.

L'instabilité politique générale qui s'impose dans le nouvel Etat contribue aussi à l'efficacité médiocre de l'activité des gouvernement dans le domaine économique et social. L'existence d'un grand nombre de partis qui se regroupent sans cesse, affaiblit le front politique gouvernant. Les crises de gouvernement fréquentes, provoquant le chaos dans le Royaume représentent le résultat logique des luttes de coterie.

Comme il est mentionné ci-dessus, la vie politique en Grèce diffère de celle au RSCS par la disposition dissemblable des forces politiques. L'orientation principale du développement social y est déterminée par les deux partis politiques traditionnels —le Parti populaire et le Parti libéral.

Le Parti populaire exprime les intérêts des propriétaires fonciers conservatifs en Grèce qui dans leur majorité se déclarent contre la réforme de l'ordre social existant. Les ailes différentes et les groupes intérieurs du parti sont unis par leur fidélité à la couronne. Ses leaders politiques —D. Gounaris, les frères Théotokis et d'autres— entretiennent des liaisons étroites avec le roi Constantin²⁸.

Dans son activité, le Parti populaire compte en général sur les "vieilles provinces" (Peloponèse et Grèce continentale) où il a le soutien de la grande partie des paysans. La cause de l'influence des forces conservateurs sur la majorité des paysans à l'Ancienne Grèce se cache dans une certaine mesure dans le fait que dans ces provinces les terres sont réparties d'une manière plus régulière et la plupart des agriculteurs sont en même temps propriétaires des lots qui labouraient. Par conséquent, le degré de tension sociale à l'Ancienne Grèce est plus basse en comparaison avec celui des "nouvelles provinces" (Thessalie, Macédoine, Epire) où la grosse propriété semi-féodale prédomine

27. Petranović Br., *Istorija Jugoslavije 1918-1978* (Histoire de la Yougoslavie 1918-1978), Beograd, 1981, p. 42; Mirković M., *Ekonomska historija Jugoslavije* (Histoire économique de la Yougoslavie), Zagreb, 1958, 376-377.

28. Mavrogordatos G. T., *Stillborn Republic. Social Coalitions and Party Strategies in Greece 1922-1936*, University of California Press, 1983, 158-161.

et la question de la nouvelle répartition des terres se maintient trop importante. L'orientation monarchique d'une grande partie de la population locale dans "anciennes provinces" est une condition préalable favorable pour l'influence des conservateurs dans ces régions. Mais malgré les traditions et leur expérience politique, les représentants du Parti populaire cèdent en général par leur force économique et prestige social devant la jeune bourgeoisie libérale en Grèce²⁹.

Le Parti libéral est composé surtout de représentants de la bourgeoisie industrielle et commerciale grecque: financiers, banquiers, industriels etc. Mais le parti attire aussi d'autres couches sociales et des représentants de la petite et moyenne bourgeoisie, ce qui le fait un des partis les plus forts et populaires au pays³⁰. Dans ce sens, son leader E. Venizelos, un des plus importants personnages dans la vie politique en Grèce pendant la première moitié du 20^{ème} siècle, joue un rôle décisif.

L'entrée de la bourgeoisie libérale grecque dans la vie politique active du pays coïncide de temps avec un des plus grandes émeutes paysans de masses —la révolte des paysans à Thessalie en 1909 contre la l'existence de la grosse propriété foncière et les formes semi-féodale d'exploitation³¹. Ainsi, dès le début de son activité, le Parti libéral se heurte à la question grave de la réforme agraire, posée à l'ordre du jour par les paysans de Thessalie.

La bourgeoisie libérale, elle-même, est intéressée à la liquidation des survivances semi-féodales qui entravent le développement du capitalisme dans l'économie grecque. Tout comme ses confrères balkaniques, elle a besoin d'un vaste marché intérieur assurant le développement des forces productives. D'autre part, les libéraux s'efforcent à renforcer leurs positions dans la vie politique ce qui détermine leur conduite modérée lors de la résolution des problèmes sociaux et économiques. Leur prudence se fait voir pendant le travail de l'Assemblée du parlement grec en 1911 lorsque la constitution grecque subit d'importantes corrections. Des discussions véhémentes sont provoquées par la correction de l'article 17 qui réglemente l'indépendance de la propriété privée dans le pays. Les députés de la région de Tricala (Thessalie)

29. Svolopoulos C., "Les partis politiques en Grèce depuis l'indépendance jusqu'à la Deuxième guerre mondiale", *Balkan Studies*, v. 21 (1980), n. 1, 28-30; Mavrogordatos G., *op. cit.*, 158-161.

30. Svolopoulos C., *op. cit.*, p. 30.

31. A ce sujet voir en détail Σιδέρης Α. Δ., *Η γεωργική πολιτική της Ελλάδος κατά την λήξαν εκατονταετία 1833-1933* (La politique agraire de la Grèce dans la dernière centenaire 1833-1933), t. 1, Αθήνα, 1934, 103-106.

se déclarent pour l'expropriation totale de la grosse propriété semi-féodale et pour la création de petites fermes. Ils trouvent un appui de la part du célèbre représentant du Parti libéral A. Papanastassiou. Par contre, les gros propriétaires fonciers expriment leur désaccord s'appuyant au principe que "le droit de propriété est inviolable"³².

E. Venizelos louvoye entre ces deux conceptions opposées. Il se déclare pour l'application du droit de propriété privée en vue des besoins de l'Etat. D'autre part, l'accroissement du danger social (les troubles paysans) exige, d'après lui, l'accomplissement de certaines concessions en faveur des couches pauvres de la population³³. En fin de compte, l'article 17 de la Constitution dans sa rédaction définitive paraît de la façon suivante: "Personne ne peut être privé de sa propriété qu'en cas de profit social ... et toujours avec une récompense préliminaire"³⁴.

A ce sujet on peut dire que la notion de "profit social" est assez large et donne de grandes possibilités d'interprétations. Mais c'est qu'il importe dans le cas est que dans sa nouvelle formule l'article 17 de la Constitution réglemente l'expropriation de la grosse propriété foncière ouvrant la voie à la nouvelle répartition des terres.

A ce temps-là la guerre des pays balkaniques contre la Turquie mûrit et mène à la mobilisation générale en Grèce ce qui éloigne pour une période de temps continue les paysans et les partis politiques du problème de la nouvelle répartition des terres.

La question agraire se pose de nouveau à l'ordre du jour au temps du gouvernement libéral en 1917. En ce temps-là, le pouvoir politique à Athènes se tient entre les mains des conservateurs du Parti populaire. De sa part, E. Venizelos a besoin d'une large base social dans sa lutte contre les forces monarchiques et il fait des efforts pour gagner les paysans grecs. Le 29 décembre 1917, le gouvernement de Salonique publie la loi N 1072 qui légalise en pratique les décrets sur la question agraire promulgués par le gouvernement nommé "provisoire"³⁵. L'importance de la loi N 1072 s'explique par

32. Svoronos N., *Histoire de la Grèce moderne*, Paris, 1972, p. 84.

33. Mavrogordatos G. T., *op. cit.*, p. 158. Voir aussi Nikitina T. V., *Grecija nakanune Prvoj mirovoj vojny i osobennosti vnutripolitičeskogo razvitija* (Grèce à la veille de la première Guerre mondiale et les particularités du développement politique intérieur), M., 1984, p. 86.

34. *Encyclopédie économique des Balkans*, Etat économique des pays balkaniques, Belgrad, 1938, p. 47.

35. Evelpidis C., *La réforme agraire en Grèce*, Athènes 1926, 17-18; Svoronos N., *op. cit.*, p. 95.

le fait qu'elle règlemente l'expropriation forcée d'une partie des grosses propriétés foncières au profit des paysans sans terres sur tout le territoire de la Grèce.

Mais la répartition de la propriété foncière est remise de nouveau à cause de la guerre d'Asie Mineure qui absorbe entièrement la force et l'énergie de toutes les couches sociales en Grèce. La défaite qui s'ensuit au front provoque le mécontentement de tout le peuple. La population d'Athènes, de Salonique, de Pirée et etc. insiste à la punition des coupables pour la catastrophe à venir³⁶.

Dans ces conditions continue la rivalité entre le Parti libéral et le Parti populaire. Le rapport entre les forces change souvent au profit de l'un et de l'autre des partis politiques, ce qui donne la possibilité au corps des officiers supérieurs grecs de prendre le parti des adhérents de Vénizelistes ou de ceux de la monarchie en dépendance de leurs propres intérêts et ambitions.

Le 10 septembre 1922 les officiers antimonarchistes N. Plastiras, St. Gonatas, Al. Hadjikiakou et d'autres font un coup d'Etat connu dans l'histoire sous le nom de "révolution militaire de 1922". Le 14 septembre 1922 le roi Constantin est obligé d'abdiquer en faveur de son fils Georges II et de quitter le pays³⁷. Venant au pouvoir, le nouveau gouvernement libéral accorde l'amnistie aux prisonniers politiques et se déclare pour l'élargissement de la liberté démocratique et pour la mise en pratique de la réforme agraire³⁸.

On peut dire que les partis grecs dirigeants, pareils à ceux du RSCS, entreprennent de changements importants surtout lorsqu'ils sont pressés par les circonstances politiques. La force motrice décisive en Grèce pour la mise en pratique des réformes économiques s'avère la catastrophe d'Asie Mineure et l'influence de centaines de milliers de réfugiés, ce qui entraîne d'après l'historien grec N. Alivizatos "une crise sociale sans précédent" dans la société grecque moderne³⁹.

L'analyse des faits disponibles montre qu'au début des années 20, les partis dirigeants en Yougoslavie et en Grèce déterminent leurs positions face à la question agraire dans une grande mesure en fonction de la situation politique. Il est évident que les gouvernements d'après guerre dans les deux pays

36. Šemenkov K. A., *Grecija. Problemy Sovremennoj istorii* (Grèce. Problèmes de l'histoire contemporaine), M., 1987, 19-20.

37. *Ιστορία του Ελληνικού Έθνους* (Histoire de la nation Grecque), t. ΙΕ', Νέοτερος ελληνισμός από 1913 ως 1941, Αθήνα, 1980, 251-253.

38. Vacalopoulos A., *Histoire de la Grèce moderne 1919-1974*, Paris 1975, p. 235.

39. Alivizatos N., *Les institutions politiques de la Grèce à travers les crises 1922-1974*, Paris, 1979, p. 11.

prennent des mesures concrètes par rapport à la nouvelle répartition des terres avec l'espoir que ces mesures vont contribuer à la stabilisation de l'ordre social, ébranlé par les conséquences sociales, économiques et politiques de la Première guerre mondiale.

Bien sûr, la situation concrète et le rapport différent des forces politiques dans les deux pays conditionnent des nuances spécifiques dans les motifs des partis dirigeants respectifs. Dans le RSCS, où la vie politique intérieure est marquée par la signe des contradictions nationales aiguës, les partis considèrent la réforme agraire en tant que moyen pour la résolution des problèmes nationaux et politiques dans le nouvel Etat. La situation en Grèce où l'ordre social est menacé par la crise économique grave, provoquée par la défaite du pays dans la guerre d'Asie Mineure, est assez différente. La bourgeoisie libérale grecque, à la différence de celle de Yougoslavie, entreprend la nouvelle répartition de la propriété foncière menée par la nécessité de logement des milliers de réfugiés, c'est à dire elle agit poussée surtout par les problèmes sociaux dans le pays.

D'autre part la réforme agraire en Grèce est marquée aussi d'une certaine orientation politique. Les gouvernements visent au moyen de la promulgation de la réforme et son application la distribution des terres aux réfugiés ainsi que l'étouffement du mouvement antimilitaire, "l'apaisement" des couches paysannes et leur détournement de l'orientation gauche. La bourgeoisie libérale grecque obtient de résultats importants dans ce sens. Elle s'avère plus expérimentée et capable de manoeuvrer en comparaison de celle en Yougoslavie. En résultat elle réussit à retenir le mécontentement paysan par la voie des débats politiques inoffensifs. E. Venizelos qui par sa politique souple face à la question agraire contribue dans une grande mesure à la résolution des problèmes, gagne une grande partie de masses paysans. Il contribue aussi à la création d'une meilleure organisation du Parti libéral qui se caractérise par la formation⁴⁰ de sections dans toutes les régions et arrondissements électoraux.

Un bon exemple de l'habileté politique de la bourgeoisie libérale grecque représente "le Parti paysan ouvrier, crée en 1926, qui n'a pas d'analogue respectif en aucun des autres pays balkaniques. Son fondateur est A. Papanastassiou, un des représentants les plus célèbres du Parti libéral. Le Parti paysan ouvrier se forme comme conséquence de la transformation de l'organisation "Union démocratique" (A. Papanastassiou en tête). Ce changement d'après A. Papanastassiou, s'explique par la nécessité ressentie par les

40. Svolopoulos C., *op. cit.*, p. 25.

ouvriers et les paysans désunis "d'union de tous les éléments gauches dans un parti plus grand qui doit lutter d'une part contre la réaction des partis conservateurs et de l'autre contre les communistes"⁴¹.

Le représentant diplomatique bulgare à Athènes émet à ce sujet son opinion selon lequel le nouveau parti dispose de chances de succès comptant sur la bonne activité de propagande de l'Union démocratique précédent⁴². Nous devons ajouter aussi le fait que le Parti paysan ouvrier "surgit" sur la scène politique juste avant les élections parlementaires du 7 novembre 1926, organisées pour la première fois selon la proportionnelle en accord avec la nouvelle électorale⁴³. Dans le cas on peut saisir l'intention de A. Papanastassiou d'attirer à son côté de larges couches paysans et ouvrières dans le but d'assurer le succès électoral de son parti.

Les partis politiques dirigeants dans le RSCS s'efforcent aussi à gagner les paysans dans le but d'élargir leur base sociale. Ce n'est pas par hasard que dans les programmes de ces partis sont formulées une série de demandes économiques au profit du village. Certains d'entre eux se déclarent lors des campagnes électorales même pour l'expropriation des grands domaines et la répartition des terres parmi les paysans sans aucun rançon. Il faut souligner pourtant que les partis politiques grecs se manifestent beaucoup plus agiles, réussissant à attirer dans ses luttes intestines une grande partie des masses paysannes.

Considérant les facteurs pour la promulgation des lois et la mise en pratique des réformes agraires d'après guerre il faut mentionner que les conséquences de la guerre mondiale, ainsi que les appréhensions des partis dirigeants de secousses sociales graves accélèrent le procès de la nouvelle répartition des terres. Mais il ne faut pas oublier aussi le fait que les forces politiques en Yougoslavie et en Grèce déterminent leurs positions face à la question agraire menées par toute une série de raisons économiques. Par exemple c'est la nécessité de liquidation des survivances semi-féodales dans les rapports agraires et la création d'un régime agraire uni de pair avec un vaste marché intérieur pour l'industrie locale. Le problème de la liquidation de la grosse propriété foncière inproductive en Yougoslavie et en Grèce est en liaison étroite aussi avec la tâche des gouvernements d'après guerre de l'accroissement de la production agricole et de l'affermissement de l'économie dans ces pays où l'agriculture représente la branche principale de leurs économies nationales.

41. *CDIA*, f. 176, op. 5, a.e. 269, l. 293-294 — Ivan Dantchev, ministre plénipotentiaire, d'Athènes au Ministère des Affaires étrangères et des cultes à Sofia, le 14 septembre 1926.

42. *Ibid.*, p. 294.

43. Mavrogordatos G. T., *op. cit.*, 88-89.

IOANNIS KAKOULIDIS

LA CONTRIBUTION DES HÉBREUX À L'HISTOIRE
DU PARTI SOCIALISTE-OUVRIER DE GRÈCE (1918-1924)*

D'abord, à titre d'introduction, je voudrais, justifier la limitation de la période historique (1918-1924). Il est vrai que la contribution des Hébreux au mouvement socialiste grec se développe, essentiellement, pendant les années 1909-1924, à savoir, dès la fondation de la Fédération Socialiste-Ouvrière de Salonique (F.O.S.) jusque la transformation du Parti Socialiste-Ouvrier de Grèce (S.E.K.E.) en Parti Communiste de Grèce (K.K.E.). Mais il n'est pas moins vrai que l'historiographie sur la F.O.S. est assez riche, surtout si l'on considère la pauvreté de la bibliographie concernant le mouvement socialiste en Grèce avant la première Guerre Mondiale. C'est pour cette raison que je préfère renvoyer le lecteur, en ce qui concerne la période 1909-1918, à la bibliographie existante¹ et m'occuper exclusivement de la période 1918-1924, qui correspond à la contribution des Hébreux à l'histoire du S.E.K.E.

Je voudrais aussi éclaircir que par le terme "socialistes Hébreux" je désigne les socialistes Hébreux de Salonique (à savoir la F.O.S.), car seulement dans

* Cet article, sous une forme plus générale et sous le titre "La contribution des Hébreux à l'histoire du mouvement socialiste de Grèce", a été présenté comme exposé à une table ronde, organisée par la Communauté Israélite de Salonique et ayant comme sujet générale "Les Hébreux dans l'Histoire Grecque" — Salonique 23.5.1990.

1. Λιάκος Αντώνης, *Η Σοσιαλιστική Εργατική Ομοσπονδία Θεσσαλονίκης και η Σοσιαλιστική Νεολαία. Τα καταστατικά τους* (La Fédération Socialiste Ouvrière de Salonique et la Jeunesse Socialiste. Leurs statuts), Thessalonique 1985, 164 pp., Νούτσος Παναγιώτης (éd.), *Η σοσιαλιστική σκέψη στην Ελλάδα, από το 1875 ως το 1974* (La pensée socialiste en Grèce, de 1875 à 1974), t. 2, Athènes 1991, 551 pp., Μοσκόφ Κωστής, *Εισαγωγικά στην Ιστορία του κινήματος της εργατικής τάξης. Η διαμόρφωση της εθνικής και κοινωνικής συνείδησης στην Ελλάδα* (Introduction à l'histoire du mouvement de la classe ouvrière. La formation de la conscience nationale et sociale en Grèce), Athènes 1985 (2), 530 pp., Λεονταρίτης Γεώργιος, *Το ελληνικό σοσιαλιστικό κίνημα κατά τον πρώτο παγκόσμιο πόλεμο* (Le mouvement socialiste grec pendant la première guerre mondiale), Athènes 1979, 312 pp., Κέντρο Μαρξιστικών Ερευνών (Centre de Recherches Marxistes), *Η σοσιαλιστική οργάνωση Federation Θεσσαλονίκης 1909-1918. Ζητήματα γύρω από την δράση της* (L'organisation socialiste Fédération de Salonique, 1909-1918. Questions autour de son activité), Athènes 1989, 312 pp.

cette ville il y avait des Hébreux ayant eu une contribution particulière au mouvement ouvrier de Grèce. Ce terme inclut aussi le très-petit nombre des socialistes grecs, qui ont été membres de la F.O.S. et porteurs de sa tradition idéologique.

Le choix du sujet et le niveau de développement de l'historiographie du mouvement ouvrier en Grèce imposent une certaine méthode de traitement du sujet. Ainsi j'adopte la méthode de l'histoire événementielle, en suivant la succession chronologique des congrès du S.E.K.E. et les conflits idéologico-politiques. Cette méthode, malgré ses inconvénients, est, selon l'auteur de cet article, indispensable pendant les premiers pas de l'historiographie du mouvement ouvrier en Grèce.

La F.O.S., qui avait joué un rôle capital dans le processus de fondation du S.E.K.E. (Novembre 1918), a accepté l'organisation centraliste du parti nouveau-né. Par conséquent, ses membres deviennent des membres du S.E.K.E. à titre égal, sans discriminations raciales et sans avoir droit à conserver une organisation distincte. Ainsi l'étude de la contribution des Hébreux à l'histoire du S.E.K.E. doit, obligatoirement, se faire à travers l'activité d'individus et de tendances politiques, tant bien que mal, organisées.

La contribution des socialistes Hébreux à la formation de la physionomie politique du S.E.K.E., à travers le congrès fondateur du parti, a été décisive. On peut le constater, d'abord, par une étude de la liste des délégués de ce congrès. Selon cette liste, parmi les 34 délégués du congrès les 7 étaient Hébreux: A. Arditis (F.O.S. et journal "Avanti"), A. Benarogia (F.O.S. et Comité d'Organisation), H. Benroubis (F.O.S.), A. Pinkhas ou Pekhna (Organisation Socialiste de Kavala), I. Karasso et A. Levi (Jeunesse Socialiste de Salonique) et A. Kouriel (député). La F.O.S., la plus grande organisation socialiste de l'époque en Grèce (800 membres environ), avait 10 délégués au congrès. L'élection d'A. Pekhna au poste du président du congrès est aussi très significative à ce propos.

Mais, ce qui est le plus important, c'est la participation de délégués Hébreux —notamment de Benarogia, de Kouriel et d'Arditis— aux discussions, aux commissions diverses, aux propositions de décisions².

A la première importante question, qui a occupé le congrès, à savoir le soutien, de la part du parti, de la république "populaire", en tant que stade

2. Το πρώτο συνέδριο του Σ.Ε.Κ.Ε. Πρακτικά (Le premier congrès du S.E.K.E.), Athènes 1982, p. 147 (par la suite comme "Πρακτικά..."). Smith Ole, "The first congress of the Socialist Workers Party of Greece: Old and new problems", in *Scandinavian Studies in Modern Greek*, No 7-8/1983-1984, pp. 112-114.

de transition vers l'établissement de l'état socialiste, Kouriel, Arditis et Sideris ont joué un rôle principal dans le support de cette position. Le jeune Karasso, au contraire, prenant une position plus "à gauche", s'oppose à une décision du parti sur cette question³.

Au sujet de la Société des Nations (S.D.N.), les délégués ci-dessus prennent position pour celle-ci, mais c'est Pekhna, cette fois-ci, qui ne l'accepte pas⁴.

Quant au problème de la guerre, la F.O.S. impose au congrès sa position, qui est: l'abstinence, en principe, de toute guerre, le désarmement de tous les peuples, et la reconnaissance du droit de défense nationale par une commission d'arbitrage de la S.D.N.⁵.

En ce qui concerne la question agraire, Benarogia balance d'abord entre la nationalisation et l'expropriation de grands domaines et il choisit à la fin la dernière. Mais c'est la proposition de Sideris et de Kouriel, à savoir la nationalisation des tsiphliks (grands domaines semi-féodaux) et de terres conventuelles et leur cession aux communautés de cultivateurs, qui est adopté par le congrès. Les demandes immédiates de la classe ouvrière, formulées, presque exclusivement, par la F.O.S., prouvent aussi sa longue expérience dans le mouvement ouvrier grec⁶.

Tout de même, aucun délégué Hébreu n'a pas été élu au Comité Centrale (C.C.) du parti, à l'exception de Benarogia qui a été élu au Comité de Contrôle (C.Co.)⁷.

Au congrès fondateur de la Confédération Générale d'Ouvriers de Grèce (G.S.E.E.), les délégués de la F.O.S., Benarogia en tête, ont parvenu à obtenir l'organisation de la G.S.E.E. conformément au principe de la lutte de classes⁸.

Tous les faits cités ci-dessus démontrent, à mon avis, la contribution décisive de socialistes Hébreux à la détermination de la physionomie politique de premières organisations ouvrières en Grèce. En général, les délégués Hébreux envisagent les questions politiques sous le même aspect idéologique. Si l'on voulait situer cette idéologie dans le cadre générale du mouvement

3. *Πρακτικά...*, pp. 62-71.

4. *Op. cit.*, pp. 74-80.

5. *Op. cit.*, pp. 83-85.

6. *Op. cit.*, pp. 89-98.

7. *Το Κ.Κ.Ε. Επίσημα Κείμενα* (Le K.K.E. Textes Officiels), Athènes 1974 (2), t. 1, p. 4 (par la suite comme K.K.E.).

8. Benarogia Avraam, *Η πρώτη σταδιοδρομία του ελληνικού προλεταριάτου* (La première carrière du prolétariat grec), Athènes 1986 (2), pp. 117-118 (par la suite comme "Benarogia...").

ouvrier internationale de l'époque, on dirait qu'elle appartenait, à la tendance "centriste" (2^{me} Internationale) et qu'elle n'avait, aucune relation avec les points de vue "bolchevistes-leninistes". Ces points de vue qui bouleversaient le mouvement ouvrier et l'Europe en général, étaient, d'ailleurs, relativement inconnus en Grèce. A part les historiens qui ont indiqué le rôle décisif de délégués Hébreux au congrès fondateur du S.E.K.E., Giannios, qui a été délégué lui-même au congrès et ennemi juré de la F.O.S. et du Benarogia, le confirme à sa façon. Il écrivait dans son journal "Socialismos" (Socialisme) 18.11.1918: "Malheureusement ...il ne s'agissait pas d'un congrès socialiste, mais plutôt du socialisme hébraïque".

Les points de vue "centristes" de la F.O.S. ont amené à un premier conflit politique au 1^{er} Conseil National du S.E.K.E. (Mai 1919). Les délégués au Conseil —notamment Benarogia et Sideris — ont critiqué le C.C. du parti, parce qu'il avait publié le programme du parti en supprimant la clause relative à la S.D.N. et qu'il avait décidé l'adhésion du parti à la 3^{me} Internationale sans en avoir mis au courant la minorité du C.C. Cette critique a provoqué la démission de membres concernés du C.C. A. Benarogia, A. Kouriel et A. Levi ont participé au Conseil en question⁹. Un peu plus tard, le gouvernement fait arrêter et exiler quatre membres de la direction de la G.S.E.E. —parmi eux se trouve Benarogia. Cette action gouvernementale déclenche de vives protestations, tant en Grèce que parmi les socialistes européens¹⁰. Au 2^{me} Conseil National (20.11-8.12.1919), ont participé A. Kouriel et A. Pekhna. A. Benarogia a été élu, à titre d'honneur, au C.Co.¹¹.

Au 2^{me} Congrès du S.E.K.E. (Avril 1920), participent A. Pekhna (Salonique) et A. Kouriel (voix consultative). Au sujet le plus important de l'ordre du jour, à savoir l'adhésion à la 3^{me} Internationale, les deux délégués Hébreux suivent les deux tendances, qui ont apparu dans le S.E.K.E. A. Pekhna —comme d'ailleurs la majorité écrasante de délégués— s'est prononcé pour l'adhésion, en disant que la S.E.K.E. était débarrassé de traditions revisionistes de la 2^{me} Internationale. Au contraire, A. Kouriel a soutenu le détachement du parti de la 2^{me} Internationale, mais il considérait que l'adhésion à la 3^{me} Internationale devrait être suspendu, jusqu'à ce que le S.E.K.E. soit prêt pour l'action finale¹². Le S.E.K.E., dans son rapport au 2^{me} Congrès de

9. K.K.E., pp. 24-25 et 38. "Benarogia...", pp. 128-129.

10. K.K.E., pp. 39-42. "Benarogia...", p. 130.

11. Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères de France. Europe 1918-1940. Grèce. Volume 62, pp. 44 (recto) et 45 (verso).

12. *To K.K.E. από το 1918 ως το 1931. Ένσημα Κείμενα* (Le K.K.E. de 1918 à 1931. Textes Officiels), Athènes 1947, t. 1, p. 47 (par la suite comme *Ένσημα...*).

l'Internationale Communiste (I.C.), a assimilé cette attitude de Kouriel à celle du socialiste français Longuet —centriste bien connu de l'époque¹³. A. Benarogia a été élu de nouveau au C.Co.

Au Congrès Extraordinaire Electoral (Septembre 1920), ont participé A. Kouriel (député), A. Benarogia (Athènes), A. Arditis (Salonique) et Jacques Ventoura (en tant que représentant de la Jeunesse). La question centrale de l'ordre du jour était l'attitude du parti vis-à-vis les élections parlementaires prochaines¹⁴. A. Arditis et A. Benarogia ont argumenté pour la participation du parti aux élections, suivis par la majorité écrasante des délégués¹⁵. Au contraire, A. Sideris et A. Kouriel —fidèles à leurs positions "centristes"— ont soutenu l'adoption d'une proposition de collaboration électorale, de la part des "vénizelistes", en échange de 3-5 sièges de députés¹⁶. Le congrès a élu aussi les candidats à la députation du parti, parmi lesquels on trouve A. Benarogia et A. Arditis (préfecture de Salonique)¹⁷. Aux élections parlementaires qui ont suivi, le S.E.K.E. a obtenu le 90% de votes, selon l'organe journalistique du S.E.K.E. "Ergatikos Agon" (Lutte Ouvrière), dans les sections de vote hébraïques de Salonique¹⁸.

Le printemps de 1921, commence une discussion, dans le S.E.K.E., sur l'admission de 21 conditions, imposées par l'I.C. à tous les partis, qui voulaient y adhérer; le journal du S.E.K.E. "Rizospastis" (Radical) offre ses colonnes pour cette discussion. La F.O.S. apparaît, quant à cette question, divisée, ses membres suivant les deux tendances qui s'affrontent dans le S.E.K.E. à ce moment-là. A. Sideris et A. Kouriel n'admettent pas les 21 conditions. A. Sideris justifie sa position, en se référant à l'état arriéré du parti et de la Grèce en général¹⁹. A. Benarogia et I. Ammon, de l'autre part, s'expriment pour l'admission. A. Benarogia, en répondant à l'argumentation de A. Sideris, admet l'état arriéré de la Grèce, mais il souligne l'influence de capitalisme international. Il en déduit que les principes généraux vont s'appliquer en Grèce aussi, adaptés, bien sûr, à ses conditions spécifiques²⁰. Un peu plus

13. *Rapports adressés au deuxième Congrès de l'Internationale Communiste 1920*, Petrograd 1921, p. 173.

14. *Επίσημα...*, p. 117.

15. *Ριζοσπάστης* (Rizospastis) 18.9.1920, p. 1.

16. Κορδάτος Γιάννης, *Ιστορία της Νέοις Ελλάδας* (Histoire de la Grèce Moderne), Athènes 1958, t. 5, p. 543.

17. *Επίσημα...*, p. 114.

18. *Εργατικός Αγών* (Ergatikos Agon) 22.11.1920, p. 3.

19. *Ριζοσπάστης* 12.3.1921, p. 1.

20. *Op. cit.*, 22.4.1921, p. 1.

tard (Juillet 1921), la 3^{me} Conférence de la Fédération Communiste Balkanique (F.C.B.) va qualifier la tendance politique représentée par Sideris de "semi-centriste" et "dangereuse" pour le S.E.K.E. et recommander au S.E.K.E. de se débarrasser d'éléments pareils²¹. A. Benarogia est arrêté de nouveau après d'incidents violents pendant une manifestation des ouvriers de tabac à Volos (Février 1921) et il va rester emprisonné pendant deux ans environ²².

La 1^{re} Conférence Panhellénique du S.E.K.E. (Février 1922) constitue une étape importante de son évolution. Quant à la politique intérieure du parti, la Conférence déclare que "...le S.E.K.E., parcourant une période d'organisation et de propagande, a besoin d'une existence légale de longue durée..." et que "...étant donné que la Grèce est un pays petit -bourgeois..." le parti doit participer largement "...à tous les luttes et les organismes parlementaires, grâce auxquels il va se faire valoir...". En ce qui concerne les relations du parti avec l'I.C., la Conférence, après avoir déclaré que le parti reste inséparablement lié à l'I.C., fait savoir que le parti admet toutes les décisions des congrès de l'I.C. "...en tant que documents d'importance historique, qui doivent éclairer son chemin, relativement à la période historique que le mouvement parcourt en Grèce..."²³. Les décisions ci-dessus—notamment la deuxième—se trouvaient en opposition évidente avec les positions de l'I.C. et elles ont fini par aiguïser la crise du parti; une crise, qui s'y est manifesté dès par sa naissance. Le seul qui se soit opposé aux décisions de la Conférence, au moment de leur vote, c'était E. Papanastasiou; mais ses opinions ont été repoussées par tous les autres délégués et notamment par A. Pekhna et J. Ventoura. Les commentaires relatifs d'A. Benarogia, dans son livre *Η πρώτη σταδιοδρομία του ελληνικού προλεταριάτου* (La première carrière du prolétariat grec), montrent, par ailleurs que, lui aussi, il a soutenu les décisions de la Conférence²⁴.

Etant donné que les décisions de la Conférence de Février constituent vraiment le point noeudal pour la compréhension de l'histoire, tant du S.E.K.E. en général, que de la tendance particulière représentée par la F.O.S., je vais présenter une hypothèse de travail sur les conditions, qui ont conduit à ces décisions. On a déjà remarqué que les délégués Hébreux aux congrès du S.E.K.E. présentent souvent d'opinions opposées, notamment sur ce qui concerne l'attitude du S.E.K.E. envers l'I.C. et les conséquences politi-

21. *Κομμουνιστική Επιθεώρηση* (Kommounistiki Epitheorisi), No 11/Novembre 1921, p. 410.

22. "Benarogia...", pp. 142-145.

23. *Κομμουνιστική Επιθεώρηση*, No 4/Avril 1922, pp. 172-180.

24. "Benarogia...", pp. 153-154.

ques, en cas d'une admission, sans réserve, des décisions de l'I.C. de la part du parti. En effet, pendant les "années rouges" (1919-1921), plusieurs socialistes modérés —comme ceux de la F.O.S.—, ayant une information défectueuse sur ce qui passait en Russie et sur la politique de l'I.C. et enthousiasmés par la perspective immédiate de la révolution mondiale, se sont placés à côté de l'I.C. Mais, après l'imposition des 21 conditions, qui ne laissaient aucun doute, quant aux exigences de l'I.C. et le 3^{me} Congrès de celle-ci, qui a signifié la fin de la période offensive pour le mouvement socialiste et l'éloignement de la perspective de la révolution mondiale, l'attitude de ces socialistes modérés a radicalement changé. Ils ont révisé le droit de chaque section nationale de l'I.C. de déterminer sa propre politique, en prenant en considération les conditions locales, et ils se sont proclamés pour l'activité politique légale, puisque la perspective de la révolution immédiate a été éloignée. Dans ce schéma général entre aussi le cas de socialistes Hébreux de Grèce. A partir de la Conférence de Février, ils soutiennent unanimement ses positions —qui continuaient d'ailleurs la tradition idéologique de la F.O.S.— et ils ne se différencient plus que sur des questions de tactique.

Après la catastrophe de l'Asie Mineure, la crise du S.E.K.E. s'aiguise encore plus et dans cet ambiance se convoque le Congrès extraordinaire du parti (Octobre-Novembre 1922); J. Ventoura (section de Salonique et Fédération de Jeunesses Communistes de Grèce-O.K.N.E.) y participe. Malgré les attaques contre les décisions de la Conférence de Février —et contre A. Benarogia, en tant qu'un de leurs inspirateurs—, le congrès finit par un compromis entre les diverses tendances et A. Benarogia est réélu au C.Co.²⁵. Au congrès fondateur de l'O.K.N.E. (Novembre-Décembre 1922), par ailleurs, J. Ventoura, M. Ventoura et M. Karasso—provenant de la F.O.S.—sont élus à son C.C.²⁶.

Le conflit entre les diverses tendances du parti éclate ouvertement au Conseil National du S.E.K.E. (Mai 1923). On peut déjà constater, par une étude de la liste des délégués, l'absence de certains membres, parmi lesquels A. Benarogia, qui n'a pas été convoqué. J. Ventoura, qui lui il y participe, critique la non convocation de A. Benarogia et il demande la discussion de la crise du parti et la démission du C.C. Il s'oppose aussi à la décision du Conseil d'annuler les décisions de la Conférence de Février²⁷. En fonction de ses

25. *Επίσημα...*, pp. 196-203.

26. Τσιντζιλάνης Χρήστος, *Ο.Κ.Ν.Ε. 1922-1943. Λενινιστικό μαχητικό σχολείο των νέων* (Ο.Κ.Ν.Ε. 1922-1943. Ecole léniniste combatif des jeunes), Athènes 1989, pp. 54-55.

27. *Ριζοσπάστης* 27.5.1923, pp. 2-3.

positions, J. Ventoura appartient à la tendance "conservatrice" du congrès. Cette tendance tâche de défendre la ligne politique tracée par la Conférence de Février et en même temps les leaders traditionnels du parti. Mais les rapports de force dans le parti ont changé. Des cadres nouveaux—Grecs de l'étranger, Anciens Combattants— se présentent et ils s'efforcent d'imposer une politique conforme aux positions de l'I.C. et eux-mêmes en tant que nouveaux leaders du parti; ayant, dans cet effort, l'assistance active de l'I.C. et de la F.C.B. Il résulte, ainsi, —à part l'annulation des décisions de la Conférence de Février— une enfilade de démissions, de punitions et d'exclusions des cadres du S.E.K.E., parmi lesquels on trouve l'exclusion des ex-députés A. Sideris et A. Kouriel.

Au Congrès Extraordinaire Electorale (Septembre 1923), Benarogia demande le retour au parti de tous les démissionnés et les exclus et la protection du S.E.K.E. contre l'aventurisme et la dissolution. Il affronte, ainsi, la tendance "radicale" du parti, qui, elle, demande l'exclusion de tous les opposants à la direction du parti²⁸. Le C.C. élu—S. Maximos en tête—obtient un compromis, en déclarant que: "...il se conduira envers tous d'une impartialité absolue et il permettra la manifestation de toutes les tendances, de sorte que la lutte au 3me Congrès Ordinaire ne soit pas telle qu'elle était jusqu'à présent, mais qu'elle soit une lutte entre des programmes et de tendances débrouillées..."²⁹.

Cette déclaration du C.C. va être démentie, un peu plus tard. Vers la fin de l'année —et après l'échec de la greve générale d'Août, qui a aggravé la crise du parti —émerge la question de régime (Royauté ou République). Le S.E.K.E., en essayant d'y appliquer les positions du 4me Congrès de l'I.C. sur le gouvernement ouvrier-paysan et les devoirs de partis communistes de pays coloniaux et semi-coloniaux pour le soutien de la révolution bourgeoise-républicaine, prend la position qui suit. Il décide de soutenir l'établissement de la république, mais il déclare qu'il lutte, dès le présent, pour le gouvernement ouvrier-paysan et, le plus tôt possible, pour la démocratie soviétique des ouvriers-paysans; il justifie cette position, par la considération que tout changement, apporté par la classe bourgeoise, ne peut qu'être contre l'intérêt du peuple³⁰. Cette position vraiment contradictoire est contestée, parmi

28. "Benarogia...", p. 165.

29. K.K.E...., pp. 326-327.

30. Pour les décisions relatives du 4me Congrès de l'I.C., voir *Manifestes, Thèses et Résolutions des Quatre Premiers Congrès Mondiaux de l'Internationale Communiste 1919-*

d'autres, par la section de Salonique du S.E.K.E. Un rassemblement public à Salonique, après avoir entendu le discours de A. Benarogia, approuve une déclaration, par laquelle il reconnaît le régime de l'Union Soviétique, comme le seul qui puisse satisfaire à tous les exigences de masses ouvrières, mais, en considérant que cet régime ne peut pas encore être établi en Grèce, il déclare son soutien pour l'établissement de la république, autant que possible popularisée³¹. Cette position —qui nous rappelle celle de la F.O.S. sur la république populaire, au congrès fondateur du S.E.K.E.—est très mal reçue par le C.C. du parti, qui exclut A. Benarogia du parti; d'autres cadres du S.E.K.E. de la tendance "gauche" cette fois, en ont été exclus un peu plus tard, car ils soutenaient la vote pour la Démocratie Soviétique.

La discussion sur la crise du parti continue au Conseil National du S.E.K.E., qui est convoqué en Février de 1924; J. Ventoura (Conseil National) et I. Ammon (Salonique) y participent. Des délégués accusent la section de Salonique, représentée par les deux cadres ci-dessus, de se trouver sous l'influence des "réformistes" exclus. Les représentants de Salonique nient l'accusation, tout en demandant des explications sur les exclusions et notamment sur celle de A. Benarogia. Ils déposent, en plus, une proposition de la section de Salonique, par la quelle, après avoir dénoncé les éléments aventuriers-arrivistes, qui emploient une phraséologie "révolutionnaire", ils demandent du Conseil: 1) Un Congrès de révision 2) L'exclusion des aventuristes 3) Le rétablissement des positions de la Conférence de Février, en tant que programme provisoire du parti 4) Ils soulignent que si le Conseil n'approuve pas la convocation d'un Congrès de révision, la section de Salonique s'en chargera. Le C.C. du parti considère la dernière clause comme coercitive et tendant à la dislocation du parti et il demande des représentants de déclarer leur discipline aux décisions du parti; les représentants ont été ainsi obligés de retirer la clause en question. En cédant plus encore, ils votent pour une proposition, qui impute la crise du parti à l'existence de deux tendances (l'une "réformiste" et l'autre "ultra-révolutionnaire") et qui propose la formation d'un directoire à trois membres et aux pouvoirs illimités pour affronter la crise. Les mêmes représentants votent pour la ratification des exclusions des représentants de deux tendances ci-dessus: celle d'A. Benarogia ("réformiste") et celle d'E. Papanastasiou ("ultra-révolutionnaire"). Le conseil dans sa décision sur l'exclusion d'A. Benarogia déclare que: "...il stigmatise, à la personne

1923, Paris 1934, pp. 158-159. Pour les résolutions correspondants grecques, voir *K.K.E...*, pp. 385-387.

31. *Εφημερίς των Βαλκανίων* (Ephimeris ton Valkanion) 12.11.1923, p. 2.

de A. Benarogia, l'effort de certains individus d'exploiter, de façon démagogique, la position dans le mouvement ouvrier de notre pays, que les luttes de notre parti leur ont rendue, à fin de miner l'existence même de notre parti, en tant que parti révolutionnaire du prolétariat et de fonder une organisation politique anti-communiste et hostile au programme de l'I.C...."³². A. Benarogia, avant même la ratification de son exclusion, fonde, avec d'autres membres de la section de Salonique, le groupe "Νέα Εποχή" (Nouvelle Époque) (N.E.) (Janvier 1924). Cet groupe, sous l'influence évidente de la tradition de la F.O.S., se propose des buts analogues à ceux de la proposition de la section de Salonique au Conseil National de Février 1924. La N.E. va se coaliser, en Février 1924, avec l'"Εργατική Σοσιαλιστική Ένωση" (Union Ouvrière-Socialiste) (E.S.E.), qui a été fondée par G. Georgiadis et A. Sideris. Mais un peu plus tard (été de 1924), la N.E. se retire de cette coalition. Elle impute à l'E.S.E. le refus d'entrer en contact avec l'I.C. et son attitude en général, qui l'amenait "...à sortir définitivement de son entourage idéologique et à identifier son destin avec celui d'un parti bourgeois...". La majorité des membres de la N.E. vont adhérer de nouveau, plus tard, au S.E.K.E. (K.K.E.); une adhésion qui va se prouver, d'une certaine façon, symbolique³³.

En effet, le S.E.K.E., par son 3^{me} Congrès Extraordinaire (26.11-3.12 1924), clôt solennellement cette première période du mouvement socialiste grec, en décidant sa bolchevisation et en changeant son titre en "Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδος" (Parti Communiste de Grèce) (K.K.E.). Ce changement de titre correspond à une transformation effective, au moins potentielle, du parti. Il constitue une rupture avec la tradition du mouvement ouvrier grec, quelque petite que soit cette tradition, et cela sur deux niveaux qui s'entrecomplètent. Au premier niveau, le parti procède à une substitution de ses leaders traditionnels par une nouvelle génération de cadres, qui n'avaient pas l'expérience de leurs prédécesseurs, mais, en échange, ils étaient beaucoup mieux formés, en ce qui concerne le bolchevisme de l'I.C. Au deuxième niveau, le parti rejette sa tradition idéologique, formée surtout par la F.O.S., pour introduire la doctrine de l'I.C. Le S.E.K.E. (K.K.E.) arrive ainsi à s'imposer en tant que le seul représentant de la classe ouvrière. Les dissidents se réduisent à deux alternatives: soit de mener une vie privée, soit de former de petits groupes sans perspectives. Ces alternatives sont aussi

32. *Επίσημα...*, pp. 269-289.

33. "Benarogia...", pp. 168-170 Νικολόπουλος Θεόδωρος, *Η άλλη όψη του Ελληνικού εργατικού κινήματος 1918-1930* (L'autre face du mouvement ouvrier grec 1918-1930), Athènes 1983, pp. 81-86.

valables pour les socialistes Hébreux de Salonique: soit ils accepteraient l'abandon de la tradition idéologique, qui avait été formée, en grande partie, par eux —c'est l'alternative qu'ont choisie surtout les jeunes—, soit "ils iraient chez eux". En tout cas, la contribution particulière des Hébreux à l'évolution du mouvement socialiste en Grèce finit ici, avec la fin de l'histoire du S.E.K.E.

VLASIS VLASIDIS

THE "MACEDONIAN QUESTION" ON THE BULGARIAN POLITICAL
SCENE (1919-23)¹

With the signing of the Treaties of Bucharest and Neuilly, which ended the Balkan Wars and the First World War respectively, Greece regarded the "Macedonian Question" as closed. The same was not true of Bulgaria, however, who had been the great loser in all the confrontations over the occupation of Macedonia since the beginning of the century. For Bulgaria, the "Macedonian Question" remained open throughout the interwar period and engaged the interest not only of the political parties but also of all those agencies who were in a position to exercise any sort of influence at home and abroad. This study examines the effect of the "Macedonian Question" on the Bulgarian political scene, each party's policy towards the problem, and the effects of this policy on its progress. Particular attention is also paid to such extra-parliamentary forces as the Macedonian refugee organisations in Bulgaria, the Macedonian Committees, the armed forces, and the royal family, in an endeavour to present the "Macedonian Question" not only as an issue of Balkan diplomacy but also as a focal point of the internal political developments in the Bulgarian kingdom.

The party which dominated the Bulgarian political scene in the period in question was the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BANU). It was headed by Alexander Stamboliiski, a charismatic leader who promised the much desired agrarian reform, domestic tranquillity, and economic recovery. In the first post-war parliamentary elections, held in 1919, BANU garnered the most votes, though it lacked an absolute majority. This it achieved in the elections held the following year². It continued to meet with an enthusiastic

1. This paper is taken from the writer's yet unfinished thesis "The Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation between the Wars (1918-29) and its Activity in Greek Macedonia". For the scholarship which enabled me to produce this paper, I am grateful to the Museum of the Macedonian Struggle. My thanks are also due to Professor John S. Koliopoulos and Dr Basil C. Gounaris for their valuable comments.

2. In the first elections BANU won 85 parliamentary seats, against 47 for the Communists, 38 for the Socialists, 28 for Malinov's Democrats, and 19 for Teodorov's Narod-

response from the electorate throughout its term of government; indeed, the results of the local elections held in 1921³ and the parliamentary elections held in 1923⁴ indicate that its popularity increased during this time.

As far as foreign policy was concerned, the Stamboliiski government's aims focused on the question of renegotiating Bulgaria's war reparations and acquiring a geographical or economic outlet to the Aegean. To achieve the latter goal, Stamboliiski sought to further Bulgaria's demands by attending such international conferences as those held at Geneva (April-May 1922) and Lausanne (late 1922-early 1923) and also from the forum of the General Assembly of the League of Nations. Bulgaria had joined the League with the concurrence of the other Balkan nations, but this did not mean that the Great Powers supported Bulgaria's revisionary demands⁵. The reasons for this failure lay in Bulgaria's lack of international support during the period in question and in the fact that Greece was involved in a war with Turkey in order to force Turkey to accept the terms of the Treaty of Sevres.

The Great Powers' imminent refusal to satisfy Bulgaria's aspirations prompted Stamboliiski to take steps towards reaching an understanding with Serbia with the aim of uniting Yugoslavia and Bulgaria as a federation. For the sake of these aims the Stamboliiski government was prepared to sacrifice all Bulgarian claims on Yugoslav Macedonia and to agree to the occupation of Thessaloniki by Yugoslavia in exchange for a Bulgarian outlet to the Aegean in Thrace⁶.

niaks. Six months later, in March 1920, BANU won 110 seats, the Communists 50, the Socialists 9, the Democrats 24, the Narodniaks 14, the Progressive Liberals 9, the Radicals 8, Gennadiev's National Liberals 3, and Petrov's National Liberals 3. For a full account of the election results, see D. Petrova, *Samostoiatelno upravlenie na BZNS 1920-1923* [The One Party Rule of the BANU (1920-1923)], Sofia 1988, pp. 33, 85.

3. Αρχειον Υπουργειου Εξωτερικων (AYE) [Foreign Ministry Archives]/Κεντρικη Υπηρεσια (KY) [Central Department], A/1921, A/5/XII/(1), Telegram from Panouryias to Foreign Ministry, Sofia, 21 Oct. 1921, No. 5497.

4. In the elections held on 22 April 1923 BANU won 53.92% of the vote and 212 parliamentary seats. The Bulgarian Communist Party won 19.3% and 16 seats, the Constitutional Bloc 18.28% and 15 seats, and the Social Democrats 2.64% and 2 seats (R. J. Crampton, *A Short History of Modern Bulgaria*, London 1987, p. 97).

5. USA National Archives (henceforth NA), SD Decimal File M 363/27, C. Wilson to Secretary of State, Sofia, 10 Dec. 1922, f. 197. V. Bozinov, "Bulgaria na konferentsite v Genya i Lozana (1922-1923)" [Bulgaria to the Conferences of Geneva and Lozanne], *V tsest na akademik Hristo A. Hristov, Iz sledvaniya po sluytsai 60 godini ot rozdenieto my* [In Honour of the Academician Hristo A. Hristov. From Studies on the Occasion of the Sixtieth Anniversary of His Birth], Sofia 1976, pp. 321-2, 327-37; Crampton, *op. cit.*, 92.

6. AYE/KY, A/1920, A/5/XII/(5), Military Mission in Bulgaria to General Staff.

The negotiations began in 1920 and went on until 1923, with the Serbs repeatedly withdrawing owing to the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (IMRO) and other Bulgarian agencies' opposition to the policy. The Serbs' condition for a successful outcome to the talks was the conclusive cessation of IMRO's terrorist activity in Yugoslav Macedonia⁷. The two sides eventually reached an agreement at Nish in March 1923. The Stamboliiski-Pasich declaration obliged Bulgaria to renounce all claims to Macedonia, to wipe out the Macedonian organisations on Bulgarian soil, and to support a Yugoslav outlet to Thessaloniki. Yugoslavia would support a Bulgarian outlet to the Aegean and defend the Bulgarian government's policy both at home and abroad⁸.

As a consequence of BANU's hopes of reaching an agreement with Yugoslavia, the party adopted a chilly attitude towards the Executive Committee of the Macedonian Brotherhoods⁹ and made every effort to quell IMRO's activities on Yugoslav territory. Specifically, it sought to reduce the Executive Committee's power and influence by integrating the refugees into Bulgarian society. It was for this purpose, indeed, that it created the relevant department of the Ministry of the Interior, the head of which was Alexander Dimitrov, a select BANU cadre and loyal supporter of Stamboliiski¹⁰.

In his efforts to stamp on IMRO's activities Stamboliiski resorted by turns to force, persuasion, and promises. At the end of 1919 he arrested and imprisoned IMRO's leaders, Protogerov and Alexandrov, together with numerous other Macedonian Committee cadres; but the leaders escaped with typical ease. Subsequently, Stamboliiski even tried to use the army against IMRO, but it would not carry out his orders. In 1921 he changed the leadership of the army and of the police in the Petrich area and replaced the

Information bulletin 24 Mar. - 21 Apr. 1920, Sofia, 22 Apr. 1920, No 336 confidential. AYE/KY, A/1920-1921, A/5/(25), Greek Legation in Bulgaria to Foreign Ministry, Sofia, 13/26 Jan. 1921, No 50 confidential. AYE/KY, A/1921, A/5/XII/(15), Telegram from Panouryas to Foreign Ministry, Sofia, 9/27 Mar. 1921. NA, SD Decimal File M 363/27, C. Wilson to Secretary of State, Sofia, 10 Dec. 1922, f. 197.

7. E. Barker, *Macedonia: Its Place in Balkan Power Politics*, London 1950, pp. 24-5.

8. B. J. Whetstone, "Bulgarian Interwar Politics and the Military Solution: The Coups d'Etat of 1923 and 1934", *Bulgarian Historical Review*, 16/3 (1988), 85. S. Troebst, "Die IMPO als Objekt der Einheitsfrontstrategie von Komintern und sowjetrussischer Diplomatie in den Jahren 1923-4" (unpublished postgraduate dissertation, Berlin, 1979, p. 49). Barker, *op. cit.*, 25.

9. Troebst, *op. cit.*, 45.

10. Troebst, *op. cit.*, 47.

guards at the border outposts; but again to little effect¹¹. His inability to combat IMRO effectively led him to conclude a secret agreement with the organisation in 1921, the terms being that IMRO would curtail its activities on Yugoslav territory, while the government would grant tacit support for IMRO action in Greek Macedonia. The agreement would remain in force for the duration of the Bulgaro-Yugoslav talks, which had started up again in the meantime¹². As it turned out, this was not long. IMRO soon began its activities again, and the Stamboliiski government was obliged to condemn a number of comitadjis to death and to pass a law in the *Sobranje* [Parliament] against brigandage, while any citizen who was away from home for more than twenty days and could not account for where he had been was sent to prison¹³. In spite of IMRO, the talks went well and the agreement was eventually signed at Nish; which boded ill not only for the organisation's political line, but also for its very existence. Thus, in the summer of 1921, IMRO no longer had any reason to refuse to be involved in the *coup d'état* which toppled BANU from power and resulted in Stamboliiski's assassination.

The Bulgarian Workers' Social Democratic Party (BWSDP), one of the oldest parties in Bulgaria¹⁴, was the first attempt at political representation by Bulgarian leftwing forces. However, conflicting tendencies within the party pulled it apart in 1903. The split resulted in two parties: the "broad" and the "narrow" Socialists, which latter, after the First World War, changed their name to the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP)¹⁵.

The "broad" Socialists, who were advocates of West European Social Democracy, were well received by the Bulgarian people up to the First World War. The party remained strong in the first post-war election, but in subsequent elections it did so poorly that in 1923 it had only two representatives

11. AYE/KY, A/1919, A/5/V/(5), Greek Military Mission in Bulgaria. Information bulletin, 8 Nov. 1919. AYE/KY, A/1920, A/5/XII/(1), Military Mission in Bulgaria to General Staff, Sofia, 7 July 1920, No 661 confidential. Whetstone, *op. cit.*, 85.

12. AYE/KY, A/1921, A/5/XII/(15), Telegram from Panouryias to Foreign Ministry, Sofia, 20 May/2 June 1921, No 3148.

13. Foreign Office - Public Record Office (henceforth FO) 421/303, Article from the newspaper *Preporod* [Advise] (10 Nov. 1922), enclosure in confidential report No 82, Alban Young to Earl Curzon, Belgrade, 16 Nov. 1922.

14. Concerning the BWSDP's institutive meeting, which took place on 20 July 1891 at Buzludja on Mount Stara Planina, see *Ιστορία του Κομμουνιστικού Κόμματος Βουλγαρίας* [History of the Bulgarian Communist Party], Sofia 1977, p. 20.

15. *Ιστορία*, 35-6.

in the *Sobranje*¹⁶. The reasons for the BWSDP's fall from popularity may be sought both in the general crisis which afflicted all the Socialist parties after the Bolshevik revolution and the creation of separate Communist parties throughout Europe, and in its unfortunate attitude towards BANU. Specifically, instead of acknowledging the democratic nature of the Stamboliiski government and behaving like a responsible opposition party, the BWSDP denounced BANU as an exponent of tyranny and refused to have anything to do with it on a party level¹⁷.

Needless to say, the BWSDP's reduced electoral strength must also have had something to do with the various positions it had adopted in the foreign policy sector. To be precise, the Bulgarian Social Democrats had espoused the West European Socialists' theory that peace should prevail on a pan-European and a local level; with the result that they opposed both the Turco-Italian War of 1911 and the Balkan Wars of 1912-13¹⁸. According to the Social Democrats, the only way to maintain peace in the Balkans was for all the Balkan states, including the European part of the Ottoman Empire, to join together in a single state entity in the form of a federation. Within this Balkan federation the various peoples would live in peace and mutual respect¹⁹.

In principle, this policy was also maintained after the end of the First World War. But the hatred between the Balkan peoples persisted, and when the peace treaties had been signed and the borders fixed, the concept of the Balkan federation became unfeasible and was discreetly shelved. The BWSDP believed that the Bulgarian people were tired of constant wars and wanted only peace, and so it set the preservation of peace as its principal foreign policy goal. But the results of the 1923 elections showed that the voters had forsaken the BWSDP for BANU and the Communist Party, both of which maintained

16. For the results of the parliamentary elections of this period, see Petrova, *op. cit.*, 33, 85, 337.

17. B. Grigorov, "Sotsialdemokratitseskata partia v Bulgaria (Fevryari 1924-Oktovri 1926 g.)" [The Social-Democratic Party in Bulgaria (February 1924 - October 1926)], *Vtressnata politika na Bulgaria prez kapitalizma (1878-1944)* [The Home Policy of Bulgaria during Capitalism (1878-1944)], Sofia 1980, p. 203.

18. L. Bushkoff, "Marxism, Communism and the Revolutionary Tradition in the Balkans 1878-1914: An Analysis and an Interpretation", *East European Quarterly*, 1 (1967-8), 385. L. A. D. Dellin, "Politics and Political Organizations", *Bulgaria: A Volume in the Mid-European Studies Center Series*, London 1957, p. 109. D. Zografski, "Die zweite Internationale und die Balkan-Sozialisten", *Papers Presented at the Vth International Congress of South-East European Research Studies*, Skopje 1988, pp. 68-9.

19. Dellin, *op. cit.*, 109. Zografski, *op. cit.*, 67.

an aggressive stance over the "Macedonian Question". So when the *coup* took place on the 9 June 1923, the Social Democrats decided to support the junta and eventually to play a part in the Tsankov government, represented by Dino Kazasov from the Party's Central Committee²⁰.

The Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) was the continuator of the party of the "narrow" Socialists. At their twenty-second party conference in May 1919, the "narrow" Socialists voted to become a Communist party and adopted a manifesto similar to that of the Bolsheviks²¹. From the start, the BCP maintained strong links with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, with the result that Bulgarian Communists held high positions in the Comintern and Soviet policy was frequently given its first airing by the BCP²².

Although the Bulgarian working class was relatively small, in all the elections held during the period in question the BCP came second to BANU, garnering some 20% of the votes²³. In order to make an effective bid for power, the BCP needed to win over the tens of thousands of refugees who had come to Bulgaria from Macedonia; these remained loyal to the Macedonian Committees and their vote was a decisive factor in political developments in Bulgaria. So the BCP tried to formulate a policy on the "Macedonian Question" which would take political realities into account. These realities amounted to the fact that Bulgaria was a defeated country and was therefore unable dynamically to integrate ethnic Bulgarians from abroad within the borders of the Bulgarian state. Moreover, the BCP's policy had to be consistent with the Communist ideology relating to the co-existence of neighbouring

20. B. Grigorov, "Prominent Figures of the International Socialist Movement and the Bulgarian Workers' Social Democratic Party (United) (1923-1941)", *Bulgarian Historical Review*, 3/2 (1975), 4.

21. E. Atanasova, *Vrski i vzaimootnoshenia mezdy Bulgarskite i Srbskite socialisti 1895-1919 godina* [Relations et rapports reciproques entre les socialistes Bulgares et Serbes (1895-1919)], Sofia 1968, p. 202.

22. AYE/KY, A/1919, A/5/V/(1), The political situation in Bulgaria, enclosure in a Foreign Ministry document to Politis, Athens, 2 May 1919, No 4261 confidential. Dellin, *op. cit.*, 112.

23. In the elections held in August 1919, the BCP won 119,000 votes (18%) and elected 47 representatives. In 1920 its share of the vote rose to 20% and it gained 50 parliamentary seats; while in January 1923, although it retained 19.3% of the overall vote, its parliamentary strength fell to 16 seats, owing to a change in the electoral system. AYE/KY, A/1919, A/5/V/(5), Vice-General Mazarakis, head of the Mission, to Foreign Ministry, Sofia, 7 Aug. 1919, No 511 confidential. AYE/KY, A/1920, A/5/XII/(1), Military Mission in Bulgaria. Information bulletin 26 Feb. - 23 Mar. 1920, Sofia, 22 Mar. 1920. Crampton, *op. cit.*, 97. Bushkoff, *op. cit.*, 395-6.

peoples within a single state structure²⁴. This quest led to the adoption of IMRO's policy, with regard to both longterm aims and everyday practice, adapted in both cases, needless, to say to Leninist models.

So the BCP espoused the cause of autonomy for Macedonia. Thrace, and Dobroudja within the context of a Balkan federation, to which all the Balkan states would belong after the Socialist revolution had won them over²⁵. At the same time, the party was bringing all its influence to bear at the meetings of the Balkan Communist Federation (BCF) to ensure that the decisions taken accorded with its own positions. It is worth noting that for the first few years after the War the BCP regarded the Slavonic-speaking population of Macedonia as part of the Bulgarian nation and the efforts for Macedonian autonomy as a means of rescuing ethnic Bulgarians from the neighbouring countries²⁶.

This policy brought the BCP into conflict with the other Communist parties in the Balkans, particularly the Yugoslav Communist Party (YCP). So, at the Comintern's urging, at the BCF's fifth conference the BCP described Macedonia's Slavonic-speaking population not as a Bulgarian ethnic minority, but as a separate nationality, like the Croats and the Albanians²⁷. It clung to this arbitrary stance even after the fall of Stamboliiski and the ineffectual BCP *coup* of September 1923. The reason this time was the BCP's attempt to win IMRO over and make common cause against the Tsankov government. To this purpose, Vasil Kollarov, Secretary-General of the Comintern, brought his high rank to bear in November 1923 to persuade the sixth BCF conference to adopt a text which stated that the "Macedonian" people wished to be regarded as a nationality and to have their own separate territory independent of other nations. These efforts culminated in the recognition of the people of Pirin's right to secede from Bulgaria and either to become part of the future "Macedonian state" or to be autonomous²⁸. Ultimately,

24. V. Vasilev, "Bulgarskata komynistitseskata partia i makedonskiat vpros (1919-1934)" [Bulgarian Communist Party and the Macedonian Question (1919-1934)], *Bulgarskiat natsionalen vpros sled berlinskia kongres (1878-1914)*, [Bulgaria's National Problem after the Congress of Berlin (1878-1914)], Sofia 1986, pp. 175-6.

25. AYE/KY, A/1919, A/5/V/(1), Proclamation by the extreme Socialists of Bulgaria, "National House, Lions' Square", 30 April 1919, enclosure in Foreign Ministry document to Politis, Athens, 2 May 1919, No 4261 confidential. AYE/KY, A/1919, A/5/V/(5), Proclamation by the Bulgarian Communist Party (Narrow Socialists), 24 Sept. 1919.

26. Vasilev, *op. cit.*, 177-8.

27. Vasilev, *op. cit.*, 179.

28. Vasilev, *op. cit.*, 179-80.

the BCP's approach to IMRO was a failure, because IMRO was dominated by forces which were hostile to the idea of joining up with the Communists.

As well as its policies, the BCP also tried to imitate IMRO's handling of the refugees in Bulgaria. In May 1920, on the initiative of Dimo Hadjdimov, the party began creating organisations for working-class refugees from Macedonia, and a few months later the foundations were laid for the formation of the Union of Communist Refugees "Liberation". These organisations did not manage to attract many refugees, however, because it was a prerequisite that members belong to the working class²⁹; and this failure furnished one more reason for the BCP to try to win over IMRO.

In conclusion, until the failed *coup d'état* of September 1923, the BCP tried to win power through an erroneous implementation of the Leninist policy of the united front both at the top level — by trying to force the Balkan Communist parties to accept its own views on the "Macedonian Question" via the BCF — and at the grass-roots level — by creating refugee organisations. These efforts failed because the other Communist parties were not prepared to give up their share of the vote so that the BCP could come to power, nor would the refugees desert IMRO for the BCP. Tsankov's *coup* took the BCP completely by surprise. Trapped in its firm conviction that BANU was an oligarchic party, it chose to remain neutral during the crucial days of the *coup*. The criticism it received for this from the Comintern ultimately led to a second wrong decision, to put up armed resistance to the Tsankov regime. The BCP's own ill-prepared *putsch* was received with indifference by the Bulgarian people, with the result that it was crushed mainly by the armed forces of IMRO. Thus the BCP was outlawed and most of its cadres fled the country. Amidst this debacle, the party did its best to win allies, even if their ideologies differed. At the end of 1923, IMRO's and the BCP's converging views on the "Macedonian Question" led the Bulgarian Communists to do all in their power to effect a rapprochement with IMRO, even going so far as to espouse the IMRO's most extreme positions. But there was no reason why IMRO should share its dominion either over Pirin or over the refugee organisations: rather than allying itself with a party which, for ideological reasons, would sooner or later turn against it, IMRO preferred Tsankov to remain in power. So the BCP's final move came to nothing.

29. Vasilev, *op. cit.*, 187-8. D. Vlahov, *Momenti za historija od makedonskiot narod* [Moments of the History of the Macedonian Nation] (mimeographed Greek trans. publ. by Institute for Balkan Studies), vol. 2, p. 235. K. Bitoski, "Simeon Kavrakirov: The Leader of IMRO (United) in Bulgaria", *Macedonian Review*, 19 (1989), 25.

In this period the bourgeois forces were very fragmented and gaining an extremely limited electoral response. The principal parties were Malinov's Democrats and Teodorov's Narodniaks (Nationalists); and there were also the Progressives under Danev, the Radicals led by Kosturkov, and the Liberals, who had been split into three parties since before the First World War. These parties' limited representation in the *Sobranje*³⁰ was due, of course, to the conflicts between them, but above all it was a consequence of Bulgaria's defeat in the First World War. The bourgeois parties, some wholeheartedly, others with reservations, had regarded Bulgaria's participation in the War on Germany's side as an opportunity to overturn the Treaty of Bucharest and to expand Bulgaria into Macedonia and Dobroudja. All the bourgeois political parties had held government posts during the First World War and each of them bore some of the blame for the frustration felt by a nation which had fought for several years and now had nothing more to show for it than two national disasters³¹.

Although they differed on various ideological issues, the bourgeois parties were in agreement over the "Macedonian Question": Macedonia was Bulgarian territory and every effort should be made to incorporate it into the Bulgarian state. However, Bulgaria's unfavourable position at the end of the First World War made this an impossible aim to realise. So they opted to seek protection for the Bulgarian minorities living in neighbouring countries³² or generally to press for the revision of the Treaty of Neuilly³³, without, however, abandoning the ultimate aim of Macedonia's being absorbed into the Bulgarian state. The coincidence of the bourgeois parties' views on foreign policy issues, coupled with their terror at the Bulgarian people's steadily increasing support for BANU (which was following a totally different line in domestic and foreign affairs) led to the formation of a powerful opposition. At

30. In the 1919 elections, the Democrats won 28 parliamentary seats, the Narodniaks 19, the Progressives and the Liberals 8, and the Radicals 3 (Petrova, *op. cit.*, 33). A year later, the situation scarcely changed: the Democrats won 24 seats, the Narodniaks 14, the Radicals 8, and the Progressive Liberals 9 (Petrova, *op. cit.*, 85).

31. FO 421/297, Confidential report No 85, Harry Lamb to Earl Curzon, Sofia, 24 Aug. 1919.

32. Archives microfilmes des affaires étrangères (henceforth AMAE), Europe 1918-1940, Bulgarie, vol. 22, Liberal Party Conference, Conference programme, enclosure to Supreme Commander of (French) Armed Forces, 2nd Bureau, Information Department, Bulgaria, 19 Dec. 1920, f. 56.

33. AMAE, Europe 1918-1940, Bulgarie, vol. 29, M. Clement-Cimon to Raymond Poincaré, Belgrade, 20 June 1922, ff. 210-11.

the same time a search was going on for allies outside the political and party sphere.

It was the Narodniaks and the Progressives who took the first step: after talks, they decided to join forces as a single party and call themselves the National Progressives. But it was no easy matter to unite all the bourgeois parties. An initial meeting of representatives of all the parties to discuss the formation of an alliance against Stamboliiski in September 1920 had no conclusive results³⁴. Early in 1921, the National Progressives tried to reach an agreement with the other large opposition party, the Democrats³⁵. The latter were not averse to a general collaboration between the bourgeois parliamentary forces; but they considered it more important to cultivate a close relationship with the Military League and to maintain their old ties with the Macedonian refugee associations³⁶. These forces belonged to an rather unusual political and social movement, the National Alliance, whose aim was to create openings for communication and co-operation between the members of the political parties and prominent figures in Bulgaria's economic life, academics, and representatives of the Military League and IMRO³⁷. Members of the National Alliance included Liapchev and Mollov from the Democratic Party, Atanas Burov from the National Progressive Party, Smilov from the National Liberal Party, and General Lazarov, a leading cadre of the Military League³⁸.

By 1922 the time was ripe for a purely political alliance of all the parties. A new political grouping was created, the Constitutional Bloc, which consisted of the Democrats, the National Progressives, and the Radicals. One of the Bloc's leading lights was Alexander Tsankov³⁹. Directly after it had come

34. FO 421/299, Confidential report No 299, Herbert Dering to Earl Curzon, Sofia, 28 Sept. 1920.

35. AYE/KY, A/1920, A/5/XII(4), Greek Legation in Bulgaria to Foreign Ministry, Sofia, 29 Oct.-11 Nov. 1920, No 2006.

36. AYE/KY, A/1920, A/5/XII(4), Greek Legation in Bulgaria to Foreign Ministry, Information, 5 September 1920, Sofia 7/20 Sept. 1920, No 471. FO 371/5812, Memorandum from Baird enclosed in Baird to Arthur Peel, Constantinople, 16 July 1921, ff. 52-3.

37. Dellin, *op. cit.*, 106. Crampton, *op. cit.*, 96. *Istologia*, 88.

38. V. Georgiev, *Narodniat Cgovor 1921-1923* [People's Alliance 1921-1923], Sofia 1989, p. 108.

39. FO 421/319, Enclosure in confidential report No 40, S. D. Water to Arthur Henderson, Sofia, 26 August 1930. M. Kumanov, "Km istoriata na byrzoaznite i drevnobyrzoaznite polititseski partii v Kiystendilski okrid (1918-1923)" [To the History of the Bourgeois and Petty Bourgeois Political Parties in the Kynstendil District (1918-1923)], *Vtreshnata politika na Bulgaria prez kapitalizma (1878-1944)* [The Home Policy of Bulgaria during Capitalism (1878-1944)], Sofia 1980, pp. 144-5. *Istologia*, 88.

into being, the Constitutional Bloc approached the National Alliance and the understanding reached by the two associations resulted in a broad coalition of all those who were opposed to the Bulgaro-Yugoslav rapprochement and the abandoning of Bulgaria's territorial "rights" in Macedonia. This coalition eventually succeeded in overthrowing the Stamboliiski government⁴⁰.

At the end of 1918, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation reconstituted itself and made Sofia its base. The founders of this new Committee were cadres of the old Macedonian Committees, IMRO, the Verhoven Komitet, and the successive Macedonian Committees of Sofia which were brought into action during the First World War, after the dissolution of IMRO⁴¹. The leading faction consisted of General Alexander Protogerov, Todor Alexandrov, an leading cadre in paramilitary organisations, and Petar Tsaulev, Chief of Ohrid Police⁴².

The main objective of the reconstituted IMRO—which, despite its name was controlled by Verhivist elements—was the incorporation of Macedonia into the Bulgarian state⁴³. But the country's lack of both military strength and international support made this an impossible aim. Once again, it seemed more realistic to pursue the goal of Macedonian autonomy, a solution which was supported both in IMRO proclamations from the beginning of the twentieth century and by the precedent of Eastern Rumelia. The idea of autonomy was regarded as the only viable solution for the salvation of the Bulgarian population of Greek and Yugoslav Macedonia⁴⁴.

The way IMRO saw it was that if these aims were to be realised it was necessary first to arouse the interest of the Great Powers and of international public opinion. And to do this it was essential to create the impression that the indigenous population of Yugoslav and Greek Macedonia was neither Yugoslav nor Greek but a distinct entity in its own right and strongly opposed to the decisions made by the central authorities. It was also vital to incite the

40. AMAE, Europe 1918-1940, *Bulgarie*, vol. 29, M. Clement-Cimon to Raymond Poincaré, Belgrade, 20 June 1923, ff. 210-11. Dellin, *op. cit.*, 106.

41. AYE/KY, A/1919, A/5/II/(1), Mazarakis, Head of the Greek Military Mission in Bulgaria, to Foreign Ministry, Sofia, 23 Dec. 1918, No 28. AYE/KY, A/1919, A/5/II/(1), Coded telegram from Diomidis to Politis, Athens, 23 Jan. 1919, No 260.

42. Troebst, *op. cit.*, 16. Barker, *op. cit.*, 39.

43. AYE/KY, A/1919, A/5/II/(3), Foreign Ministry to Politis, Athens, 10 April 1919, No 2956.

44. FO 421/297, Confidential report No 26, Harry Lamb to Earl Curzon, Sofia, 7 Apr. 1919.

refugees in Bulgaria to agitate to be allowed to return to their homes in Macedonia⁴⁵.

To achieve the first aim, armed forces were dispatched to make it appear as though a revolutionary situation were afoot, as had already been done in the first decade of the twentieth century⁴⁶, and the electorate in Yugoslav and Greek Macedonia was primed to perform as the Organisation wished. The tactics were successful in Yugoslav Macedonia. Numerous bands combed the region south of Skopje, and in Yugoslavia's first post-war parliamentary elections the indigenous population, incited—and intimidated—by Alexandrov, voted overwhelmingly for the YCP and clearly dissociated itself from the rest of the electoral body⁴⁷.

In Greece, however, things did not run so smoothly for IMRO, for it no longer had such strong support there. The Bulgarian population had begun leaving for Bulgaria immediately after the Balkan Wars and the flow had increased to a flood after 1919. In fact, had the protocol for a Greek-Bulgarian exchange of populations been implemented (as laid down by the Treaty of Neuilly), IMRO activity on Greek territory would have been impossible, which was one reason why IMRO fiercely opposed it⁴⁸.

IMRO achieved its second objective—to prince and activate the refugees from Greek and Yugoslav Macedonia—rather more easily by assuming the tutelage of the refugee organisations. The Executive Committee was the supreme administrative organ of the Macedonian refugee organisations in Bulgaria. There were about fifty of these organisations in the country; they dated from the end of the Balkan Wars and each one was named after its members' home town or village⁴⁹. It was the Executive Committee, with Ivan Karadjulov as its President and the newspaper *Narodnost* as its organ, which directed the refugee organisations and raised money for the liberation of

45. AYE/KY, A/1919, A/5/II/(2), Telegram from Kanellopoulos to Politis, Constantinople, 19 July 1919, No 4905.

46. AYE/KY, A/1919, A/5/II/(5), Mazarakis to General Staff, Sofia, 8 Mar. 1919, No 117 confidential. AYE/KY, A/1919, A/5/III/(2), Iatridis to General Staff Thessaloniki, Sofia, 23 Sept. 1919, No 717. AYE/KY, A/1921, A/5/XII/(16), Greek Legation in Prague to Foreign Ministry, Prague, 13/26 Dec. 1920, No 946. Barker, *op. cit.*, 37-8.

47. Barker, *op. cit.*, 23-4. Troebst, *op. cit.*, 24-5, 55.

48. C. A. Macartney, *National States and National Minorities*, London 1934, p. 439.

49. AYE/KY, A/1920, A/5/XII/(5), Military Mission in Bulgaria to War Office, Sofia, 6 May 1920, No 402 confidential. N. Chingo, "The Macedonians in Bulgaria after the Fall of the Fascist Regime", *Macedonian Review*, 7 (1977), 274.

Macedonia⁵⁰. The Committee in fact sought Macedonia's incorporation into Bulgaria, and had sent a memorandum to this effect to the Peace Conference⁵¹. But the difficulty of achieving this goal, allied with IMRO's increasing influence on the Executive Committee, led the latter initially to propose Macedonian autonomy as a preferable alternative to annexation by Bulgaria⁵² and, after 1919, to abandon all hope of annexation and accept Macedonian autonomy as the only possible solution.

In fact, the Executive Committee was a screen for IMRO, which the latter used to keep the refugees together, control their movements and conduct, and provide the necessary capital and human resources to fuel its activity on Yugoslav and Greek territory; and the Committee also served as one more forum to promote IMRO policy both within Bulgaria and abroad. IMRO's catalytic presence in Bulgaria in the inter-war period and its influence on Bulgarian policy towards neighbouring countries was due precisely to the control of the refugee masses which the Executive Committee gave it⁵³.

Apart from the Executive Committee, there were also the Women's Union, the Students' Union, the Union of Macedonian Youth and an organisation called "*Ilinden*"⁵⁴. The last was founded in 1921 by Alexandrov and the Military League for the purpose of providing material aid to the veterans of 1903 who had settled in Bulgaria and of supporting the struggle for the "liberation" of Macedonia. It had its own organ, the newspaper *Ilinden*, espoused a "conservative" ideology, and, like the other organisations, worked alongside the Executive Committee, reinforcing the refugee front and strengthening IMRO's position within Bulgaria⁵⁵.

At the end of 1918, concurrently with the foundation of the Verhovist IMRO, there appeared another Macedonian Committee, the Provisional

50. AYE/KY, A/1919, A/5/V/(7), Mazarakis, Head of Mission to General Staff, Sofia, 17/30 Mar. 1919, No 141. AYE/KY, A/1919, A/5/V/(5), Greek Military Mission in Bulgaria, Information bulletin, 6 Dec. 1919.

51. FO 421/297, Confidential report No 26, Harry Lamb to Earl Curzon, Sofia, 7 April 1919. Vlahov, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, 233.

52. FO 421/297, Confidential report No 26, Harry Lamb to Earl Curzon, Sofia, 7 Apr. 1919.

53. FO 421/297, Confidential report No 26, Harry Lamb to Lord Curzon, Sofia, 7 Apr. 1919. Troebst, *op. cit.*, 10, 19-20.

54. C. Miceva, "Les Emigrés bulgares de la Macédoine et la scission de l'Organisation révolutionnaire intérieure macédonienne en 1928", *Etudes historiques*, 13 (1985), 195.

55. AYE/KY, A/1921, A/5/XII/(7), Greek Legation in Bulgaria to Foreign Ministry, Sofia, 7/20 Sept. 1921, No 5192 confidential. Troebst, *op. cit.*, 37-8.

Representation of the old IMRO. This committee consisted of former supporters of the Sandanski tendency, such as Gortse Petrov, Pavel Hristov, Todor Panitsa, and Dimo Hadjidimov, and sought the unification of Macedonia and its complete independence from its neighbours. The new Macedonian state structure would adopt the Swiss administrative system and grant political and cultural autonomy to all the nationalities living within it⁵⁶. Early in 1919, the Provisional Representation became more active than IMRO, organising meetings and circulating a newspaper and numerous pamphlets arguing the case for autonomy. Needless to say, the Provisional Representation, led by well-known and active komitadjis, went down much better with the Macedonian refugees than the Verhovist IMRO⁵⁷. Indeed, it sent a memorandum to the Paris Peace Conference demanding autonomy for Macedonia, not only on behalf of the refugees in Bulgaria, but, as it claimed, expressing "the desire of all the peoples living in Macedonia to preserve it as an integral and self-existent entity in the Balkans"⁵⁸. It also denounced Alexandrov and Protogerov (who were asking to be accepted as representatives of the inhabitants of Macedonia) at the Conference as "a disgrace to Bulgarian statehood"⁵⁹.

The decisions reached at the Peace Conference disappointed the members of the Provisional Representation and made its future uncertain. In early June 1919, realising the futility of pursuing Macedonian autonomy in the context of the situation established by the Treaty of Neuilly, the organisation finally turned to the solution of an autonomous Macedonia within Yugoslav borders. With this aim in mind, members of the Provisional Representation had meetings with junior cadres at the Yugoslav Embassy in Sofia; but without result⁶⁰. The Provisional Representation broke up in

56. FO 421/297, Enclosure No 1 in confidential report No 51, Harry Lamb to Earl Curzon, Sofia, 27 May 1919. AYE/KY, A/1919, A/5/V/(5), Military Mission in Bulgaria to General Staff, Sofia, 23 Sept. 1919, No 573 confidential. AYE/KY, A/1919, A/5/II/(3), Foreign Ministry to Politis, Athens, 10 Apr. 1919, No 2956. Troebst, *op. cit.*, 39. Vlahov, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, 230.

57. AYE/KY, A/1919, A/5/II/(5), Mazarakis to President of Government, Sofia, 22 Feb. 1919, No 107 confidential. AYE/KY, A/1919, A/5/II/(3), Foreign Ministry to Politis, Athens, 10 Apr. 1919, No 2956. Vlahov, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, 234.

58. AYE/KY, A/1919, A/5/V/(1), newspaper *Byletin* [Bulletin], 2/15 May 1919.

59. AYE/KY, A/1919, A/5/II/(3), Warning to the inhabitants of Macedonia and the Macedonian immigrants in Bulgaria, enclosure in Foreign Ministry document to Politis, Athens, 10 Apr. 1919, No 2956.

60. Troebst, *op. cit.*, 40.

October 1919, when Gortse Petrov and Dimo Hadjidimov clashed over its future. After the collapse, Petrov joined BANU and Hadjidimov the BCP⁶¹. But most of the organisation's cadres, members, and sympathisers turned to the refugee organisations under the Executive Committee and continued their activities there.

Their difference of opinion with the main tendency of the Executive Committee led the former members of the Provisional Representation to break away in October 1920. The new organisation which they formed, the Provisional Committee, envisaged an autonomous Macedonia within a Yugoslav federation, and, in furtherance of this federalist aim, it approached and began to work with similar Turkish, Koutsovlach, and Albanian organisations, though its activities were directed chiefly towards Europe⁶². All this disturbed IMRO, which attempted to make up its differences with the Provisional Committee and induce its members to return to the Executive Committee's fold. The protracted negotiations got nowhere, however. The Provisional Committee's attitude infuriated IMRO, which, in 1923, launched a pogrom against Provisional Committee cadres and ordinary members⁶³. Those who survived sought refuge in Vienna, where, a year later, they helped to found Dimitar Vlahov's IMRO (United). However, the federalist tendency in Bulgaria was more or less annihilated. In subsequent years, the few remaining federalists joined IMRO (United) and once again endured the vengeful wrath of IMRO.

In the period under examination, a decisive role in both Bulgaria's domestic affairs and the "Macedonian Question" was played by the Military League, which was founded in 1919⁶⁴. Its membership consisted of officers on active service and also those who had been forced to retire by the Treaty of Neuilly's restrictions on the Bulgarian armed forces. Many of them were originally from Macedonia. The members of the Military League regarded the Treaty of Neuilly as a humiliation for Bulgaria and the founding of their League as an act of resistance to it.

The Military League initially took a guarded view of BANU's rise to

61. Troebst, *op. cit.*, 41. Vlahov, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, 234. J. Swire, *Bulgarian Conspiracy*, London 1939, p. 145.

62. Barker, *op. cit.*, 39-40. Troebst, *op. cit.*, 32-3.

63. Troebst, *op. cit.*, 34-5. Swire, *op. cit.*, 34-5.

64. AYE/KY, A/1919, A/5/V/(5), Greek Military Mission in Bulgaria. Information bulletin, 8 Nov. 1919. Whetstone, *op. cit.*, 83.

power. But it found Stamboliiski's efforts to reach an agreement with Yugoslavia and the final interment of the dream of the Great Bulgaria unacceptable, and its aim thenceforth became to oust Stamboliiski and replace him with a dictatorship run by its own members, or at least by politicians who shared the League's ideas⁶⁵. But the Bulgarian people's enthusiastic response to BANU made it difficult to overthrow Stamboliiski. The League therefore launched itself into a quest for allies, whom it found amongst the Democrats and the members of IMRO⁶⁶. The latter's activities in Yugoslav Macedonia placed a tremendous obstacle in the way of the Bulgaro-Yugoslav talks. The Military League donated the huge sum of two million leva to IMRO to help it escalate its activities, and also promised that the army would abstain from any action against IMRO in Pirin⁶⁷.

The League tried to overthrow Stamboliiski three times. On the first two occasions (in December 1920 and January 1923), the plot was discovered before the *coup* could take place⁶⁸. But Stamboliiski's tepid reaction to the aspiring junta and the announcement of the Nish agreements spurred the Military League to act with IMRO and the bourgeois parties to topple Stamboliiski before the agreements could be ratified by BANU's parliamentary majority⁶⁹. The *coup* took place successfully in June 1923, conducted chiefly by members of the Military League, with IMRO forces standing by ready to intervene if necessary⁷⁰. Stamboliiski and a number of BANU cadres were assassinated, and many other cadres and supporters were forced to flee the country. The Tsankov government, which came to power with the junta's support, was subsequently to bury the Bulgaro-Yugoslav rapprochement. It openly supported IMRO and practised a revanchist policy towards Yugoslavia in particular and also towards Greece, based, of course, on Italian support.

65. FO 421/299, Confidential report No 84, Herbert Dering to Earl Curzon, Sofia, 28 Sept. 1920. AYE/KY, A/1920, A/5/XII/(5), Military Mission in Bulgaria to General Staff. Information bulletin, 24 Mar. - 21 Apr. 1920, Sofia, 22 Apr. 1920, No 336 confidential.¹

66. AYE/KY, A/1920, A/5/XII/(4), Greek Legation in Bulgaria to Foreign Ministry, Information, 5 Sept. 1920, Sofia, 7/20 Sept. 1920, No 471. Troebst, *op. cit.*, 51.

67. AYE/KY, B/1920, B/59/(10), Foreign Ministry, Code Office. Except from information bulletin, 26 Feb. - 23 Mar. 1920. Troebst, *op. cit.*, 51.

68. AYE/KY, A/1920-1921, A/5/(25), Greek Legation in Bulgaria, Sofia, 22 Dec. 1920, No 2659. Whetstone, *op. cit.*, 86.

69. FO 421/304, Confidential report No 94, William Erskine to Earl Curzon, Sofia, 14 June 1923, Troebst, *op. cit.*, 31.

70. FO 421/304, Confidential report No 99, William Erskine to Earl Curzon, Sofia, 20 June 1923. AMAE Europe 1918-1940, Bulgarie, vol. 29, Georges Picot to Raymond Poincaré, Sofia, 30 June 1923, ff. 269-70.

The royal family had also come out against the Bulgaro-Yugoslav rapprochement and in favour of reviving the "Macedonian Question" by fanning the flames of irredentism. King Boris was hostile to any union between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, believing that the royal families of both countries would have no place in the new state structure. At best, the role of king would devolve upon Alexander of Yugoslavia, since Yugoslavia had been on the winning side at the end of the First World War and was clearly stronger than Bulgaria in every respect⁷¹. Boris was not powerful enough to bring down the BANU government nor to force Stamboliiski to revise his foreign policy. The Bulgarian people had not yet forgotten the painful experiences of the First World War, which had been largely due to the choices made by his predecessor Ferdinand. Furthermore, he had little support in the political world. He therefore elected to act as mediator to bring together all the forces which had the desire and the power to overthrow Stamboliiski. Specifically, when the representatives of the Military League and the bourgeois parties approached Boris a few months before the *coup d'état* and asked for his help, he refused to play an active part; but he did advise them to study and emulate the methods employed by Kemal Atatürk to prepare and carry out the putsch in Turkey⁷². Also, the rapprochement between IMRO and the Military League was due in large part to the personal friendship between Boris and Protogerov⁷³.

It was not Boris who conceived the idea of toppling Stamboliiski, nor did he play an active part in the bloody *coup*. But the royal endorsement of the seditious plans and the National Alliance together formed the cohesive bond between those forces which, loyal to the dream of the Great Bulgaria, were contemplating the overthrow of BANU and its replacement with a government whose goal would be the unification of Macedonia with the kingdom of Bulgaria.

From all that has been said above, it is clear that the "Macedonian Question" was one of the most important issues which preoccupied the political world and public opinion in Bulgaria. As far as foreign policy was concerned, the "Macedonian Question" was a source of friction with neighbouring

71. FO 421/318, Confidential report No 65, Neville Henderson to A. Henderson, Belgrade, 26 Mar. 1930. Barker, *op. cit.*, 22, 38-9.

72. AMAE Europe 1918-1940, Bulgarie, vol. 29, Georges Picot to Raymond Poincaré, Sofia, 16 June 1923, f. 163.

73. Troebst, *op. cit.*, 51.

countries. And within Bulgaria itself, no-one could ignore the tens of thousands of Macedonian refugees, whose vote did much to determine election results—as was also the case in neighbouring Greece. All the parties therefore adopted clear, though not always unwavering, positions on the “Macedonian Question”. The single common denominator in all these policies was the desire to reverse the territorial *status quo* imposed by the Treaty of Neuilly. The only party which tried to take a different line, the BWSDP, saw its strength dwindle to such an extent that it was forced to throw in its lot with the Tsankov regime in order not to disappear altogether.

The policies adopted by the other parties may be summed up as follows. On the one hand, there were the right and centre-right parties, which sought the direct or indirect incorporation of Macedonian territory into Bulgaria; and on the other, the parties at the left-wing end of the political spectrum, which were trying to go beyond the doctrines of Bulgarian foreign policy. Their efforts were, if not applauded, then at least tolerated by the electorate; but they jeopardised the interests—and sometimes the very existence—of important factors in Bulgarian society, such as the royal family, the Macedonian Committees, the refugee organisations, and the armed forces. The *Sobranje*’s imminent ratification of the Bulgaro-Yugoslav rapprochement, on the initiative of the parliamentary omnipotent Stamboliiski, made it imperative that the opposing forces unite to remove him forcibly from power. All the same, in subsequent years, the change of political scenery contributed very little to the success of the plans for a Great Bulgaria.

IRENA STAWOWY-KAWKA

L'EUROPE DU SUD-EST DANS LA POLITIQUE ÉCONOMIQUE DU TROISIÈME REICH (1933-1939)

I.

Sur les relations économiques entre le Troisième Reich et les pays de l'Europe du Sud-Est il existe parmi les historiens une quasi-unanimité: à la veille de la guerre tous ces pays constituaient pour le Reich une base d'alimentation et de matières premières.

Cette thèse s'est trouvée reflétée par les théories et mots-d'ordre que les économistes allemands prônaient à l'époque de l'entre-deux guerres. Depuis les temps de la grande crise on pouvait observer en Allemagne un retour aux idées de l'organisation de l'Europe, idées lancées tout d'abord avant 1914 par F. List et W. Rathenau, puis développées en 1916 par F. Naumann. A partir de 1930 la conception de la *Mitteleuropa* apparaissait de plus en plus fréquemment sous l'appellation "*Grossraumwirtschaft*" dans les milieux du national-socialisme. Depuis 1933 cette théorie est devenue le principe auquel faisaient référence plus ou moins souvent tous les économistes. Selon leurs conceptions, le bassin du Danube devait jouer un rôle important de partenaire économique du Reich. A l'époque qui précédait le début de la guerre, sont apparus de nombreuses études sur ce sujet. Les principaux auteurs et théoriciens de la doctrine "*Grossraumwirtschaft*" étaient: Werner Daitz, Friedrich Bülow, Bruno Krasewether, Andreas Predöhl et d'autres. Ils présentaient les objectifs, les principes de fonctionnement ainsi que les formes de réalisation de "*Grossraumwirtschaft*".

W. Daitz¹, expert et théoricien national dans le Département de la politique étrangère du parti NSDAP d'A. Rosenberg (Aussenpolitisches Amt der NSDAP), a pris la parole publiquement pour la première fois déjà en 1932. Il proposait la création d'un "grand espace économique" à l'échelle du continent européen, et qui, de même que le mot-d'ordre "L'Europe pour les

1. W. Daitz, *Der Weg zur Volkswirtschaft, Grossraumwirtschaft und Grossraumpolitik*, Dresden 1943, p. 10, 94.

Européens", était l'un des éléments essentiels de l'idéologie du national-socialisme. Ce grand espace économique devait s'étendre du Gibraltar jusqu'à l'Oural et du Nordcap jusqu'aux confins nords de l'Afrique.

Dans les conceptions du "grand espace économique" ses auteurs mettaient l'accent sur le postulat d'autarcie économique, c'est-à-dire d'une autosuffisance totale dans le domaine des matières premières et de la production, ce qui apparaissait comme indispensable surtout dans les conditions d'un conflit et d'un blocus qui lors de la guerre précédente avaient entraîné pour le Reich des conséquences désastreuses. Les partisans de l'autarcie prônaient la nécessité de créer un "grand espace économique" qui aurait englobé l'Europe Centrale et l'Europe du Sud-Est. Dans cette zone domineraient les intérêts allemands, et l'industrie allemande en échange de ses produits pourrait puiser dans ces pays moins développés sur le plan industriel les matières premières dont l'Allemagne aurait besoin pour la production.

La question que nous voudrions poser est celle de savoir quels étaient les résultats des projets allemands ainsi dessinés?

La plupart des historiens qui étudient les relations en Allemagne nazie et en Europe du Sud-Est estimaient que l'Allemagne exploitait sa supériorité économique par rapport aux pays moins industrialisés, en leur imposant ses conditions. Ces analyses sont apparues déjà au début des années quarante et ont influencé par la suite les opinions des chercheurs dans ce domaine². Les échanges économiques croissants étaient souvent interprétés comme la première étape de la création de l'autarcique "Grossraumwirtschaft". Cependant, comme le soulignait W. Treue³, dans les efforts persistants des Allemands il ne s'agissait pas de créer les possibilités d'accroître seulement le commerce des céréales mais d'introduire des changements essentiels qui influenceraient la totalité de l'économie nationale de certains pays de l'Europe du Sud-Est. Comme objectif on a adopté une telle transformation de l'économie de l'Europe du Sud-Est qu'il soit possible de l'intégrer au plan économique allemand de sorte à ce que l'industrie des pays balkaniques apte à exploiter devienne une base économique-alimentaire avec un faible niveau de vie. C'est pourquoi H. E. Volkmann⁴ en soutenant la thèse que dans le

2. H. S. Ellis, *Exchange Control in Central Europe*, Cambridge/Massachusetts 1941.

3. W. Treue, "Das Dritte Reich und die Westmächte auf dem Balkan. Zur Struktur der Aussenhandelspolitik Deutschlands, Grossbritaniens und Frankreichs 1933-1939", dans *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 1953, p. 54.

4. H. E. Volkmann, "Aussenhandel und Aufrüstung in Deutschland 1933, bis 1939", dans F. Forstmeier, H. E. Volkmann, Ed., *Wirtschaft und Rüstung am Vorabend des Zweiten Weltkrieges*, Düsseldorf 1975, p. 110.

Troisième Reich le commerce extérieur traduisait la lutte pour acquérir le pouvoir politique et économique a présenté "Grossraumwirtschaft" en tant que moyen qui aurait pu assurer une plus grande sécurité stratégique lors de la prochaine guerre. Cette opinion est aussi partagée par J. Niehans⁵ qui avait formulé la thèse d'après laquelle tout le commerce et les arguments conjoncturels soutenant l'autosuffisance n'étaient qu'un prétexte de second ordre par rapport aux "fondements économiques et militaires de l'autarcie".

Certains des historiens allemands attiraient l'attention sur d'autres aspects de la dépendance qui subsistait entre les pays de l'Europe du Sud-Est et l'Allemagne. H. J. Schröder⁶ soulignait que la dépendance économique de ces pays envers l'Allemagne a entraîné une dépendance politique et déjà dans la seconde moitié des années trente on pouvait considérer les pays de cette région comme un "Empire Informel" du Troisième Reich. Le même point de vue était présenté par K. Olshausen⁷ qui soulignait l'importance des dépendances non seulement d'ordre économique mais aussi politique. Effectivement, la mise à l'écart des puissances occidentales dans cette région, ainsi que l'expansion économique de l'Allemagne avait provoqué une dépendance économique et aussi politique. Un historien yougoslave, S. Dimitrijević⁸ estimait que la Yougoslavie, et cela depuis 1936, avait le status d'une semi-colonie, et cette dépendance ne faisait que s'accroître à la veille de la guerre par le fait des importations croissantes des matières premières de la part de l'Allemagne. E. Campus⁹ disait que: "à l'époque de automne-hiver 1939/1940 il est devenu évident que la Roumanie fasciste était considérée comme une zone attachée au Reich car en réalité les Allemands l'exploitaient selon leurs objectifs en utilisant au plus haut degré leur supériorité".

De plus en plus souvent apparaissaient toutefois des opinions différentes. A. S. Milward¹⁰ tout en étant d'accord avec la thèse que le caractère bilatéral

5. J. Niehans, *Der Gedanke der Autarkie im Merkantilismus von einst und Neomerkantilismus von gestern*, Zürich 1945, p. 125.

6. H. J. Schröder, "Südosteuropa als "Informal Empire" Deutschlands 1933-1939. Das Beispiel Jugoslawiens", dans *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, t. 23, 1975, p. 92.

7. K. Olshausen, "Die deutsche Balkanpolitik 1940-1941", dans *Hitler, Deutschland und die Mächte, Materialien zur Aussenpolitik des Dritten Reiches*, Ed. M. Funke, Düsseldorf 1976, p. 708.

8. S. Dimitrijević, *Das ausländische Kapital in Jugoslawien vor dem Zweiten Weltkrieg*, Berlin 1963, p. 307.

9. E. Campus, "Die hitlerfaschistische Infiltration Rumäniens 1939-1940", *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, Heft 2, 1957, p. 226.

10. A. S. Milward, "The Reichsmark Block and the International Economy", dans G.

des relations commerciales avec l'étranger constituait un pas vers la création de l'autarcie dans le cadre de "Grossraumwirtschaft", indiquait que l'exploitation des pays du Sud-Est de l'Europe par les Allemands n'avait pas eu lieu. Selon lui, ce sont justement ces pays qui en utilisant le mouvement commercial bilatéral se sont vu ouvrir des marchés de vente de leurs matières premières. Qui plus est, ces relations ont permis à des pays faiblement développés et principalement agricoles de créer grâce à l'exportation les conditions nécessaires à l'industrialisation et à la croissance économique. De même, J. Wuescht¹¹ soulignait que le "profond rattachement économique" des deux pays (l'Allemagne et la Yougoslavie... I. S-K), dans les moments décisifs de l'histoire de la Yougoslavie n'avait pas entravé sa souveraine liberté économique. Comme preuve de cet état des choses l'auteur cite le coup d'Etat à Belgrade le 27 mars 1941.

Ces divergeances dans les opinions ont fait que les historiens ont de nouveau abordé ce problème. Dans le présent article nous ne présenterons qu'un seul aspect de la totalité des relations réciproques entre le Troisième Reich et les pays de l'Europe du Sud-Est, à savoir l'aspect des relations commerciales.

II.

Comme base à la création des conceptions allemandes servaient les accords commerciaux bilatéraux qui comportaient des décisions sur les échanges des produits, les transactions commerciales et sur les questions douanières. Parmi les décisions les plus favorables pour l'Allemagne il faut citer l'organisation des échanges commerciaux entre ces pays sur la base des accords de clearing bilatéraux. Ces accords permettaient des échanges commerciaux avec l'omission des règlements en devises. L'adoption des règlements bilatéraux était nécessaire car le mouvement des produits était défini régulièrement, dans un court laps de temps et se reportait aux accords particuliers entre les pays-partenaires. Comme le démontrent les analyses récentes, dans ces accords l'Allemagne avait introduit les objectifs de sa politique du national-socialisme.

Le premier accord de ce type l'Allemagne l'avait signé le 21 février 1934 avec la Hongrie. Par la suite, cet accord est devenu le modèle des accords

Hirschfeld, L. Kettenacker, Ed., *Der "Führerstaat": Mythos und Realität, Studien zur Struktur und Politik des Dritten Reiches*, Stuttgart 1981, p. 377-413.

11. J. Wuescht, *Jugoslawien und das Dritte Reich, Eine dokumentierte Geschichte der deutsch-jugoslawischen Beziehungen von 1933-1945*, Stuttgart 1969, p. 104.

signés par l'Allemagne en vue de la réalisation du programme de création d'un grand espace économique. Les journaux allemands informaient abondamment sur le rôle et l'importance de ces événements. "*Berliner Börsenzeitung*"¹² avait même utilisé le terme d'accord pionnier et soulignait l'instauration d'un nouveau mode de coopération entre le Troisième Reich et les pays agricoles de l'Europe du Sud-Est. L'accord en question n'était pas seulement important pour son caractère de contingent et de clearing, mais aussi en raison des avantages dans le domaine des céréales et l'introduction des tarifs douaniers de 1931, lesquels ne pouvaient pas être introduits jusqu'alors¹³. Pour que la réalisation de cet accord soit meilleure on a créé une commission mixte que devait régler toutes les questions litigieuses.

En 1934 et 1935 le Troisième Reich a signé des accords commerciaux bilatéraux avec tous les pays de cette région sur les mêmes principes.

L'Allemagne désirait élargir autant que possible les échanges commerciaux avec l'Europe du Sud-Est. Une quantité restreinte de devises obligeait l'Allemagne à créer des liens très forts avec les pays agricoles et disposants de matières premières. Le programme des armements lié au manque de devises poussait l'Allemagne à une expansion économique. Cette situation s'est notablement améliorée en faveur de l'Allemagne en octobre 1935 à la suite de la décision de la Société des Nations imposant des sanctions économiques contre l'Italie. Les pays-membres de la S.d.N. pouvaient exporter en Italie entre autres les minéraux considérés comme stratégiques. Les pays de l'Europe du Sud-Est ont alors cessé de fournir ces matières. Seule la Hongrie qui avait signé les Accords de Rome ne participait pas à ce boycott, mais bien au contraire, a profité de l'occasion pour créer des liens économiques encore plus proches avec l'Italie. Une nouvelle reconquête des marchés de l'Europe du Sud-Est par l'Italie en 1936, c'est à dire après la levée des sanctions, s'était avérée impossible.

L'un des facteurs qui facilitaient la percée commerciale de l'Allemagne était le peu d'intérêt pour ces pays en tant que partenaires commerciaux, que portaient la France et l'Angleterre. Dans le cas de la Yougoslavie, les avantages pour l'Allemagne ne sont apparus que lorsque l'Angleterre, à la suite des

12. "*Berliner Börsenzeitung*", n. 93, 24 février 1934.

13. Dans les accords signés le 27 juin et le 18 juillet 1931 avec la Roumanie et la Hongrie, le gouvernement du Reich a accordé des réductions des tarifs douaniers pour l'orge fourragère roumaine, et pour le maïs roumain de 50% ou de 40%, et les droits de douane pour le blé hongrois ont été baissés de 75%. Les accords préférentiels ne sont pas entrés en vigueur en raison des protestations des puissances mondiales.

accords signés auparavant, n'avait pas acheté les quantités prévues de matières, et lorsque la France ne manifestait guère d'intérêt pour les importations. C'est pour cela que les exportations vers l'Allemagne ont progressées de façon considérable en la seule année 1935-1936 de 96%¹⁴.

Le marché allemand, où la demande était très forte, était en mesure d'acheter tous les excédents de matières provenant des pays agricoles, mais en même temps voulait aussi éliminer de ces marchés tous les concurrents. Comme le remarque W. Treue: "Lorsque l'Angleterre, la France et la Tchécoslovaquie importaient de ces pays 25% des exportations de céréales, H. Schacht a proposé à la Yougoslavie que l'Allemagne prenne 60% de la production et à un prix de 30% supérieur aux prix mondiaux"¹⁵.

Un autre facteur qui a permis la croissance des importations allemandes était le taux de change du Mark que le Reich avait volontairement réhaussé par rapport aux devises des pays de l'Europe du Sud-Est. Les importateurs déterminaient leurs redevances dans le bureau national des comptes, en prenant en considération le taux de change des devises qui restait au niveau conforme aux accords antérieurs. Les Allemands maintenaient le taux élevé de leur monnaie, et cela indépendamment de la baisse de celle-ci à l'étranger, ce que nous démontrent les cotes du Mark aux bourses étrangères¹⁶. Les accords basés sur le clearing permettaient à l'exportateur de l'Europe du Sud-Est d'obtenir certains avantages, car il pouvait ainsi vendre ses produits à un prix plus élevé que dans un pays de libre-change. Ainsi, le prix du blé en 1936 sur le marché anglais était de environ 6 livres sterling pour une tonne, et sur le marché allemand elle valait 189 marks. Si nous calculons le prix du blé en Angleterre d'après le taux de change qui était adopté ce jour-là à la bourse de Londres, nous obtiendrons le prix de 76,08 marks¹⁷. Cet écart des prix constituait une occasion et un attrait trop important pour les exportateurs et les agriculteurs des pays de l'Europe du Sud-Est pour que ceux-ci n'interviennent pas auprès de leurs gouvernements afin d'élargir les accords de clearing

14. Les Archives Archiwum Akt Nowych (AAN), Varsovie, Ambassade de Pologne à Berlin, t. 271. Rapport confidentiel du ministre à Belgrade, du 10 juin 1937.

15. W. Treue..., *op. cit.*, p. 54.

16. Le taux de change officiel du mark par rapport au cours paritaire adopté pour 100 était en 1929 de 99,97, en 1933 de 99,47, en 1934 de 98,56, alors que sur les marchés financiers étrangers ce cours se situait entre 60 et 70. *Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich*, Berlin 1935, p. 212.

17. Le cours du mark allemand par rapport à la livre anglaise était en 1929 le suivant: 1 livre = 20,4 mark; en 1934: 1 livre = 12,68 mark. *Statistisches Jahrbuch* ..., 1935, p. 368.

avec l'Allemagne. Des avantages aussi importants faisaient que l'on renonçait au paiement en devises.

La totalité de la participation des pays de l'Europe du Sud-Est dans les importations allemandes s'est accrue de 5,6% en 1933 à 18,9% en 1939. Même en Grèce, pays dont les échanges commerciaux avec l'Allemagne étaient les plus faibles dans la totalité des échanges commerciaux avec l'étranger, les exportations vers l'Allemagne représentaient 27,5% de toutes les exportations en 1939, alors qu'en Bulgarie, en cette même année, les échanges avec l'Allemagne représentaient 67,8% des exportations¹⁸.

Cependant, d'après les accords de clearing, les exportateurs voulant vendre en Allemagne pouvaient être réglés à condition qu'en même temps des produits d'un montant déterminé seront importés d'Allemagne, et que les redevances seront versées dans la caisse financière autonome. C'est pour cela qu'il était indispensable de maintenir un niveau élevé des importations en provenance de l'Allemagne. Toutefois, aucun des accords commerciaux n'avait comporté la condition de l'équivalent. Ce problème devait être réglé séparément par les partenaires eux-mêmes. C'est pour cette raison que les pays de l'Europe du Sud-Est se sont trouvés en grandes difficultés.

Parmi les raisons de cet état des choses, l'un des facteurs principaux était le protectionnisme des pays de l'Europe du Sud-Est. Ce protectionnisme favorisait les exportations, et la politique d'industrialisation devait être réalisée avec une faible participation des importations. La production industrielle de la Bulgarie, de la Grèce, de la Yougoslavie, de la Roumanie et de la Hongrie au tournant des années 1934-1935 avait déjà atteint le niveau de 1928, et en 1937 la croissance a atteint 1/3¹⁹. Par exemple la Grèce en 1928 importait près de 42% des produits industriels de consommations de l'étranger. En 1937 la part de la production industrielle intérieure s'est élevée à 74% et seulement 26% des produits industriels nécessaires était importé²⁰. La Yougoslavie avait décidé des limitations dans les importations en 1935. En juin 1935 le gouvernement roumain a imposé une surtaxe de 44% sur les importations, en mettant un obstacle aux produits allemands en faveur de la production industrielle nationale. Grâce aux décisions globales sur les importations et l'export prises le 25 avril 1936, les importateurs bulgares devaient réduire

18. A. S. Milward..., *op. cit.*, p. 404.

19. *Wochenbericht des Instituts für Konjunkturforschung*, Berlin, Jg. 11, n. 18, 1938, p. 145.

20. R. Schönfeld, "Zur Entstehung der deutschen "Clearingverschuldung" gegenüber Südosteuropa in der Weltwirtschaftskrise", dans *Südosteuropa in Entwicklungsprozeß der Welt*, München-Wien 1979, p. 107.

leurs achats en moyenne de 50% par rapport aux années 1930-1932. Une bonne partie des sociétés d'importation a cessé d'exister, et pour chaque achat à l'étranger il était nécessaire d'obtenir l'accord de la Banque Nationale²¹.

III.

La limitation des exportations allemandes vers les pays de l'Europe du Sud-Est avait aussi d'autres raisons. Les marchés en question n'étaient pas en mesure d'absorber les produits de l'industrie très performante du Troisième Reich. Les acheteurs privés préféraient des modèles de machines plus simples et moins chers produits dans d'autres pays. La production tchèque, italienne, autrichienne rivalisait avec les produits allemands qui étaient souvent de meilleure qualité mais aussi plus chers. De nombreux acheteurs pouvaient influencer leurs gouvernements et les autorités qui s'occupaient de l'export en les persuadant qu'il n'était pas nécessaire d'importer les produits allemands qui étaient plus chers. Souvent les acheteurs se plaignaient des délais de livraison et du choix limité que proposait l'Allemagne. L'offre allemande était limitée et souvent les Allemands ne proposaient qu'un seul genre de marchandise ou même laissaient la dette, c'est à dire ne payaient rien. Ainsi on forçait l'acheteur plus faible économiquement à acheter certains produits.

La presse anglaise commentait ce phénomène en ces termes: "Les Allemands vendent à l'Europe du Sud-Est seulement les produits qu'ils ne peuvent pas placer sur le marché mondial et les vendre pour devises"²².

D'une part l'augmentation rapide des exportations (surtout des produits alimentaires) en Allemagne, et de l'autre les difficultés d'importation ont amené bien vite l'augmentation de la solde dans le bilan commercial en faveur des pays de l'Europe du Sud-Est, ce qui pouvait constituer un élément défavorable pour les deux partenaires. De son côté le Troisième Reich craignait que lorsque les redevances de clearing augmenteraient d'une façon excessive, ces pays limiteraient leurs livraisons pour l'Allemagne. L'Allemagne ne pouvait pas remédier au manque de produits alimentaires et de matières premières en achetant ailleurs en échange de devises. C'est pourquoi le solde devait être maintenu à un certain niveau. Toutefois l'importance et l'envergure des

21. *Ibid.* Malgré le protectionnisme, en 1936 80% des importations des machines par la Bulgarie provenait du Troisième Reich; en Yougoslavie ces importations représentaient 50,4%, en Roumanie 35%, et en Hongrie 70%.

22. Germany's Trade Offensive, *The Economist*, CXXXIII, n. 4967, 5 novembre 1938, p. 262.

“endettements de clearing” de la part de l'Allemagne permet d'appeler le Troisième Reich “débiteur” des pays de l'Europe du Sud-Est.

La dette de la Banque Nationale de Bulgarie auprès de la Banque du Reich, c'est à dire de la Caisse Allemande de Balance, en janvier 1934 était de 200.000 marks, en janvier 1935 s'élevait à 4,8 millions, pour atteindre à la fin de la même année 17 millions de marks. Le solde de clearing en faveur de la Yougoslavie avait augmenté à la même période de 100.000 à 13,1 millions, et à la fin de l'année s'élevait à 23.3 millions de marks. Les plus grandes dettes allemandes étaient faites auprès de la Roumanie, et elles avaient progressé de 1 million à 14,3 million et ensuite jusqu'à 21,5 millions de marks. En Grèce, au profit de la Banque Nationale de Grèce on enregistrait une dette de 12,2 millions de marks au début de l'années 1934, en décembre 1935 de 25 millions pour atteindre en 1936 la somme de 38 millions de marks, ce qui représentait la dette allemande la plus importante envers ce pays²³.

Déjà dans les années trente, dans la presse anglaise on pouvait lire que le gouvernement allemand envisage de mener une politique discriminatoire de contingentement et d'excédent, avec comme objectif, la subordination économique de ces pays et la volonté de rattacher cette région à l'Allemagne. Une question se pose alors: est-ce que les Allemands achetaient tous les produits en voulant réduire le déficit des produits alimentaires et des matières premières, en imposant par écrit les exportations afin de reporter les coûts de la militarisation de l'Allemagne sur l'Europe du Sud-Est par le non-règlement des dettes commerciales, ou bien le bilan commercial constituait un résultat innatendu de cette politique à laquelle il fallait adapter plus tard les activités d'exportation?

Comme l'écrivait dans son rapport le ministre de Pologne à Budapest Leon Orłowski: “Il est fort probable que les Allemands consciemment et volontairement ont permis la création de l'excédent. Si un phénomène analogue de la politique douanière pouvait être constaté dans d'autres pays, on pourrait parler d'une action allemande planifiée et qui se développerait sur l'ancien axe d'expansion”²⁴.

La thèse selon laquelle H. Schacht a introduit le système “néo-colonial”, et le clearing entraînait petit à petit et systématiquement l'apparition d'un excédent des importations, ce qui créait la dépendance des pays de l'Europe

23. *Statistisches Jahrbuch...*, 1938, p. 282. Cf. H. Gross, *Südosteuropa. Bau und Entwicklung der Wirtschaft*, Leipzig 1937, p. 228.

24. AAN, Légation de Pologne à Budapest, t. 14. Rapport politique de L. Orłowski du 26 juin 1937.

du Sud-Est envers l'Allemagne, est une thèse très répandue dans les ouvrages contemporains. Comme l'avait remarqué fort pertinemment F. Perroux: "l'utilisation de la technique du clearing non équilibré constituait l'une des méthodes essentielles de l'expansion économique"²⁵. Grâce aux dettes croissantes sur la balance, le Reich pouvait obtenir des crédits sans avoir à payer les intérêts. Tant que les redevances dans les mouvements internationaux étaient réglés bilatéralement, l'existence d'un excédent de paiement au profit des pays de l'Europe du Sud-Est était inévitable. La situation difficile des pays de cette région quant aux exportations, les demandes pressantes de l'Allemagne quant aux produits agricoles et aux matières premières, le protectionnisme des pays du Danube et l'intérêt faiblissant pour les exportations de l'industrie allemande ont créé des disproportions continuelles dans les échanges des produits et des marchandises.

Les Allemands non seulement ne payaient pas pour les produits achetés, mais en plus ils vendaient pour des devises les excédents des produits agricoles sur les marchés de Rotterdam et de Londres à des prix qui y étaient en vigueur, en faisant ainsi du dumping. Le blé, le tabac et beaucoup d'autres produits agricoles étaient d'abord achetés en échange de marchandises et en proposant des prix élevés afin d'éliminer les concurrents, puis ont revendu les excédents pour obtenir des devises. Cela provoquait les réactions de mécontentement de la part des pays de l'Europe du Sud-Est, car ainsi les prix de leurs produits se trouvaient abaissés, de sorte que la vente de ces mêmes produits pour leur propre compte devenait de plus en plus limitée.

Avec la reprise économique en 1936 la situation dans le domaine des exportations en Europe du Sud-Est s'est aggravée. Les propositions allemandes sur les marchés de cette région en comparaison avec les offres des autres pays n'étaient pas avantageuses. L'augmentation des échanges commerciaux avec la France et L'Angleterre au début de l'année 1937, et qui devait freiner le processus de dépendance envers le marché allemand, n'était pas favorable pour l'Allemagne. Ainsi, les Allemands devaient rendre leur offre plus intéressante. Le fait d'appliquer le taux de change variable pour le mark ce qui réduisait la dette et encourageait à acheter en Allemagne par la baisse de la valeur du mark, ou l'introduction de la ASKI — mark²⁶, toutes ces actions

25. F. Perroux, "Entwurf einer Theorie der dominierenden Wirtschaft", *Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie*, Heft 13, 1952, p. 24.

26. ASKI-marks étaient acceptés comme paiement pour les marchandises que les exportateurs obtenaient pour les produits envoyés en Allemagne. La réalisation des ASKI-marks en produits allemands survenait avec un important retard et même si la balance commerciale

ne pouvaient pas résoudre le problème. A cela devaient servir les services techniques et industriels ainsi que les livraisons d'armes.

En 1933 Hitler avait interdit les exportations des biens d'investissements vers les pays faiblement développés, en voyant dans ce type d'exportation les causes d'une surproduction industrielle qui entraîne la dépression. Mais la politique de l'Allemagne en Europe du Sud-Est n'était nullement entravée par des considérations idéologiques de ce genre.

Le 30 octobre 1935 a été créée la société *Ausfuhrgemeinschaft für Kriegsgerät* prévue pour les exportations des armements. Au début cette société était une succursale de *Reichsgruppe Industrie*. Elle se composait de 12 entreprises qui produisaient les armements et les uniformes. Jusqu'à la fin de 1937 la coopération de AGK s'est élargie à 88 entreprises. Son activité était contrôlée par le Ministère de l'Industrie et le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères du Reich. Plus tard, l'AGK recevait des instructions de la part de H. Göring qui était responsable de la réalisation du plan quadriennal. Jusqu'en 1938 la société était dirigée par E. Trendelenburg²⁷.

Le 5 avril 1935 la cour royale à Sofia a entrepris des démarches auprès de la légation d'Allemagne pour obtenir des livraisons d'avions de combat et de matériel militaire destinés à l'armée bulgare²⁸. Ces démarches ont débouché sur la signature d'un accord entre la Bulgarie et le Troisième Reich un an plus tard. Conformément à cet accord les Allemands ont accordé un crédit de 30 millions de marks pour 5 ans, destiné à l'achat de matériel militaire allemand. Le 13 mars 1938 les Bulgares ont obtenu un deuxième crédit pour l'achat d'armement, d'avions militaires et d'uniformes. Les paiements devaient s'étaler sur 8 ans avec la possibilité de prolonger ce délai jusqu'à 11 ans²⁹.

Depuis la moitié de l'année 1935 avaient commencé à Budapest les négociations sur l'achat d'armes anti-chars et de chars pour la somme de 20 millions de marks. Cette transaction devait réduire les redevances de paiement de l'Allemagne auprès de la Hongrie.

En Grèce la politique de non-engagement ne favorisait pas une telle politique. Mais ici aussi on tentait de maintenir de bonnes relations avec Berlin.

de l'Allemagne avec les pays de l'Europe du Sud-Est était négatif cela ne pesait pas sur le Trésor Allemand et était très avantageux pour le Reich.

27. Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (PA), Bonn, Wirtschaftspolitische Abteilung, Geheim, Handel mit Kriegsgerät. Berlin 10 février 1937.

28. Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik (ADAP), C IV, doc. 14, p. 17, 18.

29. PA, Wirtschaftspolitische Abteilung, Geheim, Bulgarien, Bd 1., Berlin 21 mars 1938.

Comme l'écrivait E. Eisenlohr, ministre d'Allemagne résident à Athènes, à l'*Auswärtiges Amt*, le 12 décembre 1935: "le solde grec continuellement actif qui s'est formé à la suite des mouvements des marchandises a créé pour la Grèce la possibilité d'importer d'Allemagne les produits qu'il serait impossible d'acheter ailleurs compte tenu du manque de devises. C'est pourquoi il est normal que la Grèce puisse envisager l'achat de matériel militaire dont elle a besoin en Allemagne où une grande partie des livraisons pourrait être réglée grâce à ses propres exportations"³⁰. Les négociations qui avaient commencé encore avant 1935 ont abouti à la signature de deux accords en 1936 et 1937 sur les livraisons de matériel militaire à la Grèce pour la somme de 60 millions de marks avec un délai de paiement de 6 ans. Les difficultés survenues plus tard dans le commerce d'échange ont fait que le crédit a été révoqué et jusqu'au 31 décembre 1937 ce crédit avait atteint la somme de 40 millions de marks³¹.

De même, la Yougoslavie, malgré les offres avantageuses de la part de Škoda de Tchécoslovaquie et d'une entreprise française, a décidé d'entamer des négociations avec le Reich sur les livraisons d'armes. Dans les années 1936 – 1938 la valeur du matériel militaire importé d'Allemagne représentait 13 millions de marks. Cet accord englobait 48 avions Dornier, des bateaux, le matériel d'écoute. D'autre part le consortium Krupp a obtenu l'autorisation de construire à Zenica une laminerie dont le coût s'élevait à 160 millions de dinars, et qui devait produire pour l'industrie de l'armement. Cependant, la Yougoslavie, avant 1938 restait très réticente quant aux livraisons d'armes en provenance du Reich³².

Une transaction analogue à celle du consortium Krupp en Yougoslavie était l'accord entre la société Rimma (société minière roumaine qui contrôlait les ressources roumaines d'or, d'argent, de cuivre et de zinc) et l'entreprise Ferrostaal (entreprise allemande qui dépendait financièrement de Gutehoffnungshütte). Le crédit de la société Rimma devait être réglé en traites pendant plusieurs années. Ce crédit était exceptionnel quant au montant car il atteignait 25 millions de marks et concernait non seulement les livraisons des machines mais aussi la construction d'une usine et d'une centrale en échange de matières et de céréales qui étaient considérés par les autres puissances comme des

30. ADAP, C IV, doc. 459, p. 893.

31. PA, Geheim, Griechenland, Bd. 1, Berlin 2 février 1938.

32. Dans les années 1936-1938 la valeur des exportations du matériel militaire français et tchécoslovaque vers la Yougoslavie s'élevait à environ 100 millions de marks.

produits excédentaires sur les marchés mondiaux³³. Cette politique renforçait l'influence de l'Allemagne en présentant ce pays comme ami et allié des pays moins développés et voulants acquérir une indépendance industrielle.

Compte tenu des crédits bloqués à Berlin, les gouvernements des pays de cette région consentaient à adapter leurs marchés à la structure défectueuse de l'économie allemande. Comme les Allemands ne pouvaient pas fournir de biens de consommation, de demi-produits ou de matières premières, la dette ne pouvait être réglée que par les achats faits par l'Etat, ce qui répondait aux intérêts de l'industrie lourde allemande. Plus l'Allemagne poursuivait son programme d'armement, plus la tension politique en Europe du Sud-Est montait. Les pays de cette région n'étaient pas favorisés dans le domaine des achats d'armements ni par la France, ni par l'Angleterre ni par les Tchéques. Dans une telle situation, les propositions allemandes devaient être considérées comme étant de plus en plus attirantes. Pour l'Allemagne, où la quantité d'armes dépassait de loin les réserves en devises, cette politique permettait d'acheter les matières premières en échange de matériel militaire et d'autre part rendait les pays de cette région militairement dépendants de l'Allemagne.

L'Anschluss de l'Autriche, et ensuite Munich ont apporté aux conceptions allemandes de création d'un grand espace d'énormes avantages et fait naître l'espoir de réaliser les objectifs voulus. Les relations commerciales d'un empire comptant 74 millions d'habitants avec les pays de l'Europe du Sud-Est sont devenues beaucoup plus importantes. Cependant, ces pays pouvaient-ils satisfaire et en quelle mesure les besoins alimentaires et en matières premières du Troisième Reich?

IV.

Dans le contexte de la stratégie militaire allemande et des réactions prévisibles des alliés qui pouvaient entreprendre des sanctions contre l'Allemagne, les produits alimentaires devenaient une marchandise stratégique de la plus haute importance. C'est d'ailleurs les importations des produits alimentaires dans les années trente qui ont provoqué les changements les plus importants dans la structure commerciale de l'Allemagne, et les échanges de produits alimentaires contre les produits industriels et les armes constituaient un facteur unissant les pays de l'Europe du Sud-Est en un espace d'échanges commerciaux. La part des importations des produits alimentaires provenant de

33. W. Grenzebach, *Germany's Informal Empire in East-Central Europe*, Stuttgart 1988, p. 173-189.

cette région dans la totalité des importations allemandes était de 5,31% en 1928, de 9,76% en 1932 pour atteindre 28,23% en 1939³⁴.

Parmi les minéraux stratégiques de première importance, que ces pays pouvaient fournir dans des quantités suffisante à des fins stratégiques répondant aux besoins allemands il y avait: le chrome, la bauxite, le cuivre et le pétrole.

Dans les années 1935-1938 l'Allemagne recevait environ 30% de la production de chrome de la Grèce, de la Turquie et de la Yougoslavie. Ce n'est qu'après avoir signé les accords sur les armements avec la Turquie que la participation des exportations de chrome de la Turquie vers l'Allemagne est devenue plus importante et représentait 49,6% de la totalité des importations allemandes. La participation de la Yougoslavie (de même que de la Grèce) dans les exportations de chrome en Allemagne était tombée de 13,3 milles tonnes en 1938 à 5,6 milles tonnes en 1939. Il faut rappeler que les mines en Yougoslavie appartenaient au capital français et anglais. Par exemple la mine de zinc et de plomb à Trepča en Serbie du sud appartenait à la société anglaise Selection Trust Company, l'une des plus grandes sociétés minières du monde. La participation du capital anglais dans ces mines augmentait continuellement, allant de 316 milles livres sterling en 1937 à 525 milles livres au début de l'année 1940³⁵.

Les Allemands tenaient à s'emparer de toute la production industrielle de la Yougoslavie afin de pouvoir en profiter sans restrictions. Malgré les intentions du prince-régent yougoslave qui voulait exploiter chaque occasion pour que les mines de Bor où l'on extrayait le zinc et le plomb soient gérées par l'Etat, la Yougoslavie devait s'efforcer à exporter les matières premières dans les pays de non-clearing, car ce n'est qu'ainsi qu'elle pouvait répondre à ces besoins d'approvisionnement.

Les Allemands, afin de changer cette situation qui leur était défavorable, ont de nouveau eu recours aux livraisons d'armes en tant que mode de paiement. Le 5 juillet 1939 a été signé un accord secret sur les livraisons d'armes et de matériel militaire allemand. Conformément au protocole le paiement du crédit était étendu sur 10 années et devait être achevé par un accord de clearing. L'Allemagne a exigé 50% du montant du crédit sous forme d'importants minéraux provenant des mines yougoslaves. L'accord ne mention-

34. Depuis 1936 on considérait comme produits alimentaires les "articles de l'économie alimentaire", c'est à dire aussi les fourrages, le bétail, le tabac. Dans: S. A. Milward, *op. cit.*, p. 408.

35. Ž. Avramovski, *Treći Rajh i Borski rudnik*, Bor 1975, p. 23.

nait pas explicitement de quels minéraux il s'agit, et les Allemands pouvaient choisir selon leurs besoins. En plus, les sociétés allemandes ont obtenu l'autorisation de faire des forages et d'exploiter le pétrole en Yougoslavie.

Les livraisons d'armes dans le cadre de l'accord secret n'étaient pas réalisées. Ce n'est qu'après la décision de Göring dans la dernière décade du mois d'août 1939 qu'ont été envoyés en Yougoslavie 5 avions-chasseurs du type Messerschmitt ME 109 et trois avions d'entraînement Me 108. En même temps Hitler avait annulé l'interdiction d'exportation du matériel militaire du 11 juillet 1939 et a permis de fournir à la Yougoslavie 120 chars. Ces actions des autorités allemandes démontrent le jeu politique sur lequel Berlin appuyait son comportement envers un pays important économiquement et stratégiquement lors de la phase d'expansion du "grand espace économique". La reprise des livraisons d'armes pour la Yougoslavie en août 1939 avait surtout un but politique. A la veille de la guerre les Allemands voulaient montrer leur bonne volonté mais aussi, et surtout, ils voulaient s'assurer des livraisons importantes de matières stratégiques.

En même temps la France a entrepris des démarches très énergiques pour bloquer les livraisons de cuivre yougoslave pour l'Allemagne. Une note officielle a été adressée au gouvernement de la Yougoslavie, note dans laquelle on soulignait que le cuivre provenant de la mine de Bor appartient à la France qui importera toute la production pour ses propres besoins. Seulement du début de 1940 jusqu'au mois de mai la France a reçu autant de cuivre que tout au long de l'année précédente. La situation était telle qu'en avril 1940 on a envoyé en France 3235 tonnes de ce produit alors qu'en Allemagne, pour laquelle on avait prévu des livraisons de 1500-2000 tonnes, on a envoyé seulement 465 tonnes. Cette fois-ci le gouvernement allemand ne pouvait pas y remédier³⁶.

En plus, au début de 1940 les excédents des exportations yougoslaves pour l'Allemagne s'élevaient à 15 millions de marks. Belgrade a annoncé que les livraisons suivantes pour l'Allemagne seront arrêtées aussi longtemps que la balance ne sera pas équilibrée, et les livraisons d'armes allemandes précéderont de trois mois les livraisons en provenance de la Yougoslavie. Ainsi, l'accord du 5 décembre, appelé Landfried-Abkommen, n'a pas pu constituer un obstacle aux conflits avec la Yougoslavie. Ce n'est que l'accord du 12 mai 1940 qui devait garantir les livraisons des matières yougoslaves sur le marché allemand.

Il en était différemment avec la bauxite. L'un des producteurs les plus

36. S. Dmitrijević, *op. cit.*, p. 307.

connus de bauxite était la France. C'est pourquoi l'augmentation de l'extraction de bauxite en Hongrie et en Yougoslavie était destinée dans sa totalité au marché allemand et seulement de petites quantités de la production grecque étaient vendues ailleurs. Ces sources d'approvisionnement constituaient les 3/4 de tous les besoins de l'Allemagne.

Jusqu'en 1938 le rôle du pétrole roumain dans la totalité des importations allemandes était faible et les livraisons insuffisantes. En 1935 la Roumanie a accepté le paiement du pétrole d'après le système de clearing, mais pour garder la diversité de ses marchés de vente, elle a imposé la condition que ces importations ne dépassent pas 1/4 de la totalité des échanges. Les accords de septembre 1936 prévoyaient la possibilité de dépasser ces 25% mais seulement au cas où une quantité supplémentaire serait l'objet de négociations à part, et le pétrole serait payé avec des livraisons d'armes et de machines. Cette possibilité dépendait donc de la bonne volonté du gouvernement roumain. Les Allemands, en voulant acheter du pétrole devaient vendre à la Roumanie plus de produits, ce qui avec la dévaluation du mark n'était pas facile. Ainsi, à la fin de 1937 et au début de 1938 la position de l'Allemagne dans le domaine des importations du pétrole n'était pas favorable et les importations ont non seulement baissées par rapport aux années précédentes mais elle restaient à un niveau très bas. Toute possibilité de changer cette situation semblait irréaliste aussi longtemps que la France et l'Angleterre maintenaient leurs achats de pétrole en Roumanie. Les exportateurs roumains de leur côté faisaient tout leur possible pour maintenir ces achats. C'était le seul moyen de s'assurer des devises. L'annexion de l'Autriche a renforcé les possibilités du Reich mais non pas au point de mettre en cause la position solide de l'Angleterre et de la France³⁷.

C'est pourquoi aussi bien le gouvernement roumain que les consortiums pétroliers avaient intérêt à ne vendre qu'une petite partie de la production pétrolière dans le système de clearing. La pression politique a fait que le moment favorable pour qu'un changement de cette situation intervienne n'est apparu que lors de l'agression allemande contre la Tchéco-Slovaquie, à la mi-mars 1939. Le gouvernement roumain a signé le 23 mars de la même année

37. La participation de l'Autriche dans les importations de pétrole de la Roumanie avant l'annexion était de 6,8%. En 1937 l'Allemagne importait de Roumanie 435000 tonnes de pétrole, ce qui représentait 9% des exportations roumaines et en 1938 704000 tonnes, c'est à dire 15%. La Grande Bretagne importait en 1937 17% de la production roumaine et en 1938 14%. De même, la France en 1937 importait de Roumanie 17% de pétrole, et en 1938 seulement 11%. Cf. P. Marguerat, *Le IIIe Reich et le pétrole roumain 1938-1940*, Genève 1977, p. 84.

“l'accord sur le développement des relations économiques entre la Roumanie et l'Allemagne”. Les Allemands ont obtenu d'importants privilèges économiques de la part des Roumains. Comme point culminant de la politique d'expansion commerciale de l'Allemagne envers la Roumanie il faut citer le protocole secret du 8 juillet 1939 qui prévoyait des livraisons de pétrole en échange de matériel militaire moderne allemand. Comme le prouve la liste du matériel militaire, les Allemands étaient prêts à fournir pour les forces de l'air des équipements jusque-là tenus en secret et cela en grandes quantités³⁸. Il semblerait que ce fait soit quelque peu sous-estimé dans la littérature historique. Souvent nous rencontrons la thèse générale selon laquelle les pays des Balkans ont été dupés par les Allemands qui leurs avaient fourni un matériel militaire ancien de production autrichienne ou tchèque. Dans le cas de la Roumanie, Berlin ne pouvait pas se permettre le risque de proposer du matériel non-compétitif. Aussi bien l'accord signé avec la Roumanie que le protocole faisaient partie des accords commerciaux les plus importants négociés par le Troisième Reich en 1939.

* * *

En analysant les relations commerciales du Troisième Reich avec les pays de l'Europe du Sud-Est, nous devons constater que l'Allemagne hitlérienne tenait non seulement à élargir les échanges à l'échelle internationale, mais aussi à obtenir les meilleures conditions dans la réalisation de ce programme. Il faut citer le système d'endettement de grande envergure, l'utilisation du dumping, le fait de proposer des prix avantageux avec le maintien d'un taux élevé du mark et l'octroi de crédits pour l'achat d'armes. Toutes ces transactions étaient faites sur la base des accords d'échange avec le système de clearing. Comme succès du Troisième Reich nous devrions aussi considérer le fait que sans devises il est devenu le partenaire commercial le plus important des pays de l'Europe du Sud-Est. Cependant, le renforcement de la position de l'Allemagne n'est survenu qu'au moment où le conflit militaire était déjà inévitable. C'est à ce moment-là que l'Allemagne s'est assurée des livraisons illimitées de pétrole roumain et des matières stratégiques de la Yougoslavie.

Cracovie

38. PA. Ha-Pol. IV b, Handel mit Kriegsgerät, Bd. 1, 8 juillet 1939. Dans le protocole avait été mentionné pratiquement tout le matériel faisant objet des négociations. La valeur des livraisons était de 41,5 millions de marks et englobait: 32 Heinkel 111h, 200 Junkers Jumo, des licences, des outils, des semi-produits pour la production des moteurs Jumo 211, 30 Dorniers, 15 Fieseler Storch, 30 Heinkel 112 Ea. le matériel pour le service au sol, 30-50 Messerschmitt, 80 moteurs d'avion BMW.

N. G. L. HAMMOND

THE ALLIED MILITARY MISSION IN NORTHWEST MACEDONIA
1943-44

In this article I am publishing, with the permission of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, a selection of the papers which Captain P. H. Evans brought out of Macedonia in late November 1944 and entrusted to me recently. The papers consist mainly of signals which were 'in clear', i.e. before being encoded for transmission by wireless. These signals were sent out or received by Evans' station on Mt. Vitsi which had the code-name FERTILIZER. He was in communication with the AMM HQ* of West Macedonia, of which the

** The following abbreviations are used:*

ALO	Allied Liaison Officer
AML	Allied Military Liaison
AMM	Allied Military Mission
Bde	Brigade
BLO	British Liaison Officer
BMM	British Military Mission
Bn	Battalion
CO	Commanding Officer
Coy	Company
EA	National Welfare
EAM	National Liberation Front
EDES	National Republican Greek League
EES	National Greek Army
EKKA	National and Social Liberation
ELAS	National People's Liberation Army
GHQ	General Headquarters
GOC	General Officer Commanding
HMG	Heavy Machine Gun
HMG	His Majesty's Government
HQ	Headquarters
LMG	Light Machine Gun
LRDG	Long Range Desert Group
MG	Machine Gun
MMG	Medium Machine Gun
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer

station was called BOODLE, and also with SOE GHQ Cairo, which was known simply as Cairo. The signals which he brought out are only a part of those which were sent at the time (for instance, there are very few QQQ signals, which were particularly urgent), but they give a representative picture of events in the Vitsi area from 23 March to 15 November. They are of historical importance as primary evidence, since they were composed at the time by the CO of the AMM station throughout that period.

In addition to the signals there are letters, reports, orders, notes, receipts etc. which were issued at the time. There are two reports by Evans. One dated 7 August 1944 is an 'Introductory Report on Sub-Area Vitsi', which consists of the boundaries of the area, accessibility to Germans, population, armed villages and Independent Macedonia. The other undated but probably written early in 1945 gave a full account of Evans' activities from September 1943 to December 1944, his commentary on matters of general interest, and ten Appendices. There are also some papers in Greek, being orders issued by ELAS HQ Vitsi or GHQ 9 Div, excerpts from contemporary newspapers, and a long report mainly on the Bulgarian contacts of the armed villages, which is unsigned, undated and of doubtful veracity.

Patrick Hutchinson Evans, born 1. 12. 13, volunteered for service in occupied Greece. He parachuted into Greece on 15 September 1943 and joined the AMM of West Macedonia at Pendalophos as a Lieutenant. He conducted a Commando and Demolition course for selected ELAS Andartes there, and

OG	American equivalent of RSR
PAO	Panhellenic Liberation Army
PEEA	Political Committee of National Liberation
QMS	Quarter-Master Sergeant
RSR	Raiding Support Regiment
SMG	Sub Machine Gun
SNOF	Slaboden Narodn Ondofascistky Front (Liberation National Antifascist Front)
SOE	Special Operations Executive
YBE	Defenders of Northern Greece

References to other books are abbreviated as follows:

- Apple* : C. M. Woodhouse, *Apple of Discord* (London, 1948).
DM : N. G. L. Hammond, *Αντική Μακεδονία: 'Αντίσταση και Συμμαχική Στρατιωτική 'Αποστολή 1943-1944* (Athens, 1992) being the Greek translation by P. I. Papatathanasiou of the forthcoming book *'The Allied Military Mission and the Andartes in West Macedonia, 1943-44'*.
Venture : N. G. L. Hammond, *Venture into Greece with the Guerrillas 1943-1944* (London, 1983), of which the Greek version by G. Lampsas was published in Athens as *Περιπέτεια με τους 'Αντάρτες 1943-44*.

he carried out reconnaissances in command of British and other personnel in the area north of Pendalophos. During the civil war between ELAS and EDES he was engaged in Welfare operations for the people of the burnt villages and for the Italians in Pindus villages. He kept a number of papers which concerned these operations. During February and early March 1944 he was in charge of the work which resulted in the provision of a landing-strip near Grevena — the papers for which I have not used in this article. On 23 March 1944 he set up the first AMM station in the Vitsi area, and he was in command of it until late in November 1944, with the rank of Captain (he became Major later). He had a good knowledge of modern Greek, and also of German and French, and he had a flair for descriptive writing, which he had developed as a journalist in civilian life. He intended to publish a book, based on these papers, but he was prevented by ill health. In summer 1990 he asked me to take over the papers and publish what I might consider to be of historical value. I am very grateful for his help.

In the first part of this article the Welfare operations in West Macedonia are described much more fully than elsewhere. In the second part the activities in the Vitsi area of AMM, ELAS, Komitaji, Germans and Partisans of Yugoslavia and Albania are reported in a coherent manner with sub-headings, under which the relevant selected signals and papers are cited. I have added introductory and explanatory passages which are sometimes marked off by square brackets. My qualification for making such additions is that I was CO in Macedonia from May 1943 into January 1944, Chief Liaison Officer with GHQ ELAS thereafter, and Acting Commander of AMM from May to August 1944. Thus much of the background is familiar to me. The papers have been deposited with the consent of P. H. Evans in the Liddell Hart Centre of Military Archives at King's College London.

PART I. WELFARE BY AMM FOR GREEK VILLAGERS AND FOR ITALIANS

1. The burnt villages and the feeding of the Italians

The Italians and the Germans responded to guerrilla warfare by attacking defenceless villages, where they killed any villagers, removed stock and burnt the houses. This form of atrocity was practised in West Macedonia much more by the Germans than by the Turks against the Arabs and T. E. Lawrence. The first instances were in spring 1943 after the defeat and surrender of an Italian battalion in a battle with the Andartes, and most of the villages bet

ween Siatista and Grevena were burnt at that time. As most of the refugees from these villages were destitute when they returned to the ruins, HQ 9 Div of ELAS asked me to provide gold sovereigns which were to be distributed to those in need by EA, the Welfare branch of EAM. Because I distrusted ELAS and EA, I asked each burnt village to form a committee of the priest, the schoolmaster and the 1941 president, which would draw up a list of those in need, and I arranged that sovereigns would be issued only by an Officer of the Mission to individual recipients in the presence of the committee. This system was employed in summer 1943.

ELAS occasionally defended a village against attack by Italian forces but not against attack by German forces¹. For instance Skalokhori lost only eleven houses when Italians attacked it, but on 4 August 1943 Germans burnt almost every house, killing the priest and a man of ninety who had not run away. It was said then that the Germans had been accompanied by 'Ekkatzidhes' in the uniform of Greek officers — a blatant piece of EAM propaganda at the expense of EKKA, a rival organisation, which had taken the field farther south and was attacked by ELAS that summer. Evans gave examples of ELAS failing to defend the villages against such attacks:

'On 4 October I was on high ground and watched Vrakhos, Vitsista and Nestorion being burnt by a German column from Kastoria and Argos Orestikon. They had burnt Langa on the previous evening. All these villages were on the front of 1 Battalion 28 Regiment of ELAS. The OC of the Regiment told me later that the German force included about 400 Italians, some Komitaji and EKKA personnel, which latter I doubt, and that their strength was 600 to 700. ... I saw no real fighting. The only opposition was MG fire at 1500 metres and over. The Andarte tactics were to sit safely on distant ridges. The Poles serving with us (having escaped from German forces) told me that in their experience the Germans would have withdrawn immediately if one Company of Andartes had counterattacked. ... Germans withdraw in afternoon and burnt Melanthion on the way. OC 28 Regiment said that German success was due to greater mobility. In fact it was because the Andartes as usual considered Germans as supermen and would not fight at close quarters'.

'On 18 October I was at Nestorion which the Germans, advancing from the area of Pentavryso[s], entered that afternoon to burn the three remaining houses. During the middle of that day I watched sporadic fighting round the river crossing, where the German force was of one section and one armoured car. Andarte tactics were as before. I discovered afterwards that the Andartes

1. See *Venture* 32 for a similar instance.

in forward positions had mostly dropped their arms and fled at the approach of the Germans. ... The Andartes were all 1500 metres or more away, except for one MG nest which was mopped up by the German section through lack of alertness. At 1500 hours thirty Germans formed up behind an armoured car, entered the village unopposed to burn houses, rejoined the main body several kilometres away, and returned to Kastoria the same evening. The reason for Andarte failure was lack of courage due to absence of discipline. While the OC 1st Battalion is a competent, aggressive officer, his subalterns, NCOs and men will not hold fast and obey orders. The general condition here is that the Germans fear the Andartes and the Andartes fear the Germans, but the Germans have taken the initiative and got the upper hand. If the Andartes showed real fight, the Germans would be confined to the towns and main roads, but the Andartes on this front have very little discipline under fire. There is no hope of improvement until this is put right'.

Evans was recalled by me on 19 October when I knew that ELAS had attacked EDES in the start of a civil war which was to last until 29 February 1944. My immediate recommendation that relief should be stopped was accepted by GHQ Middle East, whereas in Thessaly and Roumeli payments to EA were continued. HQ 9 Div blockaded the Mission at Pentalophos, but in December it found itself compelled to accept the conditions on which I insisted for a renewal of relief². Evans preserved copies of the Agreement which I had composed in Greek and in English. The latter ran as follows:

'1. In every village where are situated victims of arson, refugees by reason of enemy attack, families of war casualties, families of war hostages, and disabled people of the 1940-41 war, the priest, schoolmaster and *proedros* and two of the war victims, whom the war victims themselves shall elect freely and democratically, shall be members of the aid committee. If one of the first three is missing or does not enjoy the confidence of the war victims the war victims shall choose a deputy. This committee shall prepare lists of the war victims in need and shall examine the needs of each family.

'2. Members of the AMM will visit each village and after examining the lists will give to the families in person assistance. I shall be grateful if the district doctors and the district priests assist the AMM. The HQ 9 Div is free to send both Andartes and representatives of the HQ, who will advise the Mission on the representatives forming the committees in areas under German control.

'3. The district doctors, or if they are missing the doctors conscripted

2. See *Venture* 103 f. and 111; and *DM* 39.

into ELAS, will estimate the medical needs of the war victims and will report to AMM.

'4. HQ 9 Div will give freedom of movement specifically for this work to the members of the Mission. When danger exists for the entry of AMM, the officer representative of HQ 9 Div on the spot and the officer of AMM on the spot will reach agreement as to how far they can proceed, or if they do not agree will not pass into the area under dispute but will make a report to their superior officers.

'5. If the question is asked in the village 'Whence comes the aid?' the answer shall be 'Gift of the Allies'.

'6. Where they cannot proceed, the AMM will call the committee of the village, or as many members of the committee as are able, to come to a centre. If the officer of AMM thinks fit, he will give the aid and the committee will be obliged to bring the nominal receipts.

'Since the AMM has not the order to assist the destitute families of the Andartes as a separate category, the AMM promises to request GHQ Middle East to permit the assistance of these also.

'The AMM promises to give the aid in accordance with the above conditions.

'The HQ 9 Div promises to assist the AMM in this work in accordance with the above terms.

'Agreed on 18.12.43 at Pendalophos by EGGS and by KARAYIANNIS (GOC 9 Div), having been written by EGGS and the translation made by him'.

After the first distribution of relief which took place in 19-24 December 1943 HQ 9 Div issued to the committees in the villages a set of instructions which was composed in agreement with me. It included the following clauses.

'The distribution is an experiment in West Macedonia alone. There is no certainty that it will occur again, and no probability that if it does occur again it will be expanded to include other categories. Continuation depends on the needs of the Allies and on the sincere cooperation of each committee and of each village.

'The duty of each committee, as it is responsible to the Allies, is to list only those who are starving, provided they belong to the stated category. For that reason the committee is obliged to examine strictly the needs of each category, because this aid is aid against death.

'The duty of those who accept the gift is to buy foodstuffs at once. Gold is given only because we cannot give foodstuffs, as the Red Cross does.

'The Western Macedonians should understand that this winter there will be greater danger of starvation than hitherto. All who can move to more

well-off areas where the Red Cross operates should go. Those who stay in the mountain villages must help one another. The Allies care for you with their blood and when they give a gift in time of war that gift is necessarily small and perhaps may not be enough to cover the needs of the various starving nations'.

Instructions were added in the light of experience gained in 19-24 December, and in particular any complaint was to be addressed not to the HQ of the Mission but to the local committee, so that it could be considered by the Officer of the Mission on the spot.

Evans was one of the officers distributing relief then and subsequently. He had to be on the alert. For instance, Aleko Karadzios, while serving as an Andarte, had a serious head wound and was destitute in the village Aetomilitsa, whereas his family lived in Pefkofito, a village in the area administered by Captain Backhouse. Because Karadzios had a certificate from the hospital, Evans felt justified in giving him aid despite the rule that relief could be given only in the village where the family was residing. At the same time he had to write urgently to Captain Backhouse to avoid a double payment. On another tour of villages between Pendalophos and Argos Orestikon he drew up the following report:

'In several villages my attention was caught by the large number of men presenting themselves with doctor's certificates to the effect that they were disabled and incapable of any kind of work. These certificates were signed by Doctor X. On 10 January I called on Doctor X in village Z to discuss the category of the disabled which he was interpreting much more widely than I under the terms of my order was able to do. During the course of the discussion he declared without my having mentioned either directly or indirectly the subject of money, that he had taken no payment for any of the certificates he had made out. The next day at village Y several men told the Divisional Representative that the doctor had demanded payment from them for the certificate of disablement; and the commander of the Vitsi Battalion told me that several men had come to him with complaints of the same thing. I have made this report so that HQ 9 Div can take whatever action they think fit'.

The system of administering relief which we had introduced in West Macedonia was adopted in all ELAS areas north of the Gulf of Corinth, when they passed under my command from late January onwards. It made considerable demands on Officers of the Mission who often had to sleep in the severe weather in a hovel or a lean-to alongside twenty or thirty villagers. But the relief certainly saved many lives, especially of young children, and our

personal supervision did ensure that the gold sovereigns bought food for the starving.

Another relief problem arose in the hard winter of 1943-44. When Italy surrendered on 8 September 1943, the Pinerolo Division of 15,000 men with all its equipment marched to Kalabaka and agreed to serve under the command of GHQ Middle East³. Since it was impossible to feed so many men at one place, the Italians were divided into groups. One group of 4,000 was allocated to West Macedonia, but before it reached Grevena the soldiers were persuaded by the oratory of General Kalabalikis to lay down their arms on the written promise that ELAS would feed them on the same rations as the Andartes received. The men were sent to camps in high Pindus villages, in order to be safer from the Germans who executed any member of the Division as a traitor. HQ 9 Div tried to trick me into paying sovereigns for their upkeep by placing them on the nominal roll of ELAS, but I refused and held ELAS to its written promise.

With the equipment and ammunition of the Pinerolo Division ELAS launched an attack on EDES in October 1943. GHQ Middle East condemned ELAS for starting the civil war and stopped all airborne supplies to ELAS. Consequently HQ 9 Div soon found itself unable to feed the Italians, and rather than let them starve I undertook in December to take them over on my own terms in the presence of Karatzas (the ELAS commander) and of the Italian C.O.⁴. I appointed an Italian officer (Captain Castiglione) to supervise parties of Italians, which were sent to collect from Grevena and nearby markets supplies purchased by ELAS at prices agreed by the ELAS QMS and myself. I then went to inspect the Italians who were brought together on parade at Dhoutsiko. After my departure from Macedonia Evans visited Dhoutsiko and made the following report on 17 February 1944:

'1. Dhoutsiko committee cannot buy anything but salt, oil, lentils, beans, chick-peas, raisins and sugar. HQ 9 Div told them two days ago not to buy wheat and maize in the eparchy of Grevena but to send via civilians selected by ELAS to Siatista and Kozani (both German-occupied).

'2. All prices for the committee were fixed by ELAS and all sovereigns were changed by ELAS QMS.

'3. Other committees here are from Prosvoro and Mesolouri, but they come only on Friday evening to leave on Sunday or Monday, the market being on Saturday.

3. See *Apple* 161 f.; *Venture* 98 f.

4. *Venture* 111 f.

'4. Prosvoro has sometimes only about six soldiers with no officer.

'5. Dhoutsiko committee says it is impossible that any committee bought rye at 60 okes per sovereign.

'6. Dhoutsiko has supplies now for the rest of February.

'7. Dhoutsiko committee is satisfied with ELAS cooperation.

'8. An Italian officer from Deskati who arrived here last Saturday, having fled twice from the Germans, told the Italians here that in accordance with an agreement between HMG and the Italian Government the AMM was giving each Italian officer 1 sovereign a month and two other ranks one sovereign a month. That, he said, was the rate in the area of 10 Div.

'9. Medicines. These people bought 8 sovereigns worth yesterday, because there is dysentery in the camp, and because the medicines (quinine etc.) sent from Pandalophos about a month ago were only a small quantity and had run out. The Medical Officer says the men will die if not given medicine. There are also 80 to 100 cases of malaria. Meanwhile I told them to buy no more medicine until I obtain an answer from my HQ.

'10. These people are worrying about the rate of 1 sovereign to 3 soldiers (? too little). Will it be increased? They say that to transport wheat from Kozani to Dhoutsiko will be much more expensive.

'11. Does the Italian Government know about the Italians in Greece? What is their position?"

It is evident that control over ELAS HQ had weakened. The final solution was that Italians were billeted with villagers and worked the land in return for food, while the AMM paid the villager one third of a sovereign a month. This system was developed in Thessaly by Major P. Worrall. He formed also two camps, one for sick Italians and the other for 'bad' Italians as a penitentiary. Casualties occurred mainly during drives when the Germans killed all Italians taken prisoner, and in Albania and Yugoslavia, through which countries ELAS said that Italians could walk home.

PART II. THE AMM AND THE ANDARTES IN THE VITSI AREA

2. First weeks in the Vitsi area

My plan to send Evans and Sergeant Kite to set up a station on Mt Vitsi lapsed when I was posted to AMM HQ and Lt-Col. Edmonds took over the command, which was now restricted to West Macedonia. In February Kite reconnoitred the Vitsi area, and Evans was sent to Grevena where he organi-

sed the construction of a landing-ground for aircraft. Thereafter Evans (now Captain), Lt. Zotos (temporarily), Sergeant Kite, two British wireless-operators, and 21 Andartes whom Evans and others had trained in demolition and commando operations at Pendalophos established their first HQ on Vitsi on 23 March. They had a convoy of 45 mule-loads of supplies, and their Andartes were armed with a Light Mortar and 2 Breda LMGs. Evans and Kite already knew the ELAS commanders, Lytrides and Arrianos. They were co-operative. Indeed they sent to Evans on 9 April their report of recent actions by ELAS. On 2 April they fought a battle against Germans between Ano Hydrousa and Drosopiya, inflicting seven casualties and suffering one; and on 4 April between Triantaphyllia and Vapsori, inflicting some 40 casualties and suffering two. On the latter date two other German groups reached Vapsori and Sidherokhori. Evans and his party had time to escape from Vapsori.

On 8 April Evans stated in a wireless message: 'SNOF, standing for Slaboden Narodn Onodofasistky Front, means Liberation National Anti-fascist Front and is, as far as I can see, ELAS under a Slav name. Have not seen a Slav equivalent of EAM. Know nothing of SNOF relations with Bulgaria; imagine same as those of EAM-ELAS. Here SNOF is used as synonym for EAM or ELAS indiscriminately. A few members of units here wear initials SNOF instead of ELAS on their cap-badges. The use of the Slav name is example of EAM's policy for minorities which is modelled on Russian policy'. He noted that the 8 Poles and Czechs operating as Commandos were particularly useful as they understood the Slav language of Vitsi Andartes. On 12 April Evans attended the first day of a three-day SNOF conference at Dhen-drokhori and resisted much pressure to make a speech. Representatives had come from villages in regions of Prespa, Florina, Kastoria and Amyntaion. 'Presence [of] Allied Officer among this mixed and wavering population helps unity against Germans, but EAM always trying to trap one into endorsing their internal political aim'.

On 9 April Evans sent to Edmonds a report of which I give a summary [with my additions in square brackets]:

1. The political situation among the Slav-speaking villages of the Vitsi area is complex. [Evans listed 32 in the regions of Florina and Kastoria; 3 more 80% Slav and 2 50% Slav; 1 Rumanian-speaking and one 50% Rumanian]. They may be divided into three classes. (1) 'Komitaji villages', which have accepted arms from the Bulgarian 'Komitato'⁵ or from the Germans.

5. The Bulgarians occupied Greece east of the river Strymon, but they also had re-

Their armed bands may attack us, they restrict the movements of the Andartes, and they report our whereabouts to the Germans. ELAS has invaded some such villages, executed 'traitors' and terrified the villagers into submission. (2) 'Converted villages', won over by EAM propaganda. The villagers were already anti-royalist, because they associated with the king the repressive measures of Metaxas; so they liked EAM's detestation of the king [and their men approved of the oath which ELAS recruits had to take, that they would stay in ELAS until a plebiscite determined whether the king would return to Greece or not]. On the positive side 'pseudo-communism is strong here. The internationale is sung and the clenched hand is raised in greeting'. There was little knowledge of communism, which was vaguely associated with EAM's Utopian 'laocracy'⁶. But the conversion remains fragile; for [in language and tradition] they have sympathies with the Bulgarian 'Komitato'. (3) 'Loyal villages', which have fully accepted EAM-ELAS with its war of liberation and its propaganda. One of these was Vapsori, where Evans established his first HQ. [Accessibility to one or other side was also a factor, because ELAS was as ready as the Germans to burn a hostile village].

2. Stores should be sent from Pendalophos to us only by night, dumps of supplies must be kept secret and we must be ready to move with prearranged rations at very short notice. For this area constitutes an intermediate stage between enemy-occupied territory and 'Free Greece'⁷.

3. ELAS forces here number about 550 armed men, mainly at Vapsori and Dhendrokhori, and a reserve of 1000 mostly unarmed. The Commanding Officer, Lytridhis, 'is in command on paper', deals with HQ 9 Div and heads the administration. The operational command lies with the 'Kapetanios', Arrianos, thanks to his dominant personality, quickness of decision, and military leadership; for 'his best quality is that he is an instinctive leader, a man with just the right amount of fire to make men follow and obey'. 'He is a democratic anti-royalist who does not like Communism but is careful not to say so in the hearing of other Greeks'. Evans found him inaccurate but not dishonest, and he intended to work with him in planning future operations.

representatives in Macedonia, e.g. at Kastoria. These representatives collaborated actively with the Italians, but they seem to have been little used by the Germans after the collapse of Italy.

6. This word was coined to serve instead of 'democracy', which had lost its original connotation.

7. This was the name given by EAM-ELAS to the mountainous area which was entered by the German forces only in strength.

4. The overall policy of AMM was to 'lie low' until such time as the withdrawal of German forces from Greece should commence, and then to launch continuous attacks under the code-name 'Noah's Ark'. Evans wanted now to give his Andarte commandoes experience in fighting by 'attacks on Komitaji villages, ambushing of Germans, attacks on German guard-posts, and defence of villages'; to reconnoitre targets with Major Scott; and to concert plans with Lytridhis and Arrianos. He foresaw much action during Noah's Ark, because Vitsi overlooks the road and railway system leading to the Monastir Gap, through which Germans would leave for Yugoslavia, and also the communications via Florina and Pisoderi with Albania.

5. He proposed to communicate with Edmonds by runners attached to AMM rather than by ELAS runners. Wireless communication via Cairo or Italy was slower.

At this time Evans signalled to Edmonds that 'anti-Quisling and anti-Komitaji operations were indispensable preliminaries to test worth of Andartes, clear ground of superfluous obstacles before time comes to strike main enemy, and to embarrass them'. Edmonds agreed that they were necessary 'but we must not be too closely connected with them'. On 23 April Evans reinforced his arguments for these operations, saying that the Komitaji villages formed an enemy front line, hindered attacks on Germans, and 'if not smashed now will be a nuisance when we attack road targets in Noah's Ark'.

Before a reply came to Evans' report, Kite took part in actions of 'our forces' as follows. On 14 April five Armenians were killed and seven were taken prisoner near Kraniona. These Armenians, conscripted into the Russian army, had been captured, maltreated by Germans and accepted arms as the alternative to death by starvation. On 15 April 150 Germans retaliated by moving towards Kraniona and Mavrokampos, and a column of Komitaji reached the heights of Sidherokhori. They carried off supplies and withdrew before our forces could reach them and engage. On the night of 18-19 April Kite accompanied as an observer the ELAS troops which made a night-attack on Perikopi which 'was harbouring Komitaji'. Fighting lasted from 4 a.m. to 7.45 a.m. with enemy losses estimated at 30 to 40 and ELAS losses 6 dead and 5 wounded. Eighteen houses of the village were burnt. Kite noted that the Komitaji were better armed especially with SMGs and hand-grenades. He judged Arrianos a very good leader, the quality of the Andartes first-rate, and the forces worthy of better weapons and more ammunition. 'The high standard of discipline', he wrote, 'I attribute entirely to Arrianos; he has

complete control of his officers and men, and they have complete confidence in him⁸.

A woman from Perikopi who was removed for interrogation said that 120 or so Komitaji from four villages rounded up the people of Perikopi and announced: 'We have got an order from Kaltchef⁹ and the Germans that you are to take arms to defend your village against the guerrillas who are trying to bring England here and reimpose the old Greek regime', i.e. the king and the dictatorship. A few men of Perikopi went to Kastoria to fetch arms, then more and more, but they were not all armed when ELAS attacked.

On 17 April Evans reported the arrival at his station of a Captain Macdonald with five members of his Mission and the 1st and 2nd Brigades of Zone 3 of Tito's Partisans on their way ultimately to ground north-east of Lake Ochrid. In conversation Macdonald and the O. C. 2nd Brigade said that no SNOF unit had penetrated north of the Greek-Yugoslav border so far. Evans described the relations of the Partisans with the EAM politicians as outwardly good, but he believed that the Partisans in reality despised all Greeks. 'Also I suspect all but most extreme EAM members feel involuntary nationalistic resentment towards representatives of an Independent Macedonia' [that being the aim of Tito]. He knew that ELAS was collaborating with the Partisans, because he had been at Pendalophos when Tzimas — a leading Communist — passed through on his way to stay at Tito's HQ¹⁰.

On 27 April the ELAS Battalion was holding elections to send representatives to Pendalophos. 'I hear all ELAS units are doing so as part of a move to form a provisional government'. [This had already been done in Albania and Yugoslavia, where rival organisations had been liquidated or rendered impotent. The elections were an indication that ELAS expected the Germans to withdraw soon and themselves to set up a Government in Athens]¹¹.

On 30 April Evans received Edmonds' reply. The new development was the destruction on 17 April of EKKA by ELAS on the orders of PEEA, thereby clearing the way for a descent on Athens. For this renewal of civil war GHQ Middle East stopped all supplies to ELAS except for any immediate operations against the enemy. Accordingly Edmonds could not obtain further supplies and ammunition for Vitsi ELAS. He wanted Evans to concentrate

8. Kite's report is cited in full in *DM* 108-10.

9. He was a Bulgarian representative at Kastoria (see n. 5 above).

10. See *Venture* 108; the pseudonym of Tzimas was Samariniotis.

11. For the setting up of PEEA as the Government of 'Free Greece' on 25 March 1944 see *Apple* 186 and *Venture* 132 f.

on 'auxiliary targets such as petrol dumps', and he passed on a directive from Cairo on 'interim operations' (i.e. pre-Noah's-Ark) as follows:

'1. Intention: prevent withdrawal further Hun troops from Greece between now and start of phase III of Noah's Ark.

'2. Method: attacks on opportunity targets such as small road convoys or detachments, railway engines, derailments etc. To be done away from main safe-harbour areas to avoid Hun interference there. Capture enemy equipment for use by guerrillas. Reduce risks reprisals to minimum, and try kill those responsible for their organisation'.

During these weeks Evans had established a regular system of information which was gathered by EAM agents in Florina and Kastoria and relayed to Evans HQ. He was able to send to Cairo a full account of enemy strengths at various places, troop movements by road and rail, goods traffic, and suitable targets for air attack. His proximity to both centres made this information particularly valuable, because it was up-to-date and relevant; for he had been trained in military intelligence and had instructed some Andartes in the art on courses at Pentalophos. There were reports in March of the Germans' efforts to recruit 'Security Battalions' (Greeks armed against the Andartes) in Florina and elsewhere. Names of collaborators were given and rival organisations such as EDES and PAO were said to be promoting the Security Battalions [there was no need to besmirch EKKΑ any more]¹².

3. A period of difficulty and frustration

In a signal of 1 May Evans reported to Edmonds on relations between the Partisans and ELAS as follows:

'30 April Lytridhis and Arrianos told me "28 or 29 April Serb Partisans attacked Hun Armenian garrison of Vigla Pisoderiou. Armenians there have been for days in communication with us via political organisation. One Armenian had already deserted and has been acting as go-between at risk his life. Via him we had told Armenians to desert with all your arms, ammn and mules and were waiting answer when Partisans attacked. Lytridhis and Arrianos added Hun has now increased garrison at Vigla. They say Partisans did not consult them before attack and had no right conduct any ops on Greek soil without ELAS permission. Also that Partisans using receipts system

12. See DM 29 with a note by P. I. Papathanasiou.

commandeered more food than villagers can afford and make secret propaganda against Greeks to Slav-speaking population'.

'My comments. Believe first part is true, also that Partisans did not consult ELAS before attack. Do not know if propaganda allegation is true and am keeping out of that hornets' nest. Partisan unit was at Trivouno morning of 30 April and is probably part of 2 Brigade making diversion for passage of 1 Brigade through Prespa. This lack of coordination, if not remedied soonest, will make serious trouble between ELAS and Partisans, also spoil Ark, as Pisoderi for instance is on Ark target 10, also will attract Hun drives which Vitsi Bn cannot hope to repel. Will take no steps, only look pleasant and keep mum till you send instructions. Arrianos and Lytridhis both nationalistic under skin but fairly amenable. My only action so far, evening 30 April sent courteous but firm note to Partisan commander area Trivouno ... (illegible line) make no attacks in ELAS areas without consulting ELAS and AMM as otherwise any offensive plans of Partisans, ELAS, AMM and Allied GHQ under whose orders we all are will fail. Coord and coop essential, and until these achieved by triangular discussion please hold your hand. Will send full text soonest'.

During the night of 8 May Vitsi ELAS attacked 814 Armenian Battalion. 'Vitsi Detachment captured 85 Armenians with their weapons, 2 Huns, 60 Hun rifles, 8 Russian auto rifles, 5 Russian LMGs, 4 Breda LMGs, 1 Maxim HMG, 28 pistols and revolvers, 1 telephone, 2 artillery horses, quantity ammu for auto weapons. Remainder of Armenians scattered towards Serb and Albanian Partisans. Thus 814 Armenian Battalion considered finished as Hun unit. Above infn from Detachment Commanders and probably reliable'. ELAS added the material to its armoury.

Evans was urged on 4 May to 'try keep in touch with Deyan¹³ or nearest Partisan leader to you for coordination in emergencies'. He commented on the effect of Tito's Partisans being on Greek soil in a signal of 13 May. 'The population in many villages here is in a quandary, because does not love Greece, yet hesitates to back Bulgaria and Axis and will follow whoever looks strongest. One result of this is that Ind Mac will probably be strong here [an Independent Macedonia being the policy of Tito's Partisans and of Russia]. When Partisan Brigades were here, Arrianos asked them to cooperate in attacking Komitaji villages, but Abbas [Tito's political officer in South Yugoslavia] declined'. On 18 May Evans sent a signal via Cairo to Edmonds on the subject.

13. Deyan was the Serb commander in the Prespa region.

'Believe present locations 1 Brigade and 2 Brigade of Zone 3 of Tito's Partisans are respectively Ochrid and Kaŕmaktsalan ("Cream-stealer" in Turkish, the cream being the snow-cap). On 16 May Arrianos and these Brigades in transit through [this] area recently and also Prespa. Partisans currently have been making propaganda to Slav population: "ELAS are Fascists out for Greek territorial integrity and will oppress you. We are Communists and will liberate you". Arrianos says Partisans are out for Independent Macedonia which "is an old Bulgar trick"¹⁴ and says there is increased Komitaji activity in the area Dhendrokhori-Prespa due to this. I told him, as before, if any trouble between him and Partisans, inform me at once. He has already sent for the politikos Athanatos to [come to] Prespa to "negotiate" but I think to put foot down. He would have told me none of this had I not pressed him. My comments. Suspect allegations are substantially true for following reasons. (1) Abbas, when at Vapsori, refused to help ELAS attack Komitaji villages and told me "I could win them all over to the Allies by political means". (2) After the attack on Sidherokhori in May Lazos, leader of Komitaji there, said in a taunting letter to Arrianos: "If you were real Allies you would wear red star like the Partisans, not the nationalist badge", taking the E of ELAS to stand for "Hellenic" [in fact the E stood for 'Ethnikos', National]. (3) There is other evidence that Mac nationalist spirit is nascent or resurgent here. Believe Independent Macedonia tendency is quite separate from Komitato¹⁵. MacDonald told me that 2 Brigade who are Macs as well as 1 Brigade who are Serbs hate the Bulgars more than the Huns.

'Do not think SNOF generally speaking has overcome local Slavs' deep-seated distrust of Greeks. Only mediation I shall undertake without instructions from you will be to quell urgent squabbles, e.g. armed clash if such arose. Arrianos is already planning to send a platoon to Prespa "to fight Komitaji" but it might be to fight Ind Macs. Can B2 do anything? It might prevent trouble if Deyan had a Mission attached to him. Meanwhile the genuine Komitaji problem increases and if not wiped out will virtually reduce this Battalion to a siege-force holding a small part of a sub-area. Vasileias is the nerve-centre of Komitaji power, and if this and two villages protecting it are smashed others will fall away. I realise this might give handle to Ind Mac anti-Greek propaganda, but such trouble can probably be stalled off till after Noah's Ark. Tailpiece: Arrianos is in queer mood of excited depression. He believes AMM is deliberately keeping ELAS short of supplies and that his

14. The reference is to the IMRO movement, founded in 1893; see *Venture* 74.

15. See n. 5 above.

own difficulties due to lack of ammunition and arms, especially mortars, is a direct result of this'.

One result of the growing threat from the Komitaji was the decision of Evans, reported in the signal of 13 May: 'from now on we shall not live in villages' [but encamped 'in the woods', the Mission with the Andarte commandoes and Italian muleteers totalling 'about fifty' personnel']. On 19 May Evans reported his belief that HQ 9 Div was trying to transfer Arrianos and his unit elsewhere, and he asked Edmonds to dissuade the HQ in the interest of efficiency in Noah's Ark. 'He is a good commander in action, a personality and real leader, and his men look up to him and obey him'. Next day Evans reported, and gave his full support to, a proposal by Sergeant Kite. 'When attacks on Komitaji villages begin, this Battalion is to uncover Vasileias by wiping out Perikopi and Polykerasos in one operation. The next operation is for this Battalion to attack Vasileias, thus drawing Komitaji reinforcements out of Kastoria, which would then be attacked by 28 Regiment. I consider these two operations would settle the whole Komitaji problem'.

On the following day Evans reported that Arrianos and his Slav-speaking unit had left the area and were being replaced by a Greek-speaking unit, that Lytridhis had been ordered to attack Perikopi, and that he (Evans) would try to restrain him. 'It would help if you get HQ 9 Div to lay down policy on Komitaji villages'. However, Edmonds stated 'the policy is not to attack Komitaji villages at this stage, but to operate on the road between Florina and Koritsa without touching the Ark target there'. On 24 May Evans reported to Edmonds as follows: 'Asproyeia, now armed, completely dominates our target 5. Nymphaion is hostile and expected to arm soon, in which case Flambouron as well. Five more villages are likely to follow suit. My conclusion is that the armed village problem is now growing so fast that the destruction of Vasileias, Polykerasos and Perikopi is not enough. Prompt action is necessary; otherwise Ark this area will fail'. In a subsequent signal Evans named eleven armed villages and added that 'Hun and Bulgar trying to force more villages along L of C to take arms, including some on Florina plain'.

On 27 May Evans reported that Lytridhis was making continuous sporadic attacks on Komitaji villages and claimed to have disarmed the Komitaji of Sidherokhori completely. Meanwhile his own Andarte commandoes, Evans said, 'were going bad on us from inactivity'. On 29 May he reported a remark by Yannoulis that Arrianos' men were unreliable and wanted Independent Macedonia. 'I am convinced this is correct and so HQ 9 Div will not send Arrianos back here. Some Andartes from Slav village went over

to the Partisan Brigades which were passing through with Macdonald'.

The wireless station, now run by Leo Voller¹⁶, sent a constant stream of signals about enemy positions and troop movements, which were reported to Evans by his two agents in Florina. They revealed that a large-scale attack on the Albanian Partisans was being conducted by a German Mountain Division. On 31 May Evans, Kite, their commandoes and a supporting Greek-speaking platoon of ELAS laid an ambush on the Florina-Koritza road. His subsequent signal to Edmonds was as follows.

'0555 hrs 31 May two sections of AMM Commandoes plus Kite and self plus one platoon ELAS Vitsi Bn at km 16 road Florina-Koritza ambushed three staff cars of HQ 1 Mtn Div leading large column from Florina. Destroyed two cars, third temporarily useless, killed one Hun Staff Officer, two NCOs, our losses nil. Captured large amount documents including complete list of units composing 1 Mtn Div, also complete list of code names of these units coming into force 0000 hrs 1 June, also latest Hun pamphlets on R-mine and on decontamination of roads etc. Also large quantity admin documents and orders for formation of transport columns from local mules and drivers Florina and Koritsa. Also sack of personal mail, newspapers, etc. Also Hun ACIs and AOs. Have sent all above to Edmonds with suggestion most important stuff be sent out for scrutiny by you. We withdrew 0630 hrs, contacted soidisant Serb Partisans, actually Ind Macs of Prespa and reached our camp in Vitsi woods 2 June. Pse inform if and when documents received by you'.

These documents were of the greatest value, as Evans who read German realised. They gave the AMM warning of the large-scale drive which was about to descend on West Macedonia¹⁷. In the action itself according to Evans the Andarte commandoes performed well; the platoon of ELAS did not. A fougasse charge proved very effective¹⁸.

Another such ambush was planned at the request of Edmonds; but the Andarte commandoes and the supporting ELAS section, going in advance, were surprised in the village Dhendrokhori at 7 a. m. by a force of 50 Germans and 80 Komitaji, all from Kastoria. Ten Andartes were killed, including the only sentry who was wounded and then hanged by the Germans. The enemy force lost 3 men killed and took from the village 25 hostages. Another ambush

16. A Sergeant in the RAF, who had run my wireless station at Krimini and Pendalophos in West Macedonia with great efficiency.

17. See *DM* 89 f.

18. A full account of the action is given by Evans in his 'General Report' pp. 36-52, which is among his papers.

was laid on the night of 22-23 June in cooperation with ELAS; but no enemy column passed at the appropriate time.

A difficult situation had arisen with a group of Komitaji who had been chased and then surrounded by three ELAS Companies on Mali Madhi ("Mt Big" in Albanian) north of Dhendrokhori. Their commander, Peyo, had fled as a Communist to Bulgaria during the dictatorship of Metaxas, and he conducted propaganda for Independent Macedonia 'under Hun and Bulgar auspices, not under Tito and Tempo'. He and his Komitaji escaped from ELAS northwards and took refuge with the Yugoslav Partisans. On 30 June Evans and two officers of the British Mission in Yugoslavia met Lytridhes and Kotchko 'agitprop' (? politikos) of 1 Partisan Brigade, who had come 'at Tito's orders to confer with Lytridhis about Peyo Komitaji'. Evans did not hear the result of the conference.

The attacks of Vitsi ELAS on the Komitaji villages continued throughout June. For example, on 17 June twenty-two Komitaji were disarmed at Asproyeia. Some Komitaji villages were plundered, for instance on 29 June ELAS carrying off from Polykerasos 700 sheep, of which 10 were presented to AMM. On 16 June, in reply to a query from Evans, Edmonds stated 'cannot agree involve RSR [due later] in any form of civil war but only against Hun. Hope Andartes can fix this on their own'. On 8 July a firm directive was given by Cairo. 'Allied troops under command AMM in Greece will not take part in any ops other than those against Germans. In event restart civil strife between rival Greek political or guerrilla factions ALOs will ensure no accusations of favouritism to either side can be made by any organisation in Greece. Such troops will be removed any area in which Gk versus Gk ops are in progress and will safeguard AMM HQs, dropping-grounds and vital Mission area'. [This directive represented a weakening in the approach to the aggression of ELAS towards rival movements].

During July AMM HQ in West Macedonia and HQ 9 Div were disrupted by a powerful German drive. The AMM and ELAS of Vitsi lay low in expectation that they would also be overrun, but nothing eventuated. Evans and Kite completed the reconnaissance, begun by Major Scott, of targets in their area. ELAS continued to take no action against the Germans, preferring to shoot up the Komitaji villages. ELAS sabotage groups refused to enter Florina unless armed with Stens. On 28 July the RAF bombed targets in Florina, of which Evans' agents had supplied information. The railway station was out of action for more than a fortnight. Estimates of German and civilian casualties were not dependable.

During this long period (May to August) of almost complete non-activity by ELAS against the Germans large sums were being expended by AMM in the Vitsi area. Edmonds authorised the payment from April 1st of 630 sovereigns a month to the 550 Andartes [a number stated by Lytridhes and Arrianos but never checked] as 'a subsidy towards their maintenance'. Large numbers of mules, some fine horses for riding, and large quantities of wheat and maize were purchased with sovereigns through Evans from Albania and sent with Italian muleteers, who were also paid, to Pendalophos. They were needed especially for the transportation of supplies from the coast of Epirus to West Macedonia. On the other hand, there had been no payments to the people of burnt villages, because they were Komitaji villages, victims of what was indeed a form of civil war. Stagnation seemed to have set in as regards operations against the Germans in the Vitsi area. Evans had been under great stress. For as the only officer of AMM Vitsi he was generally required to be available at his wireless set to receive orders or make replies, returns and reports of intelligence information, whereas he needed also to confer with ELAS, handle discussions with the Partisans, reconnoitre targets and mount ambushes. On 29 July Evans signalled to Edmonds: 'personal discussion urgently required, can leave today for flying visit'. He left soon afterwards and stayed at Pendalophos until his return to the Vitsi area on 28 August. During his absence the very capable Sergeant Kite was in command. He had two compatriots (Sergeant Voller and Corporal Long), 6 Greeks, 2 Czechs and 2 Poles as Commandoes, 5 Italian muleteers and 1 AMM runner.

4. Changes of Command, Komitaji villages and preparations for Noah's Ark

While Evans was at Pendalophos during August, changes of command and of policy took place. Some explanation of them, although it does not occur in Evans' papers, is necessary in order to understand the final stages in the Vitsi area.

From the start until mid-August SOE Cairo acted as the GHQ of the BMM, which became the AMM. In practice it agreed with the policy which was recommended by the Commanding Officer in the mountains — in sequence Brigadier Eddie (Myers), Colonel Chris (Woodhouse) and myself as Lt.-Col. Eggs (Hammond). The situation was slightly complicated in that Chris was retained outside Greece from May to early October in 1944 but was still nominally Commander. I was the Acting Commander from May to August, was not in communication with Chris, and formulated my own policy

which was generally in line with what he had been. Since late January I had been the Senior Liaison Officer with ELAS GHQ and Commander of all Mission stations with ELAS north of the Corinthian Gulf. My knowledge of ELAS was unique. Two or three times a week I conferred with the three men who formed ELAS GHQ: Siantos, who was Secretary of the Greek Communist Party, Despotopoulos, who conducted diplomacy, and 'General' Sarafis, a retired regular Army Colonel, who had — originally under duress — accepted Command of ELAS¹⁹. All matters of policy were decided by Siantos as the mouthpiece of the Communist Party, EAM Central Committee and PEEA, the last of which we did not recognise. That policy was beyond doubt to those who had seen ELAS attack PAO, EDES, and EKKA and knew of the close liaison with the Secretaries of the Communist Parties of Albania and of Yugoslavia, namely Hoxha and Tito. It was to eliminate any rival guerrilla organisation (only EDES in Epirus and Anton Tsoulos in East Macedonia were in the field in summer 1944), seize power on the heels of the German withdrawal, and set up PEEA in Athens as the official Government of Greece. For the implementation of that policy it was essential for ELAS to build up and conserve a large guerrilla army with a maximum of weapons and large reserves of foodstuffs and sovereigns.

In mid-August ELAS changed not its policy but its tactics, probably for the following reasons. PEEA, never strong in leading politicians, was isolated. A Russian Mission, attached not to Greek guerrilla organisations but to ELAS alone, was a disappointment; reaching ELAS GHQ in late July 1944, it had no means at all of arming and supplying ELAS, its currency was worthless in Greece, and it revealed the fact that the Russian army would not be able to reach Greece after the withdrawal of the Germans into Yugoslavia. The reputation of ELAS outside Greece was already dwindling, since a Government of National Unity had been formed and included representatives of EDES and EKKA. I pressed Siantos to disband PEEA and accept the offer of six offices in that Government. In mid-August he did so²⁰. I warned SOE-Cairo that this was a change of tactics only, and the aim of Siantos was still to eliminate his rivals in the mountains and to seize power in Greece²¹.

By mid-August preparations for Noah's Ark were well ahead. Small but well-armed groups of British and American troops, known respectively as RSR and OG, reached the Pindus range and were ready to be deployed.

¹⁹. For the circumstances see *Venture* 34 f.

²⁰. For the Russian Mission and Siantos see *Venture* 160-7.

²¹. See my signal of 21 August to Cairo in *Venture* 163 and 197.

Small groups of selected ELAS Andartes had been trained to work with those troops; they were known as 'Closandartes'. Three RSR groups and 200 Closandartes were destined for West Macedonia. All targets there had been surveyed and demolition plans finalised. In order to free me for the direction of Noah's Ark, on 10 August I appointed Lt.-Col. Edmonds to take over from me as Liaison Officer with ELAS GHQ and Major Prentice to command in West Macedonia.

Shortly after mid-August Brigadier Barker-Benfield, a regular officer, arrived at my HQ. He announced that he was now Commander of the Greek Section of Cairo SOE. Using his superior rank, he acted as if he was Commander of AMM and interviewed ELAS GHQ himself. His policy was to trust ELAS totally to collaborate in Noah's Ark and to have no further or ulterior aims, and on that account to supply arms and ammunition to ELAS generously and not, as hitherto, strictly for operations against the Germans. He intended to conduct Noah's Ark centrally from Cairo, whereas I intended to delegate command to Area Commanders, such as Prentice in West Macedonia, who would in turn allow individual officers to use their discretion in making attacks or demolitions. During the conduct of Noah's Ark he intended to collaborate closely with 'General' Sarafis, whom he regarded as the effective Commander of ELAS and not, as I maintained, the cardboard figurehead. When all this became clear, I sent a signal to Cairo SOE expressing my disagreement with his policy. When it became apparent that his policy was to be the approved policy, I asked to be relieved of my command, because I was not the appropriate person to execute it. My request was accepted. Lt.-Col. Edmonds took over my duties, and I flew to Italy with the delegates of EAM-ELAS who were entering the Government of National Unity at the end of August.

The fact behind the change in British policy was that Greece passed from SOE to the War Office, because it was to be entered by regular British troops on the heels of the withdrawing Germans. The thinking of the War Office appeared to be that Myers, Woodhouse and I had misjudged the aims of ELAS, and that ELAS would behave as a faithful ally of Britain if only it was treated liberally. This change of policy had two results in West Macedonia. GHQ Middle East, disposing of more aircraft, sent more military personnel and more supplies of explosive and other material to AMM; and at the same time it sent to ELAS 9 Div large quantities of military and other supplies.

On the other hand, Prentice took a much firmer line with HQ 9 Div than Edmonds had done. He insisted on action rather than promises, and he trained further Andartes as 'Closandartes' to support the incoming RSR groups.

His attitude and its effects are seen in some signals after 10 August.

His Situation Report from AMM Pentalophos to AMM Vitsi area on 16 August ran thus: 'HQ 9 Div for some time has been concentrating troops south of here with briefs further operations against Zervas (EDES); hence their frequent lies to bear out [alleged] dispositions and strengths. Prentice has put relations on a new basis of frankness, saying we know all about this and promising limited support in forward areas only. Number of Andartes [to be] supported by us [will] increase later if justified by results in ops and continued frankness by ELAS. Lack of cooperation between RSR and AMM due to complete failure to plan in this area until recently. We wish especially know quality of Vitsi Andartes as shown in current Florina ops'. On 20 August Prentice signalled to Kite 'do not give any more money to ELAS without further orders from me; this primarily is result of atrocious beating-up of Epirotes [a Greek in AMM's employment] by EAM-ELAS, and secondarily to failure of ELAS to retain Noah's Ark troops in area'. He also asked for Kite's estimate of the Vitsi battalion of ELAS in clothing, discipline and aggressiveness, and whether its Company commanders were Greek-speaking or Slav-speaking.

The attack on Florina was made by ELAS alone on the night of 13 August. Enormous claims were investigated by Kite. He signalled to Prentice on 17 August. 'Florina attack claims greatly exaggerated by ELAS. Commandoes and guerrillas returned here last night and report as follows. Andartes were in Florina for a total of $3\frac{1}{2}$ hours on night 13. Petrol and stores burnt, 33 Greek 'Gestapo' killed but few Huns, as these were in well-defended positions [a later claim was 20]. Reserve ELAS on Vitsi was mobilised for the attack. Total force used by ELAS was 600 including the Reserve ELAS'. The attack was said to have begun with the singing of the Independent Macedonia song, and Kite reported that the Serb Partisans lent Bren MGs to the Andartes for the attack. An agent in Florina said that the claim that EDES officers were forming Security Battalions in Florina 'has been swallowed and all cry anti-Zervas'²².

Earlier movements which had been reported were connected with this attack. On 15 August ELAS was reported 'to be conscripting Andartes in area, and 150 men from Laimos and 'Oxgermanos' [Ayios Germanos] are leaving today to join [these villages near the Yugoslav border]'. On 17

22. EAM maligned whichever organisation was its chief rival at the moment, whether EKKA, PAO or EDES. 'The Greek Gestapo' was EAM's phrase for the Greek Police of the Quisling Government.

August: 'Several men in Laimos refused to become Andartes but these were badly beaten up by ELAS. Yannoulis, the new commander of 28 Regiment, demanded from AMM sovereigns to pay merchants and submitted a list of ammunition, without which he declared ELAS could not undertake any further ops against the Huns'. On the other hand, ELAS was busily attacking the Komitaji villages with which the Germans were now ceasing to maintain contact. 'Vitsi Bn attacked Perikopi night 21. Five houses, two hay-stores burnt, 72 rifles, 3 MGs, mules, horses and food captured, also 73 prisoners, of whom 40 arrived in Vapsori when I [Kite] was there. All Reserve ELAS mobilised for these Komitaji ops, which are still proceeding'. At this time AMM stores, including explosives and medicines, were looted, and Kite made a complaint to ELAS.

On 2 September Prentice informed Evans that 'the reds yesterday occupied Siatista, Argos Orestikon and Kastoria and say they ambushed the withdrawing Huns'. The simultaneous withdrawal by the Germans from these three towns meant that the German route for the large-scale withdrawal was to be Kozani-Amyntaion-Vevi-Bitola (via the Monastir Gap), the last stage to be either through the plain or via Florina. The preliminary withdrawal left most of the armed villages stranded with no hope of German support. On the other hand, EAM-ELAS were now in full control of three important towns.

On 4 September Evans reported to Prentice: 'RSR section arrived today. Solon meeting second section at Khionaton ... 1 Sept Yannoulis rebels attacked Sklethron, ambushed Hun reinforcements from Kastoria, burning 4 trucks, 7 Huns killed, 1 MMG, quantity ammn and clothes captured. 3 Sept rebels entered Kastoria, destroyed 30 trucks from there near Klisoura. Above infm from Yannoulis'. On 4 and 5 September Yannoulis himself reported as follows to Evans:

'I am at Sklethron. I inform you villages Vasileias, Varyko, Lithia, Verga, Stavropotamos, Asproyeia, Sklethron and their (? instigator) Aetos have been disarmed. The criminals fled from these villages and others were drawn away after them'. 'I inform you that the Komitaji centre of resistance exists no more. We disarmed 100 men from Aetos. The Germans disarmed the remaining 130. New dispositions. 2 Coys with 3 MGs in Flambouron-Klidhi -Vevi. Keravnos
 • Coy stays put. Coy of Gotsi road Florina-Albania to work with Keravnos and with RSR when asked — base Mavrokhori.-1 Coy at Klisura—(? Dasym) and will be in comm with Ypsilantis. 1 Coy Ephedria [Reserve ELAS] at Koryphe'. [From the disarmed villages ELAS had taken large quantities of weapons, ammunition, animals and foodstuffs. What ELAS did with the 'prisoners'

is not mentioned in the papers]²³.

Prentice sent John Collins, an ALO, to be 'a kind of Town Major' at Kastoria. This town and any others which the Germans left were now controlled by EAM. On October 16, when the Red Cross tried to obtain relief for people in Kastoria, it found EA already in operation.

5. Smashem and surrender directed from Cairo

The order 'Smashem' to commence Noah's Ark on September 8th came from Cairo to Prentice and was relayed to Evans on the 5th. [The order and the following plan emanated from Cairo, i.e. presumably from Brigadier Barker-Benfield, not from Edmonds, and it had been formed in collaboration with GHQ ELAS]. On 8 Sept. ELAS was to attack Kozani with 2 Battalions from Siniatsikon and 3 Battalions from Bourinos, while the Vitsi Regiment was to attack Klidhi and to ambush the road north of Amyntaion. On 8 September AMM forces and RSR were to attack some Kozani, others a garrisoned town 'perhaps Naoussa', others the railway, while the Vitsi AMM and RSR were to demolish the railway line and lay ambush on the road near Klidhi in collaboration with Vitsi ELAS. Prentice added his own comment on this order. 'Emphasise all above is ideal and much probably not possible in the time; but do something on the above lines and remember as many ops as possible in the next few days'.

A report from Collins of RSR actions in the Klidhi area via Cairo to Prentice ran thus: 'Line blown morning 8th as reported. In spite of full plan made with ELAS no troops turned up to support op, which was entirely carried out by Commandoes. Night 8 Sept. plan made with ELAS to destroy road Vevi-Kelli with support of one Company but only 20 men turned up, so op cancelled. Mines laid outside Vevi destroyed two vehicles. Night 12 Sept, road in pass blown with support of only 12 Andartes, although full platoon promised. ELAS ops: 7 Sept. destroyed lengths of rail and one engine; road repaired by Huns at once. 8 Sept. attacked small post and then retired; des-

23. In his 'General Report' (n. 18 above) Evans listed three atrocities on information from eyewitnesses or/and participants, which he believed to be true. (1) A wounded ELAS Andarte was killed with an axe by a Komitaji of Dhendrokhori on 17 June 1944. (2) Some 25 captured Komitaji were massacred by 1 Bn 28 Regt in May or June 1944 near Vapsori. (3) Komitaji captured at Polykerasos and at Perikopi — '120, I think, but this is from memory only' — were massacred by 1 Bn 28 Regt in August 1944 on the order of Yannoulis.

troyed small unguarded bridge near Xyno Nero. 9 Sept. a tank shelled heights near Klidhi, many Andartes retired, train brought into the pass. 10 Sept. all Andartes retired towards Flambouron but returned next day. 11 and 12 no action. 13 Sept. road Vevi-Kelli blown by Andartes but repaired at once by Germans. 14 Sept. 100 Germans without tanks or artillery captured heights and Andartes retired in spite of excellent position. Road was repaired by Germans as the Andartes were no longer covering it, 15 Sept. 50 carts 70 vehicles went through the pass with no opposition from Andartes. In spite of ELAS statement that there are 3 Companies in the north of the pass I have never seen more than 40 men and 2 officers. All ELAS demolitions were carried out with explosives stolen from AMM, while Mission Commanders were greatly hindered in task through lack of explosives. ELAS also claim destruction of one Light Tank (probably on our mines), one car and bridge near Vevi but cannot be confirmed. In spite of repeated assurances from ELAS command that they would capture Hun posts in the pass no serious attempt was made to do so. Commandoes now withdrawn from area and going Boupfi'.

Kite operated with his commandoes trained in demolition [Poles, Czechs and Closandartes] at this time as follows: 'Sept. 5 Lekhovo [road-]bridge blown. Sept. 7/8 at Klidhi 300 metres line destroyed and 3 delayed charges laid, and road in Klidhi pass mined. Sept. 8/9 road Vevi-Florina mined and one vehicle destroyed. 12/13 road blown in Klidhi pass. Evans blew the road at Pisoderi on 8 Sept. Robby's RSR section blew road at 4970 on 8 Sept.; blew bridge on Albanian frontier on 10 Sept.; mortared Krystallopiyi guard-post no casualties on 12 Sept.; and 18 Sept. shot up Vatokhori bridge guard, one or more Huns killed. Alan's RSR section attacked the guard-post at kilo 15, sentry gave warning but 2 Huns killed, one wounded on 13 Sept.; and shot up Vigla guard-post on 14 Sept. Both RSR sections when not otherwise engaged have been covering Florina-Albania road with LMGs. Evans reported to Prentice on 21 Sept. 'Attacks on a defended position needed an assault force which we have not got, since RSR confined to support role. Robby finds Closandartes will not go in. Yannoulis' troops run away, see my letter. Only hope is Keravnos who may be better'.

In answer to a query by Prentice Evans confirmed that Yannoulis' claims for ELAS actions in Smashem were mainly adoptions of RSR and Kite actions in the Klidhi area. On 19 Sept. he sent a signal to Cairo: 'Gen sit. Andartes fighting little, if at all, and deceiving us as to strength, locations, ammunition. Do not think anything will induce them to fight. Only hope continue Smashem if OGP should arrive sooner for cooperation with RSR and we should have

plenty of explosives to do large-scale demolitions, which do not have to be held by fire to block routes ... RSR at moment harassing guard-posts on road Florina-Koritsa'.

[The Cairo plan failed because it depended for success on ELAS units making assaults in full strength against strongly held towns and guard-posts. ELAS failed completely to carry out their side of the plan. In consequence, no town or guard-post was captured in the entire Vitsi area. The Commander of an ELAS Company was reported to say of the guard-posts on the Florina-Albania road 'We could take these posts in half-an-hour. HQ does not permit us. We have orders to incur no losses, and we must kill 200 Huns for every Andarte killed'. There is no doubt about the truth of the first part of his remark. The RSR sections, having been strictly ordered only to support ELAS assaults in strength, were reduced to making single demolitions and shooting up guard-posts. Kite and Evans carried out the operations for which they and their Commandoes had been trained on the spot.]

[The plan had been hatched and timed in Cairo. It seems to have assumed that throughout occupied Greece there would be considerable movement of enemy troops on the railway and the roads which were to be mined, ambushed and 'covered' from the start of Smashem. In fact there was almost no movement on rail and road during this week in West Macedonia, and in consequence there was very little disruption of communications and few enemy casualties. Secondly, it was obvious that Cairo GHQ had failed to realise that ELAS would never act in strength against German troops, and that guerrilla operations, being opportunist by nature, had to be mounted not from a high command in Cairo but by commanders, even junior commanders, on the spot, who could lead their men²⁴. Finally, the weather in this Smashem week was wet, cold and misty, and it caused sickness and malaria among RSR and Commandoes waiting day and night on bleak mountainsides.]

Because Cairo GHQ expected ELAS with the support of RSR and AMM to capture towns and guard-posts, a directive was issued by Cairo to AMM stations on the subject of surrender. On 6 Sept. Evans received the following from Cairo via Pentalophos. 'To all areas. Orders re surrender of Huns. No surrender to be accepted by ALOs except in case of Div or larger. Surrender of all Hun forces in Greece ideal and for them to remain *in situ* with arms and equipment feeding themselves and await arrival of Allied Forces. Comply following orders. 1. Report full efforts surrender. 2. Do not accept surrender

24. As stated in my signal of 21 August in *Venture* 195 f.

less than complete. 3. Make no promise, guarantee or comment. 4. Only state you will refer higher authority; instructions in each case will be sent from here. 5. Attempt stop small parties surrendering themselves. Do not wish their arms obtained by guerrillas. All cases retain their arms until taken custody Allied Forces or further instructions received. All non-Huns such as Poles, French, Russians, Czechs treated as Hun. Noah's Ark your first task. Until ordered do not detain OG or RSR for guarding enemy equipment or PoWs'.

This directive was replaced by another from Cairo, sent on from Pentalophos to Evans on 21 Sept.: 'Directive of 6 Sept. now cancelled by new Cairo instrs. 1. Do not encourage small individual Hun detachments to surrender but do not prevent them offering. 2. Persuade Huns surrender to us rather than to Andartes. Point out we have no guarantee and accept no responsibility regarding treatment by Andartes. 3. Report every approach for surrender made by Hun. [Comment by Prentice follows: Above is vague and not very binding, particularly one. So carry on as before']. On the same day Evans relayed to Cairo the information from agents in Florina: 'Huns in Florina say to local people "we will surrender to Russians or British but not to Andartes"'. [Not unreasonably, since Germans had hung captured Andartes in the past and Andartes had executed captured Germans].

A particular negotiation was described in the following signal: '24 Sept. Christo, the Div politikos probably known to Prentice, had talk lasting 5 hrs with the guard-post at kilo 15. Alan [RSR Officer] was nearby, so attended talk. Huns said would surrender to British but not to ELAS. Alan told the politikos that he as a British officer would have no authority to hand over bodies and arms to ELAS. At 2200 hrs he left one Hun in tears, others nearly and saying "goot English". Politikos claimed all bodies and arms left would belong to ELAS. Comment [by Evans] can get most posts to surrender but only to be British PoW, not ELAS. Can proceed only if this formally agreed by Div'.

On 28 September Prentice advised Evans on the subject as follows: '1. Cairo policy against surrender small Hun groups, but owing possibility rebels close and hold road following surrender have requested Cairo permission proceed this case. 2. Have requested from Cairo. Mortlake [should obtain] order from ELAS GHQ to 9 Div stating [that the] disposal of PoWs and arms [is a] matter for decision by Supreme Command and weapons not automatically ELAS property'. He continued as follows: 'Div appear willing play but will require order. Pending reply Cairo on 1 above do not continue surrender talks. Meanwhile, pending answer on 2, try get Yannoulis to concentrate PoWs and deserters with their arms, and self trying get immediate order from

Div this effect. Probably some bodies and arms will slip through now in which case do not worry. Hope matter settles in a few days. Agree Kastoria temporary concentration point, and if Yannoulis agrees with this concentration send PoWs there now. Meanwhile Macki had talks surrender 25 Sept. with officers representing OC Northern Greece. Colonel unable to be present owing to a train ambush, so talks postponed. This looks like real thing, so going Vermion immediately with Peter'. On 5 October Evans informed Prentice 'Hope surrender all Hun forces [in Florina] be arranged'.

While negotiations on the British side were halted or aborted (as happened on Vermion and in Florina), Cairo issued yet another directive which reached Evans on 30 September via Pendalophos, where Prentice added 'further additional blurb from Cairo': 'Hun surrender. 1. Make Hun aware your presence sole channel negotiations, as prior instructions. 2. Only discuss surrender with Senior Officer in command. When Hun approach made, report fully when unit prepared to surrender. Cairo will instruct. Method to be settled between Hun envoy and ALO after instructions from Cairo. Make sure understood terms now not unconditional and may be altered'. Considerable delays in signal traffic did not help. On 6 October Evans summarised the difficulties in a signal to Cairo:

'Ref. desertions, surrenders, all guard-posts, and other small Hun detachments. Success not possible if every case has to be referred to you for instructions. During delay between first approach and receipt of instructions guard-post may be strengthened or replaced. Most guard-posts will give in, but many contain one or two individuals who would give show away if given chance. Please give us blank cheque proceed, or else tell us to leave small detachments entirely alone and concentrate on getting formal surrender of all their troops this area. Your instructions to Pendalophos refers. Believe ELAS will play ball about arms and equipment'.

On 8 October Cairo issued a new directive. 'All negs for surrender German army North Greece will be made in conjunction with local ELAS 9 Div and ELAS GHQ. Sarafis has been authorised to accept surrender of Germans all ELAS areas. Negs for major surrender must be referred phase by phase to Cairo for information and decision by Force 140. Following suggested line for you for major surrender to include: "If British orders to surrender are faithfully carried out, all German commanders and troops in North Greece will have opportunity to surrender direct to British and their safety will be responsibility of British forces when they arrive ... German troops will concentrate in suitable areas decided by Sarafis possibly west of Salonica. You [Prentice] will be British plenipotentiary on the spot but negs should always

be referred to Sarafis, who should if possible take part'. A note was added at Pendalophos by Wickstead. 'Both Sarafis and Zervas come under General Scobie Force 140, and it looks as though, in return for toeing the line, they are to be allowed to ride the big white horse'.

[Remote control from Cairo and time-consuming intercommunications between Cairo and the local AMM W/T station, which was usually at a day's distance or more from the scene of any proposed surrender, made it almost impossible for the officer on the spot to conclude any agreement with would-be surrenderers. Four separate directives between 6 Sept. and 8 October caused confusion and delay. The first three directives did not advise on the problem of being associated with ELAS on the spot of any would-be surrender. Under the fourth directive the officer on the spot had to negotiate both with Cairo and with Sarafis, presumably through Cairo or through AMM GHQ, before he could reply to the would-be surrenderers. The idea that Sarafis could be present at negotiations, e.g. on Vermion, was unrealistic, since his GHQ was far back in South Pindus and a journey of days on horseback or on foot would be needed to bring him to the scene of action. It is not surprising that no considerable surrenders occurred in West Macedonia, and that the great majority of deserters with their arms fell into the hands of ELAS, as Evans foresaw in a signal of 29 Sept. commenting on Cairo's third directive. 'Will carry out Part 2, but can guarantee Andartes will take all arms and equipment of all prisoners'].

6. The rest of Noah's Ark and the Independent Macedonia movement

GHQ Cairo sent out a report to all stations; it reached Evans via Prentice on 26 Sept.: 'Ark results excellent. Hun withdrawal hampered very seriously. Using sea but shipping attacked successfully. Unable give time limit Ark, hope obtain more sorties. As there will be work after Ark do not risk collapse Mission but try continue utmost endurance', to which Prentice added 'do not know if work after Ark implies night clubs Florina or staying AML'.

From the third week in September when German troops began to withdraw towards Yugoslavia there was a continuous flow of signals from Evans HQ, reporting the strength of enemy garrisons, the traffic on the railways to Florina from Arnisia and from Kozani and from Florina to Bitola, and the movements of enemy columns along the main roads which converged near Florina on the way to the Monastir Gap and Bitola, namely from Koritsa in Albania, Kozani in the south, and Arnisia in the east. One officer had always

to be with the wireless-set, as Evans reported on 6 October. 'Chandler or other officer has to remain at HQ for the following reasons. 1. Heavy signals traffic. 2. Continual supplies and information to be sent to the three RSR sections, Closandartes and Kite's Commandoes. 3. Sifting copious but inaccurate information. 4. Interrogation and disposal of deserters of whom the number is expected to increase'. Evans himself was kept busy also as linguist in German, French and Greek.

Vitsi ELAS continued to stay on the defensive, as ordered by ELAS GHQ, and did not deploy its reputed 550 well-armed Andartes against the Germans. As Evans signalled on 6 October, 'rebel tactics are "safety first", and the only way to delay the Huns is a continuous series of demolitions'. On 16 October, for instance, Evans received a letter from Captain Tozer, an ALO with an RSR section at Krateron. 'I have not seen or heard of Ptolemaios/Keravnos [commanding an ELAS Company] since they delivered their ultimatum on the 12th. Except for our own [Closandartes], there is not one Andarte to be seen in the area, and to my knowledge there are no Andartes on our stretch of the Albania-Florina road'. In order to press ELAS Evans asked Cairo on 15 October 'to send no more ammunition for the Andartes'. At that time the Battalion of Gotchi mutinied, and Vitsi ELAS sent some of its forces against him (see below). The attitude of ELAS was in contrast to that of EDES. On 17 October Ioannina was liberated, and agents in Florina reported strong attacks by 'EDES and the English' on the withdrawing Germans, even as far as Erseke in Albania²⁵.

A continuous series of demolitions was maintained by the British forces-AMM, RSR and after 6 October a sapper section of LRDG. Kite and his Commandoes (Poles, Czechs and Greeks) kept up their amazing record: '19 Sept. blew the road between Boupfi and Ano Kleinai and destroyed three bridges. 19/20 [i.e. that night] destroyed 300 m of railway track and laid three delay-charges at Papayannis. 21/22 laid mines on road Florina-Monastir; one vehicle destroyed. 24/25 blew culvert on road Vigla-Florina; two vehicles destroyed. 25/26 culvert blown on road Vigla-Florina, as Huns repaired previous blow in a half-day; and went to Vigla guard-post with Lt. Chalkley to arrange surrender but we would not accept. 27/28 300 m of railway line destroyed and three delay-charges laid at Papayannis. 28/29 went with RSR to heights over Vigla to ambush Hun column but mist was too low. 30 tried to blow the road Vigla-Florina but Hun guard-post prevented this. Oct. 1/2

25. Woodhouse described EDES as 'coming up to expectations which were high' in September and October (*Apple* 78).

moved to Krateron as Hun drive reported. 2 returned to Boupfi. 4/5 blew culvert on road Vigla-Florina with RSR in support. 6 left Boupfi for Krateron owing to Hun shelling. 7/8 railway bridge prepared for blow, 200 m. railway line destroyed. Result: one engine, one carriage and the bridge destroyed on 8th, train falling into gully, 6 Huns killed, 5 captured. RSR in support. Road Florina-Monastir was mined and one vehicle destroyed. 9 met LRDG officers. 10 Huns repairing culvert blown on 4/5 were shot up by Commandoes and RSR. 11/12 blew culvert at Vigla-Florina road and mines laid on the road; and Huns were shot up with RSR support. The next four days were spent in making plan for a combined op by LRDG, RSR and AMM. 17/18 destroyed 300 m. railway line and laid 3 delay-charges at Greek-Yugoslav border; laid mines on the Florina-Bitola road with RSR support. One vehicle destroyed. 19 Moved to the heights over a culvert on the Vigla-Florina road for a combined operation, but op postponed that evening for 24 hours. 20 Ditto. 21/22 Blew culvert on Vigla-Florina road; combined LRDG, RSR, Commandoes, RAF op. 26 Reconnaissance on the plain. Explosives awaited. 28 Left to attack railway but cancelled at the last moment — no guides at the rendezvous. 31/1 Nov. blew road Florina-Proti with RSR support. 1 Nov. present at Florina gun-duel and entered the town at 17.44 GMT. Evans added notes on the lack of ELAS Andarte support, the effect of the bad weather on the operations, as well as on the personnel, and 'the consistently outstanding work by Sergeant Kite'.

The RSR sections were posted as follows on 30 September. 'Lambhead and section at Ayios Athanasios with task ambushes on Florina-Edessa (via Arnissa) road. Robinson and section in Trivouno area watching the Koritsa-Florina road. Chalkley and section at Boupfi with the task of watching the Florina-Koritsa road'. Since the RSR were under a separate command, they figured seldom in the AMM signals, but there is a note on some activities by them among Evans' papers. We may cite those of Robinson's section. '7/8 Sept. road blown near Little Vigla. 9 move to Gavros and recced Vatokhori guard-post at bridge. 11-12 ambush positions on road. 12/13 harassed guard-post Krystallopiyi. 14 section still in ambush position. Recced Krystallopiyi guard-post; negative attack by Andartes and Albanian partisans. 15 move to Gavros. 16 recced Vatokhori bridge guard-post, Huns improving defences. 17 positions taken for that guard-post. 17-19 harassing guard-post. 20-27 guard-post continually harassed, and no sentry on the bridge day or night. No movement on the road. Not allowed to attack the guard-post or ask for surrender. 3 deserters arrived from the village. Section living out all the time in bad weather. 27 a column of 1500 started passing, but Huns had taken over

the section's positions and had taken thorough defensive precautions for their move. 29/30 move to Bouphi'.

The activities of another RSR section were as follows: '17 Sept. two sections and AMM to blow railway south of the Yugoslav border and mine the road. Held up by huge, continuous Hun column. Rob, Alan, Kite and Gerald watched from 30 yards while the Huns mended a puncture. 20 negative ambush due to insufficient liaison beforehand. 21 joint blow, results 2 trucks destroyed by blow, 3 fired by RAF, 18 damaged, 80 Huns wounded, killed unknown. 24 Rob section to Florina-Bitola road with four mines. Negative. 25 section ambushed a column which included cyclists; 4 Huns casualties. 27 General staff car destroyed and 3 officers killed by mine laid 21 Sept. 4/5 Oct. Florina-Koritsa road blown and ambush laid by both sections. 5 twenty Huns ambushed when inspecting blow, but one Andarte spoilt the show [firing too soon]. 6/7 Rob section and AMM on 26-mile walk to the Florina-Bitola railway. 7/8 bridge collapsed (see Kite's report). Constant guard kept on Florina-Koritsa road. 10 saw thirty Huns trying to repair the blow of 4/5 as two trucks had gone off the road. Eight HMGs fired on them. Results not known. 11 gave protection to Kite blowing road. Shoot at three trucks. Heavily mortared and machine-gunned'.

The first group of British troops of General Scobie's Force 140 landed at Patras on the night of 3/4 October and proceeded on the trail of the withdrawing Germans, whose demolitions impeded progress. On 27 October Prentice informed Evans as follows: 'One British officer recceing route in your area, probably followed by CO. Siatista-Argos-Xyno Nero-Flambouron reported clear for Jeeps. ... Patforce now in position in the area of Kozani'. It was at Kozani that Force 140 fought its first action against the Germans²⁶ and later pursued them to the Monastir Gap, where Tito refused the offer of help and kept Force 140 out of Yugoslavia. On 4 November a message was passed via Evans HQ to the commander, Colonel Jellicoe: '1. ELAS is being instructed through Force 133 [AMM] not to attack the Security Battalions unless ordered by you. 2. Am trying to get a Government representative to Grevena but ETA probably not before 2 November, weather permitting'. By this time AMM Vitsi was under the command of Force 140.

For the last part of Noah's Ark Vitsi ELAS had been distracted by a mutiny of which the leader was a Slav-speaking native of Melas, called Gotchi, who had joined ELAS in winter 1942/43 'with *soidisant* left-wing views'. Evans

26. See DM 253 f.

described him as having won an excellent reputation as a fighter against the Germans and as being used by EAM-ELAS to win other Slavophone Greeks for their cause. In summer 1944 he raised 2 Bn 28 Regt mainly from the area Dhendrokhori, Koryphe, Alonas and Ayios Germanos, i.e. from Slavophone Greeks, and when he became its commander the Battalion distinguished itself in an action against the Germans according to a signal of 9 September. On 10 October Prentice signalled to Evans: 'I learnt today that 2nd Bn 28 Rgt is in revolt. In my opinion revolt is usual timely Hun propaganda to protect his roads this frantic moment ... we must not be involved. Do not give more stores to this Bn. HQ 9 Div asks us to withdraw any ALO if with this Bn. Karatzas and Lokaris [the chief political leaders of 9 Div] arriving Flambouron tomorrow'. Next day 3 Bn 28 Regt informed Evans that 'units of ELAS went on 11 Oct. to disarm the Gotchi Bn which mutinied'²⁷. So on 12 October Evans reported to Prentice as follows: 'Revolt of 2nd Bn 28 Regt, also one Company of 1 Bn 28 Regt, arose from the order of Yannoulis that 2nd Bn should go to Vermion. Macs wanted to fight only in their own locality. No evidence of Hun propaganda. ELAS sending two Companies to disarm the Bn. No ALO with Bn, and stores are always given to Yannoulis. I shall reach Flambouron tomorrow'. [It may be recalled that the Battalion of Slav-speaking Macedonian Greeks commanded by Arrianos had been moved with him to Vermion and not sent back to Vitsi, although Evans asked HQ 9 Div to return it to the Vitsi area].

On 17 October Evans sent to Cairo a signal about the dispositions of ELAS forces: 'They are temporarily confused owing to the sudden eruption of the Independent Macedonia tendency in 2nd Bn 28 Regt in area Koryphe to Prespa. Am keeping Prentice fully informed about this mutiny and ELAS measures against it. Serious trouble may result but do not think so. But unless the Greek National Government has firm, consistent, liberal policy for Slav-speaking minority in Greece the problem will be a running sore after the war. Will send ELAS dispositions when they crystallise, and meanwhile am trying to make them concentrate on Huns in whom they are not so interested'. On 24 October Evans noted '1 Bn 27 Regt and Amyntas will send 2 Companies to Prespa to fight Gotchi (this includes Paleologos)'²⁸.

In a signal of 14 November to Pomforce [part of Scobie's army] Evans stated that after mutinying 'Gotchi went to Ayios Germanos with the whole

27. See DM 219 and the note by P. I. Papathanasiou.

28. Evans gave the dispositions of Vitsi ELAS units on 24 October in a signal which is among his papers, in 'Blocco per Appunti'.

Battalion and also many villagers, some taken by force, some carried away by enthusiasm. After the German withdrawal Gotchi and his force moved to Bitola and the area south of it towards the Greek frontier. He has excellent relations with the "Serb" Partisans in the area Bitola-Ochrid-Prespa, who are in fact Macedonians ready to fight to set up a Free Macedonia. Gotchi's movement would not by itself be more than an abortive revolt by the peasants of a small area, but with the support of Macedonian Partisans in the area of Bitola, some of whose leaders are intelligent and educated men, it will probably take serious proportions. These Partisans are those who were and as far as I know still are under the command of Tempo [Tito's second-in-command]. From reliable sources the situation in Bitola is the following. Most of the population say "We have been liberated from Huns but who will liberate us from Partisans? We want British troops here". Partisans are conducting propaganda and minor terrorism in favour of Independent Macedonia and victimising the Greek minority and all who have British or American sympathies. Also talking wildly about marching on Florina and Salonika, but I do not know if they will mount an organised offensive. The supreme power in all matters in Bitola is the Communist Party more or less camouflaged. The Macedonian flag, namely gold star on red ground, flies everywhere in town'.

'The situation in Florina from my own observation is as follows. (1) Most of the population is anxiously waiting for British troops to arrive and Greek Government to take over civil administration. (2) Everything at present is run directly or indirectly by the Communist Party who have cowed the population by orders not to fraternise with the British. Proportion of genuine Communists here is small but very well organised. (3) There are strong indications that the Communist Party is secretly cooperating with Gotchi and allowing his agents to enter Florina in civilian clothes, but I am not sure of this. (4) The Party is trying to levy 1500 sovs from the people of Florina. (5) Passes for travellers Florina-Bitola are issued only by the Party. (6) ELAS 27 and 28 Regts are stationed at Florina and Armenokhori with advanced elements near the frontier. (7) It is rumoured that ELAS will give up its arms by 10 December as the initial move towards the formation of a National Army, but I know that leading Communists here have denied this. ELAS have a quantity of arms and ammunition hidden in the mountains, also a large quantity of food abandoned here by Germans. (8) Most villages in this area are almost pure Slav and would probably support Gotchi, if occasion were to arise. Many villagers are proud to call themselves "Macedonians, not Greeks". (9) Morale of the Florina population is low. General gloom. ELAS is frightened by Gotchi and appears ripe to split up into various political components,

but it is still held together by its Red nucleus. The Greek section of the population would normally rise as one man to meet the Slav threat but is disunited, because the only available leadership is offered by ELAS, which is still powerful but not popular except with Communists. The most obvious need is for centre or right to provide some sort of leadership, which so far they have completely failed to do. The Slav population distrusts ELAS and also the prospect of a Greek Government and everything Greek, but it is not yet openly demonstrating in favour of Gotchi or Tempo's Macedonians. Slavs are, as usual, wary of committing themselves'.

'My comments: (1) The presence of British troops here is highly desirable and would in itself diminish the Communist hold on the population. Strength one Company or more. Not Indian troops, as this would offend all sections of the population. We know that they are fine troops, but Greeks would think them merely "black men" and would regard them as an insult. (2) It is essential that the Greek Government send representatives and undertake civil administration. (3) This would be an initial step towards unity in this area, and then the Slav threat would be a good not a bad thing, as it would help to unite the Greeks not only in Macedonia but everywhere, as it would cause them temporarily to abandon squabbles of Greek versus Greek. (4) BMA currency or preferably the new drachma is badly needed here'.

After leaving Greece Evans wrote a General Report, which summarised much that is here narrated in detail with the original signals. He made in it some general comments on the ELAS forces in the Vitsi area and their activities in three periods in 1944 as follows:

'March-May. The ELAS unit was the 'Vitsi Detachment of 9 Div', a slightly under-strength battalion raised during winter 1943/44 by Arrianos from the villages of the Vitsi area and coming directly under command of 9 Div. The positions of its Companies and of the platoons which the Companies used to put out on detachment duties varied considerably, but the basic plan was always to occupy a ring of villages surrounding Vapsori, the natural centre of the area. ,

'Arrianos' battalion was remarkable in that it was one of the few ELAS units which lived up to the heroic description tacked on to the Andartes by the Allied press and propaganda. That is, it really was a battalion drawn from the people through and through, including its officers, and as keen on fighting the foreign oppressor as the indigenous oppressor, i.e. anyone whom EAM did not like. Arrianos' Company Commanders were good stout fighters, whose men would follow and obey them in difficult situations. They all showed a genuine decency and warmth of feeling towards us which the politikos could

never counterfeit. They were thoroughly Left-wing, yet they never showed any hesitation in co-operating with "the reactionary, plutocratic British". I have very warm memories of these people, as I have of Arrianos. Both he and they, though they were no angels and had certainly murdered a few political opponents, had something cordial and genuine about them which is one of several good things which the Left-wing movement in Greece represents.

'May-August. The Vitsi Detachment was replaced by I Battalion 28 Regiment of ELAS, which also for a while was known as the Vitsi Detachment. This Battalion's positions were always designed with a view to fighting the Komitajis rather than carrying out defensive and offensive operations against the Germans. Thus the main areas occupied came to be the ridges overlooking the road Amyntaion-Kastoria from the north, and Dhendrokhori-Ieropiyl. This Battalion also made a point of having a platoon in the area of Prespa to maintain Greek national influence and EAM political influence among the villagers there, who showed an occasional tendency to listen to the Komitajis and a marked tendency to veer towards Independent Macedonia, both that of Tito-Tempo-Deyan and that of Peyo-Gotchi. Arrianos had been very keen to maintain Greek influence but had had to tread warily because most of his own Andartes were Slavs in speech. I Battalion consisted mostly of Greek-speaking Greeks, and its Commander and its Kapetanios, Lytridhis and Yannoulis, had no trammel upon them. Their orders to Company Commanders, whenever Company positions changed, used to include the phrase "to prevent the advance of any enemy whatsoever, whether Germans, local reactionaries, Bulgars, Komitajis, or autonomists". It was during this summer that Gotchi, a villager of Melas, raised the Slav-speaking Battalion which came to be known as II Battalion 28 Regt. It mutinied in October.

'September. Command of I Battalion 28 Regt was taken over by Lt. Tsamis, I rather surmise because he was first and foremost a soldier and had, as far as I know, no particular political affiliations.

'I Battalion had a straightforward military role in Noah's Ark, which it did not fulfil, but this was no fault of the excellent leadership of Tsamis or of the devotion and endurance of the Andartes. It was the fault of the ELAS system and direction generally, in this case entrusted to Yannoulis, who after Lytridhis' departure stayed on as Kapetanios of I Battalion and Liaison Officer with the AMM both for that Battalion and for 28 Regt'.

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EVANTHIS HATZIVASSILIOU

THE LAUSANNE TREATY MINORITIES IN GREECE AND TURKEY
AND THE CYPRUS QUESTION, 1954-9

The evolution of Greek-Turkish relations after the war, it is widely accepted, is a sad story. Probably the sadder part of this story is the one concerning the Christian minority of Istanbul and the Muslim minority of (Greek) Western Thrace. The Istanbul minority consisted almost totally of ethnic Greeks, whereas ethnic Turks formed half of the Thracian minority, the rest being Pomaks and Gypsies. These people had been allowed to remain in their regions after the obligatory exchange of populations which took place at the end of the Greek-Turkish wars of 1912-22. In the case of the Istanbul minority, in fact, its position in the site of the Oecumenical Patriarchate of Istanbul was seen as indispensable by the Greeks for the preservation of the influence of the Oecumenical Throne. Problems occurred immediately over the implementation of the Lausanne Treaty, as the Turks strove to reduce the influence of the Patriarch and put forward exaggerated demands concerning compensations due by this Treaty. These difficulties were overcome in 1930, when the two great statesmen, E. Venizelos of Greece and Kemal Atatürk of Turkey, initiated a new era of Greek-Turkish co-operation. Thereafter, the presence of the minorities was regarded as a further pillar strengthening the Greek-Turkish axis of the 1930s. Yet, the Istanbul minority had a particularly harsh time in the war years, when Ankara imposed the *Varlik* tax on its members. It must be stressed that Turkish citizens of Turkish origin did not have to pay such tax. After 1945, however, the evolution of the cold war and the accession of both Greece and Turkey to NATO (in 1952), indicated that Greek-Turkish co-operation would be resumed. Indeed, the two countries had been strategically interdependent since 1930; the cold war intensified such interdependence even more. The emergence of the Greek-Turkish-Yugoslav alliance in 1953-4, and the revival of the Oecumenical Patriarchate, under the new Patriarch, Athenagoras, were further signs that the minorities would again become a link, not an issue, between the two countries. Athenagoras proved a strong personality who could guarantee the preservation of the influence of the Oecumenical Throne. Such influence, furthermore, now

had a dimension touching upon cold war realities: if Istanbul lost the spiritual leadership of the Orthodox, the most likely institution to assume it, would have been none other than the Moscow Patriarchate, since the USSR was the most populous Orthodox country¹.

Despite these, Greek-Turkish relations followed a different path. The violent Turkish response to the Greek claim on Cyprus, destroyed such prospects. It has to be remembered that Ankara always suspected that the Patriarchate and the Istanbul minority were the remnants of the *Megali Idea*, the old Greek aspiration of re-establishing a large Greek state in the Eastern Mediterranean. This, of course, was rather unreasonable, as the *Megali Idea* was abandoned by the Greek state after the Lausanne Treaty, when the Greek-Turkish exchange of populations removed any ethnological basis for a Greek claim to territories in Asia Minor. However, the Greek claim to Cyprus triggered all sorts of anxieties in Ankara, for the Turks, always preoccupied with strategic concerns, immediately held that the *Megali Idea* was being revived. The Greek side substantiated its claim on the island on the grounds that 80 percent of its inhabitants were Greeks: for Athens, it was natural that they would like to chose their own future. Any irredintism was not necessarily the *Megali Idea*, nor was it necessarily directed against the Turks. However much this was clear, though, Ankara did not appear to believe it. And for the present article, what counts is not what was the case, but what Turkey thought². The irony was that the Christians of Istanbul clearly disagreed with the dynamic action of the Greek Cypriots, as such action would put the Istanbul minority in a very difficult position. For example, in Spring 1956, Athenagoras told the Americans that he had advised Athens against taking the issue at the UN. Athenagoras also clearly resented Makarios's political role³.

1. Alexis Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations, 1918-1974* (Athens, 1983); pp. 112-123, 174-180, 211-213 and 244-251.

2. The point that Turkey was afraid that Greece would, one day, revive the *Megali Idea* was made by Ambassador Gheorghios Pezmatzoglou in a letter to Karamanlis, on 31 May 1957, when the Ambassador tried to formulate the tactics of his approach to the Turks: see Karamanlis Archive, Athens, Constantine G. Karamanlis Foundation, (hereafter KA), reel 6, pp. 313-320. See also Neoclis Sarris, *Η άλλη πλευρά: Διπλωματική Χρονογραφία του διαμελισμού της Κύπρου με βάση τουρκικές πηγές* (The Other Side: Diplomatic Chronicle of the Dismemberment of Cyprus, Based on Turkish Sources), volume B, Book A I (Athens 1982), pp. 61 and 81.

3. Memorandum (Athenagoras-Robert G. Miner), 17 April 1956, Washington D.C., National Archives, State Department records, Record Group 59, decimal file number 747c.

This article will try to trace the interrelation between the presence of the two minorities and the dispute over Cyprus. As such, it will not attempt to discuss the history of the minorities. Social questions will be addressed only insofar as they touched upon the Cyprus issue, or were influenced by it. In this respect, though, it may be useful to stress a difference of a social nature between the minorities: the Istanbul one was an urban community, its members spoke Turkish and as a result were usually well educated and with a high standard of living; the Thracian one was rural, with an inadequate command of the Greek language, as a result badly educated with a very low standard of living, as Western Thrace was one of the most underdeveloped parts of Greece, a country which had just come out of a war which lasted no less than ten years (1940-9).

I. To the 1955 events

Prior to the emergence of the Cyprus dispute, the minorities were not a major issue in Greek-Turkish relations. In 1953 for example, The Turkish Press strongly criticised the Greek state for the latter's treatment of the Muslims of Thrace. The British Embassy in Greece, however, noted that both countries were very careful in handling such questions. The Embassy stressed that there was no persecution in Western Thrace, but that problems appeared because it was extremely underdeveloped: as such, the difficulties existed for the whole population, not only for the Muslims. The attitude of the Turkish Press was clearly not reflected at the perceptions of the Turkish Foreign Ministry. In November 1953, the British Ankara Embassy reported to London the opinions of Turkish diplomats, who said that the Turkish government had no grievance over the treatment of Muslims in Thrace. Members of this minority who were going to Turkey, the Turks said, wanted to escape Greek army service, or were in trouble with the Greek authorities from their own fault. The only criticism of the Turkish government was that the Greeks allowed the activities of "reactionary" (that is, non-Kemalist) elements in the minority⁴.

The Greek government of Field-Marshal Alexandros Papagos conceded

00/1-1756 (hereafter decimal file number only); Miner (Istanbul) telegram no. 808, 21 May 1956, 747c. 00/5-2156.

4. Athens to FO, 29 Oct. 1953, PRO FO 371/107544/1; Ankara to FO, 25 Nov. 1953, FO 371/107544/3.

more prerogatives to the Thracian minority in early 1954. As Kelling noted, the Papagos government was now clearly oriented towards putting forward a formal claim over Cyprus and it needed to provide assurances to the Turks to the effect that the rights of the Turkish Cypriots would be safeguarded. Indeed, the Turkish Foreign Ministry was quick to express to the British satisfaction at the 1954 Greek measures on the Thracian minority: the minority, they said, was about to become a depressed community "with reactionary tendencies"⁵.

It is common place that at that stage, Athens heavily underestimated the possibilities of Turkish reaction to Greece's placing the Cyprus issue on the UN Assembly agenda. It was more than apparent that a Greek-Turkish rupture over Cyprus would endanger the Christian minority of Istanbul. Athens, though, chose to ignore this aspect completely, probably because it did not believe that the Turks *would* in the end become entangled in the Cyprus question. The Turkish objections to the exercise of self-determination of the island were, to say the least, ill-founded, as the ethnological realities in the island as well as the distribution of the Cypriot population clearly showed that *Enosis* was in line with liberal and democratic principles and, in the final analysis, with the interests of the west. But it does not matter whether Turkey was on solid grounds in countering the Greek claim — the fact that she would do so was enough. Thus, the Greek appeal to the UN, in 1954, and mostly the outbreak of the armed revolt in Cyprus, in April 1955, seemed to confirm for the Turks that the Greeks were after a new round in pursuit of the *Megali Idea*. And, of course, the Istanbul minority and the Patriarchate, which were seen in Turkey as the last incarnations of the *Megali Idea* were about to come under the Damoclean sword⁶.

It was after April 1955 that the Patriarchate came under the attack of the Turkish Press, which demanded that Athenagoras "discipline" Makarios, as the former was senior in the Orthodox hierarchy than the latter. Certainly, this demand revealed a misunderstanding on the part of the Turkish Press of the realities in the Orthodox Church, which is not centralised. The Oecumeni-

5. George Horton Kelling, *Countdown to Rebellion: British Policy in Cyprus, 1939-1955* (London - Westport - New York 1990), p. 141; Ankara to FO, 26 March 1954, FO 371/112835/1.

6. Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities: The Cyprus Question, 1950-1963* (New York, 1986), pp. 26-27; Menelaos Alexandrakīs, Vyron Theodoropoulos, Efstathios Laghakis, *Το Κυπριακό, 1950-1974: Μια ενδοσκόπηση* (The Cyprus Question, 1950-1974: An Introspection), (Athens, 1987), pp. 95-101.

cal Patriarch is *primum inter pares*, and the Autokephalous nature of the Church of Cyprus meant that Athenagoras had no means of pressing Makarios. Furthermore, a historical irony ensured that this was anyway impossible: the Archbishop of Cyprus was still the political leader of his flock (for Cyprus was taken from Ottoman rule prior to the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923), while the Oecumenical Patriarch had ceased to be one, exactly as a consequence of the Lausanne settlement. Therefore, Makarios was not only Archbishop, but *Ethnarch* (leader of the nation) as well. Indeed, he was elected in this political post by popular suffrage: he had a mandate. The Turks did not seem to understand these and they were infuriated because the Patriarch did not "discipline" the Archbishop of Cyprus⁷.

Unfortunate consequences came more quickly than anyone would have imagined. Simultaneously with the London Conference on Cyprus, attended by Britain, Greece and Turkey in early September 1955, riots broke out in Istanbul and Izmir, which resulted to the almost complete destruction of the property of the Christian minority of Istanbul and of most Churches. The pretext for the riots was a bomb explosion at the Turkish Consulate General in Thessaloniki (Atatürk's old family house). Yet, the explosion was staged by the Turks, exactly to provide a pretext for violence; indeed, it was a member of the Muslim minority of Thrace, Octay Engin, who threw the bomb. The riots were organised by the Turkish government, in order to strengthen the Turkish stand at the London Conference. The Turkish government wanted the riots to take much smaller proportions, but they got out of control, as the *lumpenproletariat* of Istanbul grabbed the opportunity to take on the prosperous minority. The Turkish Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, Adnan Menderes and Fatin Rüştü Zorlu respectively, were found guilty of organising the riots in their trial after the *coup* of 1960⁸.

The September 1955 events had far-reaching repercussions. The Greek-Turkish alliance was destroyed and NATO cohesion in the region remained only nominal for many years; the Balkan alliance of 1954 never recovered from the shock; Turkish prestige suffered; the first signs of anti-Americanism emerged in Greece when the US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, sent

7. Alexandris, p. 253.

8. Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, "The Riots in Turkey, in September 1955: A British Document", *Balkan Studies* 31 (1990), 165-176; Frank Tachau, "The Face of Turkish Nationalism: As Reflected in the Cyprus Dispute", *The Middle East Journal*, 13 (1959), 262-272; Walter F. Weiker, *The Turkish Revolution of 1960-1961: Aspects of Military Politics* (Washington DC, 1963), pp. 33-35.

identical messages to Athens and Ankara expressing his desire for the resumption of Greek-Turkish co-operation, overlooking the fact that the one of the two countries had to be blamed for the events. The riots also confirmed the fact that the Greek effort to achieve *Enosis* might result to the destruction of the Istanbul minority. In the next years, the Turks started a war of nerves against the Istanbul minority, by making threatening statements and by selective deportations on charges of espionage (evidently, all these charges with the possible exception of one, were false). On the other hand, it must be noted that even in the immediate aftermath of the September 1955 riots of Istanbul, there were no acts of revenge against the Thracian minority in Greece, something which the Americans were quick to notice. Indeed, throughout these years, the American Embassy in Greece constantly pointed to Athens's effectiveness at avoiding discriminations against the Thracian Muslims⁹.

Following tense representations by Athens, in October 1955 the Turks honoured the Greek flag (which the mobs had insulted during the Izmir events) and offered to pay compensation for the victims. The Greeks, in turn, found themselves in a strange position: they had evidence that the Turks had organised the riots and that Turks had staged the explosion in the Turkish Consulate of Thessaloniki, which was supposed to have been the pretext for the pogrom. But at the same time, Athens, knew that any further row over these events might cause another round of violence against the Istanbul minority. The member of the minority and Deputy of the governing party of Turkey, Alexandros Hatzopoulos, visited Greece in December and had talks with the new government of Constantinos Karamanlis. Indeed, it seems that in the end of the day, the Turkish violence of September 1955 paid off: as the Americans commented on the Hatzopoulos visit, "it seems that the plight of the said [i.e. Christian] minority proved a quite effective argument with the Greek Government". The Karamanlis administration, simultaneously, was engaged in the effort to help the Makarios-Harding negotiations over Cyprus. Athens thus decided to drop the charges against Turkish diplomats for the staging of the Thessaloniki explosion. The consequent interference in the judicial process, however, caused an uproar in Greece. Things became even more complicated as the Bill concerning compensation for the victims of the September 1955 events was to be approved by the Turkish Grand

9. Alexandris, p. 267; Hatzivassiliou, "The Riots in Turkey"; for an example of a US document stressing Greece's policy of avoiding discriminations against the Thracian Muslims, see Cannon (Athens) to State Department, 20 July 1956, 681.82/7-2056.

National Assembly. The Turkish Foreign Minister, Fuat Köprülü, speaking in the Assembly, mentioned "Turks" leaving in Thrace and "Greek speaking people" living in Istanbul and threatened with a new exchange of populations. This resulted to a further row between the two countries. Whereas the Bill for compensation was voted for by the Turkish Grand National Assembly (and, according to the Greek Consul General in Istanbul, seemed to satisfy the minority), Greek-Turkish relations were at its worst since the riots. The further intensification of the Cyprus dispute after Makarios's deportation by the British, created new difficulties. In June 1956, the Greeks, in an attempt to avoid trying the Turkish diplomats accused for the Thessaloniki explosion, suggested to the Turks to replace them. Ankara refused to do so, as such move would confirm the diplomats' guilt. In the end, the diplomats were acquitted, although two others, among them Octay Engin, were indicted (the latter "escaped" to Turkey latter in the year)¹⁰.

II. To the Cyprus agreements

In the next years, the period of the first Cyprus crisis, the Turks continued to hint that the Greek commitment to *Enosis* would endanger the Istanbul minority: whenever the British contemplated making a concession to Athens, the Turks implied something about the future of the minority. Thus, in February 1956, during the Makarios-Harding negotiations, the Turkish Ambassador in London, Fuat Ürgüplü, said that if Turkey sensed a Greek success in Cyprus, "there was a risk of a massacre of Greeks at Istanbul which would make the riots of last September mere child's play". Hints were also made by the Turkish Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, in June 1956, when the British contemplated a scheme for Cyprus which would lead to self-determination, subject to a Turkish veto. To be sure, there is nothing to confirm that the Turkish government used these remarks *only* as a threat: it is beyond any doubt that the Turks did not want the repetition of the riots. Ankara might have also been genuinely anxious that this time disturbances would occur without governmental planning¹¹.

10. Peake to FO, 31 Dec. 1955, FO 371/123858/1; Ankara to FO, 16 Feb. 1956, FO 371/123858/15; Stewart to Young, 13 March 1956, FO 371/123858/19; Bowker to Young, 6 June 1956, FO 371/123858/22; Lambert to Young, 20 June 1956, FO 371/123858/24; Kap-sambelis (Istanbul) to Foreign Ministry, 3 March 1956, KA, reel 5, pp. 2326-2327; Carp (Istanbul) to State Department, 16. Jan. 1956, 681.82/1-1656.

11. FO minute (Ward), 2 Feb. 1956, FO 371/123868/1465; Bowker to FO, 28 June 1956, FO 371/123902/1392.

At the same time, after the 1955 riots, the Turks initiated a novel claim: in November 1955, Menderes departed from the previous line of Ankara regarding the Thracian minority, telling the British Foreign Secretary, Harold Macmillan, that the Muslims of Thrace lived "under almost intolerable conditions" (it is notable that the British Embassy in Athens almost immediately disclaimed this argument). In June 1956 Menderes told the British that Muslim minorities "always" had a difficult time under Greek rule. These, of course, were contrary to the position Ankara had taken with regard to the Thracian minority up to then. However, it was natural that the Turks would say so, to strengthen their case against *Enosis*: if Muslims could live under Greek rule, then *Enosis* would be more acceptable. And, as the Turks endorsed the partition solution, from the second half of 1956 onwards, they insisted in this much more strongly. Their partition claim was based on the precondition that Greek and Turk could not live together: if they could do so in Thrace, then partition in Cyprus would not be needed¹².

In that same June 1956, Menderes linked the Cyprus question with the Lausanne Treaty: he told the British that in case of *Enosis* the strategic balances between Greece and Turkey would be altered, and Turkey would then ask for the revision of the Treaty of Lausanne. He referred to the Aegean islands, (together with the position of the Patriarchate and the Istanbul minority). When the Turkish Prime Minister stated such views publicly, in an interview with the *Daily Telegraph*, he provoked an angry response by the new Greek Foreign Minister, Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza. In early July, Averoff and the Turkish Ambassador in Athens, Settar Iksel, had a lively meeting, during which the Ambassador even referred to the possibility of a Greek-Turkish war. Despite this, two Greek proposals for the future of Cyprus, communicated to the British in Summer 1956, suggested that in case of *Enosis*, Greece should demilitarise the island, offer economic advantages to Turkey and safeguards to the Turkish Cypriots which would overpass by far the safeguards which Lausanne gave to the Thracian Muslims and the Istanbul Christians¹³.

Despite this Greek effort at easing Turkish anxieties over *Enosis*, by

12. Wright (Baghdad) to FO, 22 Nov. 1955, FO 371/117670/1465; Athens to FO, 6 Dec. 1955, FO 371/117675/1605; Bowker to FO, 27 June 1956, FO 371/123903/1397.

13. Bowker to FO, 28 June 1956, FO 371/123902/1392; Stephen G. Xydis, *Cyprus: Conflict and Conciliation, 1954-1958* (Columbus, Ohio, 1967), pp. 60-65; Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, "The Suez Crisis, Cyprus and Greek Foreign Policy, 1956: A View from the British Archives", *Balkan Studies*, 30 (1989), 107-29.

mid-1956 a new rupture between Greece and Turkey did not seem unlikely. Indeed, there was much discussion about troop movements in diplomatic circles. The public references of the Turks to the Lausanne Treaty and the private threats of Iksel for a Greek-Turkish war led the Greeks to contemplate exchanging the Istanbul and the Thracian minorities, as the last resort for the protection of the former. The idea was to transfer the Patriarchate to an island or mount Athos and cede the sovereignty to the Patriarch. Athenagoras, however, was known to oppose the scheme, and the British Foreign Office did not believe that the Greeks would go that far. In July 1956, the British Consulate in Istanbul reported that no measures to repatriate the minority had been detected, but it also added that there was much anxiety among the Greeks of Istanbul and that this anxiety had started spreading to the Armenians and the Jews living in the city. Later in the year, new Turkish allegations about discriminations against the Thracian minority were dismissed by the British Consulate in Thessaloniki, on social grounds: when a newspaper of the minority suggested that the Greeks did not employ enough Muslims in certain enterprises, the Consulate pointed out to the fact that the Muslim population's women were not usually allowed to work in public among males¹⁴.

Simultaneously with the adoption of this new Turkish line, Ankara tried to limit the damage done to its reputation by the 1955 riots. In September 1956, Athenagoras received a sum of money for compensation. Athenagoras told the British that although the money did not suffice to replace all the treasure lost in the riots, it would be enough to rebuild the property of the Church that was destroyed. He also said that Ankara was probably aware of the fact that further damage to the Patriarchate might play in the hands of the Russian Church which would try to assume the spiritual leadership of the Orthodox with damaging consequences for the western alliance in the cold war. The position of the Istanbul minority, though, had now attracted the attention of other ecclesiastical organisations. During the Autumn of that year, the Church of England Council of Foreign Relations made enquiries on the conditions in which the Patriarchate functioned. The Foreign Office tried to ease the anxiety of the English clergy, even suggesting that Turkey was moderate over Cyprus, while Greece was not: the dispute over Cyprus

14. Peake to FO, 2 July 1956, FO 371/123858/25; Clarke (Rome) to FO, 10 July 1956, FO 371/123858/28; FO minute (Luard), 13 July 1956, FO 371/123858/29; Ankara to FO 31 July 1956, FO 371/123858/30; Wall (Thessaloniki) to Athens Embassy, 19 July 1956, FO 371/123985/5; Young to Waddams, 31 Oct. 1956, FO 371/124053/8.

was the reason, the FO said, why the Istanbul minority felt threatened. Things were further complicated when the Turkish police stormed the offices of the *Hellenic Union* of Istanbul and arrested its President on espionage charges. He was convicted in 1957. The charges seem to have been correct, and indeed the Greek Foreign Ministry virtually accepted it. (Alexandris terms this as the only case when Turkish action against a member of the minority was justified). Yet, as things stood, the affair only increased the alarm of the minority. On 11 January 1957, a report by the British Embassy in Ankara painted a gloomy, even sinister picture of the Greeks and the Istanbul minority¹⁵.

It appears that the Foreign Office was embarrassed by the interest of the Church of England for the position of the Patriarchate in Istanbul, partly because there was a fear that such interest might make the Turks turn against the minority once more. At this stage, it was the Turks who disturbed the FO's efforts. On 2 January 1957, the Turkish Ambassador in London met Canon Waddams, of the Council of Foreign Relations of the Church of England. Ürgüplü pointed to the payment of compensation to the 1955 victims, "but he went on to say that if provocation by the Greeks continued in Cyprus and elsewhere, it was more than likely that there would be another riot, only this time it would be a massacre and the police and the troops would probably be on the side of the rioters. He added that life was cheap in the Mediterranean, that fighting was the Turkish national sport and that Turks outnumbered Greeks by three or four to one". Ürgüplü said that if Greece rejected the Radcliffe constitution for Cyprus, Turkey would ask for immediate partition and if Greece again refused, an exchange of minorities would be called for. The FO, needless to say, was greatly disturbed by the conversation. London asked the Ankara Embassy to check why Ürgüplü spoke like this, while FO officials casted their disappointment: "Anything better calculated to alienate the Council completely, and to confirm its fears that the Turks and not the Greeks are the disturbers of the peace in the Eastern Mediterranean could hardly be imagined. One can only presume that the Turks are contemplating resorting to threats if they fail to achieve their objectives over the Cyprus question by negotiation. One is, too, quite convinced that the threat is no empty one, and that although the Istanbul Riots of September, 1955, were such a sorry performance on the Turks' part, there would be little hesitation

15. Johnston to Satterwaite, 24 Sep. 1956, FO 371/124053/4; Waddams to Bowker, 19 Sep. 1956, FO 371/124053/7; Brant to Barron, 17 Dec. 1956, FO 371/124053/10; Ankara to FO, 9 Sep. 1957, FO 371/130022/1; Alexandris, p. 273.

on the part of the Turks in provoking some further incidents to lead to a renewal of the trouble"¹⁶.

Nevertheless, this, for the British, was not a moment when they would be prepared to accept that the Turks were "disturbers of the peace". Shortly after the first shock, the British appeared willing to question everything on the report of Canon Waddams. The Consulate General in Istanbul noted that the Oecumenical Patriarch was not anxious over the fate of the minority (as if the Patriarch would know when a new pogrom would start!). The Turks for their part, told the British that Ürgüplü had reported that he had said different things to Canon Waddams, something which the FO unquestionably accepted. The British Ambassador in Ankara, Sir James Bowker, even wrote that Waddams was "tactless" in approaching Ürgüplü. Waddams himself was lobbied by the FO on the Turkish position. There were two main motives behind the attitude of this British Department. Firstly, their fear that the Turks *would* take on the minority if the Church of England appeared to support it. Secondly, early 1957 was exactly the time when the FO was coming round to accept the *implementation* of partition of Cyprus, a solution which Turkey supported. Partition, of course, would cause averse reactions anyway, for it would be accompanied by large forcible transfers of populations. It would certainly be even more difficult if the Turks had appeared threatening the lives of civilians and the Patriarchate, who had no relation with the Cyprus conflict. It is clear that the Turkish government appeared embarrassed at Ürgüplü's remarks, which seem to have been made without the authorisation of Ankara. Still, the remarks had clearly been made, and it is interesting to see the FO's readiness to overlook them, or even to forget that Ürgüplü had made *almost exactly* the same points in a conversation with a Deputy Under-Secretary of the FO, in February 1956¹⁷.

Makarios's release from exile and his arrival in Athens, in March 1957 was a further episode which led to fears for the Istanbul Greeks. Makarios's strong statements after his release provoked suggestions in the Turkish Press to expel the Patriarchate. Ankara delivered a Note to Athens, claiming that the ceremonies for the reception of the Archbishop at the Greek capital were directed against Turkey. Following these manifestations of Turkish discomfort for the reception, the Greeks delivered a Note of their own to Ankara,

16. Memorandum (Waddams), 3 Jan. 1957 and Young to Bowker, 11 Jan. 1957 and FO minute (Brant), 7 Jan. 1957, FO 371/130194/1.

17. Bowker to Young, 25 Jan. 1957, FO 371/130225/6; Broad to FO, 19 Jan. 1957, FO 371/130225/6.

making clear that they would hold the Turkish government responsible for any violence against the Istanbul minority. The Greeks' anxiety about a repetition of the September events was also evident in the conversations of the Prime Minister, Constantinos Karamanlis and Averoff with British or American diplomats. Although the Greeks told the Turks that if the 1955 events were repeated, the Greek public would demand a "tooth for tooth" response, they said to the Americans that Greece had taken measures to protect the Thracian minority in case that further violence against the Istanbul minority endangered them. At this stage, also, Averoff floated the idea of exchanging the Istanbul minority for the Turkish Cypriots, a way to remove the former from the position of hostages in which they had found themselves and ensure *Enosis* for the Greek Cypriots. The idea, nevertheless, was not taken further. The Patriarchate itself, for its part, stated its loyalty to Turkey on 14 April, trying to prevent another round of violence¹⁸.

Makarios's release was followed by a long impasse in the diplomatic scene, during which many solutions were aired, in Athens (self-determination or independence), London (partition or a British-Greek-Turkish condominium), or Ankara (immediate partition). The Greeks, at the same time, decided to try to win the Turks over to the independence solution. Athens sent Gheorghios Pesmatzoglou, a political figure with good connections in Turkey, as Ambassador to Ankara. The Pesmatzoglou mission, the diplomatic impasse, the Turkish elections and the Turco-Syrian war scare in Autumn 1957, all contributed to the toning down of the quarrel, at least for some time. However, the chaotic situation which evolved following the presentation of the Macmillan plan in June 1958 and the resort of the Turkish Cypriots to communal strife created new problems. The Greeks were again anxious about the Istanbul minority and they even withdrew the families of the Greek officers of the NATO Headquarters in Izmir, fearing a repetition of the 1955 events in the same city, when the families of Greek officers serving there had been attacked. Athens also delivered the usual Note to Turkey, holding the Turkish government responsible for any violence against the minority. Yet, both British and Americans were certain that such action was not imminent. The situation was further complicated in October, when the implementation of the Macmillan plan led to worries about further deterioration of Greek-

18. Xydis, pp. 80-86; Alexandris, pp. 270-274. Miner to State Department, telegram no. 709, 20 Feb. 1957, 747 c. 00/2-2057; Miner, telegram 858, 11 April 1957, 747 c. 00/4-1157.

Turkish relations. However, the Cyprus agreements were concluded within some months¹⁹.

Certainly, as far as the Greeks are concerned, the main driving force for the conclusion of the 1959 agreements was not their fear for the minority, but the Cyprus situation. It is, however, accurate that an additional motive for Athens to reach an understanding with Turkey was uncertainty about the fate of these people. The 1959 agreements were accompanied by a general Greek-Turkish rapprochement and created the hope that the Istanbul minority would in the end be saved²⁰.

III. After the agreements

The resumption of Greek-Turkish co-operation was greeted with relief by the Istanbul minority. Alexandros Hatzopoulos wrote to Karamanlis on 2 March, thanking the Greek Prime Minister for his reference to the Istanbul Greeks in his statements, issued after the conclusion of the settlement. The improvement of Greek-Turkish relations, at the same time, raised the issue of the treatment of minorities. In the context of an overall review of Greek foreign policy undertaken late in February 1959, after the conclusion of the agreements, the First Political Directory of the Greek Foreign Ministry painted a gloomy picture of the Turkish attitude towards the Istanbul Christians. The Ministry said that despite the fact that the attacks of the Turkish Press against the Istanbul minority had ceased, no measure had yet been taken by the Turkish government. The Ministry was anxious about this: "as it is known, a simple hint and toleration on the part of the government is sufficient for the most wild persecution of a foreign element to take place". The Ministry also enumerated cases of favourable treatment of the Thracian Muslims by the Greek state, such as acceptance of granting of Turkish scholarships to them, to an extent which overcame the spirit of the Greco-Turkish cultural agreement; allowing the forming of new Muslim clubs; permitting the Turkish Consuls to finance Muslim cultural activities; granting loans of the Agricultural Bank to Muslims to an extent which overcame loans to Greek Christian farmers. The Turks, on the other hand, according to the Greek Foreign Ministry, had continued selective deportations of Greek subjects

19. Allen to FO, 14 June 1958, FO 371/136228/3; Bowker to FO, 15 June 1958, FO 371/136228/3; Miner to State Department, telegram GO1, 8 July 1958, 747c.00/7-858.

20. Averoff, p. 364.

from Istanbul, after December 1958; gave inadequate compensation for the 1955 riots and were now trying, through taxation measures, to get these money back from the members of the minority²¹.

In fact, this was the period when Averoff and Karamanlis paid an official visit to Ankara. The visit was very successful. Agreement was reached on the examination of bi-lateral questions by a committee consisting of one Greek and one Turkish diplomat, who would review the questions of fishing rights (friction over which arose quite often), treatment of minorities, and the property of the minorities (that is, the property of the Patriarchate). These issues had been left untouched for many years and an effort to review them was natural. The two diplomats who were assigned to this committee were Dimitris Bitsios of the Greek and Zeki Kuneralp of the Turkish Foreign Ministry²².

The very fact that the Turks agreed to discuss the problems of the Istanbul minority was an indication that their previous propaganda concerning Thrace would now retire in the background. As Cyprus was settled, and most importantly, without partition, Ankara stopped claiming that Greek and Turk could not live together. Indeed, it reverted to its pro-1955 attitude: as the British Embassy in Turkey reported in Summer 1959, "we have recently seen other evidence suggesting that the Turkish Government may be more concerned — for prestige reasons — with the failure of their Thracian minority to embrace the Atatürk reforms than with the material well-being of the community and the alleged Greek discriminatory policy towards it"²³.

On 13 August 1959, the British Embassy in Athens reported Bitsios's impressions from the meetings. Kuneralp, Bitsios said, was satisfied with the position of the Thracian minority and only suggested a few further improvements, whereas Bitsios had to ask for the "redressment" of the rights of the Istanbul minority, "which he had found in a depressed state and lacking confidence in the intentions of the Turkish Government. He had put it to the Turks that it was in their own interests and in that of the West generally that the Oecumenical Patriarch should be allowed full freedom in the exercise

21. Hatzopoulos to Karamanlis, 2 March 1959, KA, reel 6, pp. 1891-1892; minute (Matsas), 21 Feb. 1959, KA, reel 2, pp. 1775-1778; Kapsambelis to Karamanlis, 11 April 1959, KA, reel 2, p. 1900.

22. FO minute (Brooke), 23 April 1959 and Athens to Ankara, 10 April 1959, FO 371/144527/2; Allen to FO, 14 May 1959, FO 371/144527/7; Allen to Selwyn Lloyd, 16 May 1959, FO 371/144527/10.

23. Ankara to FO, 6 Aug. 1959, FO 371/144527/14.

of his spiritual and oecumenical functions, since the restrictions applied to him since 1955 would have given the Patriarch of Moscow a pretext for attempting to take over the leadership of the Orthodox on the grounds that the Oecumenical Patriarch was prevented from exercising it". Indeed, the Turks allowed the Patriarch to travel outside Turkey for the first time after many years. Athenagoras himself, in September, told the British Ambassador in Ankara, Sir Bernard Burrows, that he was satisfied with the behaviour of the Turkish authorities²⁴.

The May 1960 coup which resulted to the fall of the Menderes government created much anxiety in Greece, for the new government in Turkey appeared, at least initially, to favour a more rigid policy towards minorities. In fact, even in May 1960 an incident was reported in the Greek Press, when the Turkish Consul General in Thrace insulted one of the Muslim Deputies of the Greek Parliament because he was still wearing a fez and reading the Coran in Arabic. The incident caused an adverse reaction in the Greek Press, while the British Embassy in Athens once more reported that the Thracian minority was being treated "quite reasonably" by the Greek authorities. The period of uncertainty seemed to come to an end with the visit of the Turkish Foreign Minister, Selim Sarper, in Athens, in October 1960, which re-established the confidence between the two countries. Sarper agreed that bi-lateral questions should be dealt on the lines of the Bitsios-Kuneralp Report. This report is not available, but seems to have been favourable to the Greek interests. The Greeks were also pleased that Sarper made clear that Ankara would not try to interfere in Western Thrace. Nevertheless, any hopes for the well-being of the Istanbul minority were destroyed in the mid-1960s. During the second Cyprus dispute, from 1963 onwards, Turkey expelled the Christians of Istanbul, without even allowing them to take their money with them²⁵.

IV. Conclusions

The issues concerning the minorities in Greece and Turkey in the 1950s, followed closely the evolution of the Cyprus question. Prior to its emergence

24. Curle to Addis, 13 Aug. 1959, FO 371/144527/14; Burrows to Addis, 26 Sep. 1959, FO 371/144800/4; Istanbul to Ankara, 16 Nov. 1959, FO 371/144800/5; see also Sarris, volume B, book A II, pp. 586-591, where Kuneralp's views are also presented.

25. Athens to FO, 24 May 1960, FO 371/152973/4; Allen to FO, 26 Oct. 1960, FO 371/152973/7; Curle to Sarrell, 13 Sep. 1960 and FO minute (Sarrell) 15 Sep. 1960, FO 371/153091/3; Whitteridge to Home, 5 Dec. 1960, FO 371/153091/6.

on the international scene, the Turks were satisfied with the Greek record, while the Greeks were confident that the Istanbul minority would not face substantial problems, after the trial of the *Varlik* tax. As the Cyprus dispute developed, however, things changed. The 1955 riots in Istanbul gave a severe blow to the minority, who never recovered their confidence in Turkish intentions. The Turks, on the other hand, pursuing their policy of partition of Cyprus, started claiming that the Thracian minority was having a difficult time under Greek rule, despite that prior to 1955, *privately*, they had said quite a different story. The danger of a Greek-Turkish war, as it emerged during the years of the Cyprus crisis, created fears in Athens about the safety of the Istanbul minority, and it appears that twice, in Summer 1956 and in Spring 1957, the Greeks contemplated transferring the minority and the Patriarchate in Greece. The 1959 Cyprus settlement again created hope that the Istanbul minority would be saved, whereas the Turks returned to their pre-1955 position with regard to the Thracian Muslims, focusing their concern more to the spreading of Kemalist principles, rather to any claim that Athens was oppressing them.

It may be said that the Cyprus question destroyed the Istanbul minority. The Turks were in a position to persecute these people and get away with it. To be sure, the Turks always had an easier task in the Cyprus question: they simply had to prove something negative, namely that Greeks and Turks could not live together. The Greeks, on the other hand, had to prove that co-existence was possible. In this respect, communal violence in Cyprus and pogroms in Istanbul were in line with the Turkish claim. In the case of Istanbul, indeed, violence was greatly facilitated by social reasons, such as the prosperity of the minority and the influx of poor Turks, immigrants from the Eastern provinces, who were ready to take on the prosperous Greeks living in the city. Although the Turkish government appeared reluctant to face another international outcry such as the one which it faced briefly after the 1955 riots, Athens had no means of knowing that new violence would not take place. The fate of the Istanbul minority was always in the minds of the Greeks throughout 1955-59.

With regard to Turkey, though, it has to be stressed that research confirms Professor Sarris's view that the Cyprus question had a multidimensional impact on the country. The issue of the influx of immigrants from Asia Minor to Istanbul has been mentioned. But some additional points may be made. The Cyprus crises of 1954-9 and 1963-5 spread over too long a period. Indeed, the Menderes governments had been in place for a decade and it must be remembered that these governments consisted of people who were usually

outside the traditional establishment of Kemal's heritage. Ten years is a long time; countries change, especially when a severe dispute, such as that of Cyprus, is coupled with social transformations of the magnitude of those that Turkey experienced in these years. To be sure, Greece and many other countries of Southern Europe changed in the same period. Yet, Turkey's case was very different, in the sense that Turkey had to go through this process, without the population pressures (which were much more severe than in other countries) causing the abandonment of the Kemalist tradition of a secular state (which in itself was an enormous change). The Menderes governments were anxious to develop Turkey economically, but this triggered important social tensions. Thus, the Menderes government, although mainly motivated by reasons of geopolitical insecurities and national pride, also used the Cyprus question as a distraction from the heated issues of the day. Cyprus, however, not only was outside the geographical boundaries drawn by the National Pact of Ankara of 1920, but it also endangered the Greek-Turkish friendship which was part of Atatürk's heritage. Is it the case that the popular pressures created by the Cyprus question and their combination with the social and demographic realities led to the virtual elimination of an important part of Kemal's programme? The question cannot be answered here — it may be preferable not to be addressed by a Greek. This question will have to wait for a detailed study on the matter²⁶.

The Greeks faced a dilemma in the Cyprus question: Greek -Turkish confrontation in Cyprus always endangered the Istanbul minority and the Patriarchate. The 1959 Cyprus agreements and the simultaneous Greek-Turkish rapprochement allowed hope that the minority would be saved. It was not to be. During the second Cyprus crisis, in the mid-1960s, Turkey destroyed it for good. It should be noted, however, that in all Cyprus crises the difference in the treatment of the two minorities was remarkable. The Muslim minority of Greece did not suffer in 1955; nor in 1964, when the Istanbul minority was thrown out of Turkey; nor during the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974.

26. Sarris, volume B, book A I, pp. 55-58, where the author quotes extracts from Turkish books deploring the social transformation of Istanbul because of the influx of people from Eastern Anatolia.

KIRIAKOS D. KENTROTIS

DIE ENTWICKLUNG DER GRIECHISCH-BULGARISCHEN BEZIEHUNGEN (1989-1991)

1. Einleitung

Die Annäherung und detaillierte Beschreibung der griechisch-bulgarischen Beziehungen nach den politischen und sozialen Umwälzungen im gesamten osteuropäischen Raum sowie insbesondere die Nachbarschaft Bulgariens zu Griechenland sind von großer Bedeutung für die aktuellen politischen Ereignisse in Europa.

Einerseits wird der Rahmen dieser langjährigen Beziehungen von dem in allen Presse-Kommunikés immer wieder benutzten Satz geprägt: "Die Beziehungen zwischen Griechenland und Bulgarien dienen als Vorbild für Kontakte benachbarter Staaten mit verschiedenen sozial-wirtschaftlichen Systemen". Andererseits taucht die Frage auf, wie sich diese Beziehungen in dem neuen politischen Umfeld entwickeln sollen — auch wenn dem griechisch-bulgarischen Verhältnis, trotz der unterschiedlichen Systeme, eine gute Entwicklung zugeschrieben wird.

Die ersten Elemente¹ des neuen politischen Kurses in Bulgarien nach dem Sturz Zhivkovs im November 1989 werden deutlich: Die monolithische und eiserne Linie der Periode des existierenden Sozialismus wurde im Laufe der Zeit in die Ecke gedrängt und die neuen politischen Verantwortlichen in Sofia versuchen ein flexibleres außenpolitisches Konzept für das Land zu konstruieren, damit es schneller und ohne große Risiken diese turbulente Phase überwinden kann. Alle Entscheidungen bei der Neuorientierung der bulgarischen Diplomatie sind eng verknüpft mit den Versuchen, das beschränkt existierende Know-How und das wenige Kapital zu sichern.

Zur Zeit verfügt Bulgarien über kein konkretes Verteidigungsdogma.

1. Vgl. Wolfgang Hopken, "Die Wahlen in Bulgarien - ein Pyrrhus-Sieg für die Kommunisten"; in: *Südosteuropa*, 39. Jg., 7-8/1990, S. 429-457; Magarditsch Hatschikjan, "Der unsanfte Übergang - Bulgariens Weg der politischen Erneuerung", Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (*Interne Studien*), Nr. 23/1991.

Der "Schutzschirm" der UdSSR gehört der Vergangenheit an. Die neuen führenden Persönlichkeiten des Landes versuchen nun, dieses Vakuum durch bilaterale Verträge mit benachbarten Staaten und durch die Teilnahme an europäischen Konferenzen (z.B. KSZE) zu überbrücken. "Flirts" mit dem Nord-Atlantischen Bündnis haben schon im Januar 1991 begonnen; der Generalsekretär der NATO, Manfred Wörner, besuchte Sofia im Juni 1991 und betonte dabei deren Unterstützung der Reformen in Bulgarien².

Das heutige Bulgarien lebt mit einem krassen Widerspruch: Es hat Angst vor der moslemischen (türkophonen) Minderheit³ sowie vor dem durch sie ausgeübten Druck seitens der türkischen Regierung. Gleichzeitig ist es verpflichtet, die Auseinandersetzung mit den Strukturen des vorherigen Systems voranzutreiben, wobei Bulgarien sich auf die moslemische Minderheit stützen muß.

2. Die Beziehungen beider Länder im Jahre 1990⁴

Am 11. Januar 1990 stattete der bulgarische Außenminister B. Dimitrov Athen einen offiziellen Besuch ab⁵. Es war der erste Kontakt zwischen beiden Ländern nach der politischen Umwandlung in Sofia. Hauptthema der Gespräche war das Unterstreichen der hervorragenden Zusammenarbeit und Verständigung in ihren Beziehungen, die als Stabilitätsfaktor auf dem Balkan und in Europa angesehen werden sollten.

Die griechische Regierung von K. Mitsotakis betonte ihre Unterstützung sowohl bei den Bestrebungen des neuen Bulgariens, die Demokratie im Inneren zu festigen und zu erweitern, als auch beim Willen Bulgariens, einen neuen europäischen, flexibleren Weg zu beschreiten. Insbesondere die griechische Seite erklärte ihre Bereitschaft, zum wirtschaftlichen Aufbau Bulgariens entscheidend beizutragen, damit der neue und schwierige demokratische Kurs in Bulgarien eine reelle Chance hat.

Am 17. Mai desselben Jahres reiste der bulgarische Ministerpräsident

2. Vgl. *Demokratsija*, 14.6.1991.

3. Vgl. Duncan Perry, "Ethnic turcs face bulgarian nationalism", in: *Report on Eastern Europe*, 15.3.1991, Vol. 2, No. 11, p. 5-8.

4. Über die Beziehungen beider Länder vor den politischen Veränderungen in Bulgarien siehe allg.: Bernhard Tönnies, "Bulgariens Griechenlandpolitik", in: *Sudosteuropa*, 33. Jg., 7-8/1984, S. 417-428.

A. Loukanov nach Athen⁶. Es war überwiegend eine Arbeitsreise; zum Hauptthema wurde die dramatische wirtschaftliche Lage Bulgariens in enger Verbindung mit der Verbesserung seiner Beziehungen zur Europäischen Gemeinschaft. Die junge parlamentarische Demokratie Bulgariens hatte keine andere Wahl zu überleben: Sofia suchte den schnellsten und sichersten Weg nach Brüssel über Athen.

Im Laufe des Jahres 1990 beschränkten sich die bilateralen Beziehungen zwischen Athen und Sofia nicht nur auf die politische und wirtschaftliche Ebene, es kam auch zu engeren Kontakten bezüglich Fragen der Verteidigung sowie der Stabilität in der Region und in Europa. Auch wenn man vermuten könnte, daß die bulgarische Seite die Initiative für diese Themenbereiche ergriffen habe: Athen hatte schon zu Zeiten Zhivkovs auf die intensive Zusammenarbeit im Bereich Verteidigung und Sicherheit gesetzt. Bezeichnenderweise reiste der damalige griechische Außenminister K. Papoulias am 27. März 1987 nach Sofia, um — aufgrund der Konsultationsklausel der "Deklaration über Freundschaft, gute Nachbarschaft und Zusammenarbeit" zwischen den beiden Staaten vom 11. September 1986⁷ (damals ein einmaliges Dokument von Staaten unterschiedlicher Gesellschaftsordnung) — die bulgarische Unterstützung bei der Zuspitzung des Konflikts zwischen der Türkei und Griechenland zu gewinnen.

Die Generalstäbe Griechenlands und Bulgariens hatten im Jahr 1990 zweimal die Möglichkeit, die Fragen ihrer gegenseitigen Interessen zu diskutieren. Das internationale Klima war günstig für die Fortsetzung und Intensivierung solcher bilateralen Versuche — besonders nach der Unterzeichnung des Vertrags über die Reduzierung der konventionellen Kräfte in Europa (CFE) und der Charta von Paris.

Im Geiste dieser Vereinbarungen⁸ wurde als erster Schritt zur Entspannung die Installation einer direkten Telefonverbindung zwischen den Generalstäben Bulgariens und Griechenlands vereinbart; zudem wurde die Möglichkeit des Austauschs von Professoren militärischer Akademien und Militärärzten überprüft.

Der Beginn dieser bilateralen Zusammenarbeit in dem sensiblen Bereich der Verteidigungspolitik wurde damit erklärt, daß sie der sicherste Weg zur Überwindung einer langjährigen Periode des Mißtrauens auf der Ebene der

5. Vgl. *Kathimerini*, 12.1.1990; *Eleftherotypia*, 12.1.1990; *Demokrasijsa*, 12.1.1990.

6. Vgl. *Eleftherotypia*, 18.5.1990; *Demokrasijsa*, 18.5.1990.

7. Der Text der Deklaration ist abgedruckt in: *Südosteuropa*, 35 Jg., 11-12/1986, S. 600-603.

8. Vgl. *Kathimerini*, 21.12.1990.

militärischen Sicherheit und Kooperation sowie zur Festigung des Vertrauens zwischen den einzelnen Balkanstaaten sei. Dennoch darf der Enthusiasmus und die Erwartungen beider Seiten nicht überbewertet werden. Zwar fehlt nun die ideologische Barriere der letzten Jahrzehnte, doch bleiben die verschiedenen Ansichten über eine Konkretisierung der Pläne zur Herstellung einer friedlichen Zusammenarbeit im Balkan-Raum.

Den vitalen griechischen Interessen steht immer noch die türkische Gefahr aus dem Osten entgegen, und folgerichtig sieht Griechenland die enge Zusammenarbeit mit Bulgarien der letzten 20 Jahre als den Weg zur Milderung der türkischen dynamischen Einwirkungspolitik in der Region. Mit dem Sturz des real-existierenden Sozialismus und der Öffnung der Grenzen im Falle Bulgariens tauchten vergessene und verdrängte Probleme und Fragen auf, die der Auseinandersetzung zwischen Griechenland und der Türkei eine neue Dimension gegeben haben.

3. Die Beziehungen beider Länder im Jahre 1991

Das Jahr 1991 begann für die Beziehungen zwischen Athen und Sofia mit dem offiziellen Besuch des griechischen Ministerpräsidenten K. Mitsotakis vom 11. bis 12. Januar in Bulgarien⁹. Die Gesprächspartner seitens der bulgarischen Führung waren diesmal der Staatspräsident S. Sheljev und der neue Ministerpräsident, die überparteiliche Persönlichkeit D. Popov.

Die seit vielen Jahren bestehende "Achse" zwischen beiden Staaten bekam während dieses Besuchs neue Impulse, und von beiden Seiten wurde ihre Rolle als Sicherheitsfaktor auf dem Balkan betont. Die politischen Chefs beider Länder hatten dabei erneut die Chance zu erklären, daß sie bereit seien, ihren Beitrag für die europäische Sicherheit, für die Wandlung Europas in einen Kontinent des Friedens, der gegenseitigen Zusammenarbeit und der Verständigung zu leisten und alles dafür zu tun, daß die Klausel des CFE-Vertrags in Europa und auf dem Balkan Anwendung fände.

Zusammen mit der allgemeinen Erklärung der beiden Ministerpräsidenten über die Erweiterung der bilateralen und multilateralen Zusammenarbeit auf der Balkan-Halbinsel wurden auch Themen aus den Bereichen Wirtschaft, Handel und Tourismus diskutiert.

Zu vielen der wichtigen Fragen, die in Sofia in Januar 1991 behandelt wurden, wurden während des Gegenbesuchs des bulgarischen Minister-

9. Vgl. *Narodno Zamedelsko Zname*, 15.1.1991; *Svobodni Narod*, 15.1.1991; *Duma*, 13.1.1991; *Demokratsija*, 14.1.1991; *Kathimerini*, 15.1.1991; *Ta Nea*, 15.1.1991.

präsidenten D. Popov vom 14. bis 17. Februar in Athen¹⁰ Lösungen vereinbart:

- Abschaffung des Visums für diplomatische und dienstliche Pässe;
- Erteilung sechsmonatiger Visumsgültigkeit für Unternehmer, die mit den zuständigen Bescheinigungen seitens der Handels- und Industriekammern beider Staaten ausgestattet sind;
- Abkommen über die Vermeidung der doppelten Steuer;
- Abkommen über die sofortige Benachrichtigung im Falle eines nuklearen Unfalls und Austausch von Informationen über Kernkraftwerke;
- Abkommen über die Herstellung einer direkten Flugverbindung Saloniki-Sofia;
- Regelung der Einzelheiten für die Erteilung eines Darlehens seitens der griechischen Regierung in Höhe von 50 Mio Dollar;
- Öffnung kultureller Einrichtungen in Athen und Sofia und Intensivierung der Zusammenarbeit auf den Gebieten Wissenschaft und Kunst.

Ferner gab es Vereinbarungen über regelmäßige Konsultationen auf höchster Ebene der Bereiche des Außen- und Verteidigungsministeriums sowie der Zusammenarbeit zwischen den Streitkräften beider Staaten.

Ende des Jahres 1991 markierte der "Vertrag über Freundschaft, gute Nachbarschaft, Zusammenarbeit und Sicherheit"¹¹, der am 7. Oktober in Sofia von den Ministerpräsidenten Mitsotakis und Popov unterschrieben wurden, einen Höhepunkt der Entwicklung der griechisch-bulgarischen Beziehungen.

Dieser Vertrag, der eine enorme Abweichung von ähnlichen, in der Vergangenheit getroffenen Vereinbarungen über die Prinzipien der guten Nachbarschaft (31.5.1973¹², 11.9.1986) darstellt, stützt sich auf die Prinzipien der Charta der UNO, der KSZE-Schlußakte in Helsinki von 1975 und der Charta von Paris von 1990. Er zielt auf die Konstruktion des neuen Europas nach den politischen Umwälzungen von 1989 im osteuropäischen Raum und auf die Schaffung eines Klimas des gegenseitigen Vertrauens auf dem Balkan.

Der Vertrag enthält 20 Artikel mit 20jähriger Gültigkeit und sieht eine automatische Verlängerung für weitere fünf Jahre vor.

Die wichtigsten Punkte sind:

- a) Bulgarien und Griechenland werden auf ihrem Territorium keine Aktionen

10. Vgl. *Duma*, 16.1.1991; *Demokratsija*, 16.1.1991; *Vetserni Novini*, 15.2.1991; *Ta Nea*, 16.2.1991; *Kathimerini*, 15.2.1991.

11. Vgl. *Duma*, 3.10.1991; *Otechestven Vestnik*, 7.10.1991; *Demokratsija*, 9.10.1991; *Bŭlgarska Armija*, 9.10.1991; *Eleftherotypia*, 8.10.1991; *Kathimerini*, 9.10.1991.

12. Vgl. *Rabotnicesko Delo*, 31.5.1973.

und Tätigkeiten erlauben, nicht dazu ermutigen und auch selbst keine ergreifen, die einen gegnerischen oder nicht-freundlichen Charakter gegenüber dem anderen Land enthalten (Artikel 3).

- b) Beide Staaten unterstützen mit ihren Tätigkeiten den abwehrenden Charakter ihrer Verteidigungspolitik. Ihre Streitkräfte werden zum Faktor des Friedens und der Stabilität in der Region. Die beiden Generalstäbe werden regelmäßig Informationen austauschen (Artikel 4).
- c) Im Falle, daß eines der beiden Länder einen direkten oder indirekten Angriff erleiden sollte oder Gewalt seitens eines dritten Landes angedroht wird, darf das jeweils andere Land dem angreifenden oder drohenden Land keine politische, militärische oder Hilfe anderer Art gewähren. Es ist auch vorgesehenfalls eines der beiden Vertragsländer den Eindruck hat, daß irgendwelche äußerlichen Faktoren seine territorialen Rechte, seine nationale Sicherheit oder die Unverletzlichkeit seiner Grenzen bedroht oder bedrohen lassen könnte—, daß es zu Konsultationen mit dem Partner kommt, bei denen alle Maßnahmen zur Milderung oder zur Lösung der Krise ergriffen werden (Artikel 6).
- d) Mit den Artikeln 7 bis 10 werden Einzelheiten vereinbart, die einen neuen Weg auf den Gebieten der Wirtschaft und des Banksystems auf bilateraler Ebene beschreiten.
- e) Mit den Artikeln 11 bis 15 werden ferner Fragen wissenschaftlicher, ökologischer und kultureller Natur geregelt; zum ersten Mal wird auch in einem solchen Vertrag die Rolle der Orthodoxen Kirche in beiden Ländern näher betrachtet. Beiden Staaten demonstrieren ihren Willen zur Unterstützung jeder Initiative der Orthodoxen Kirche sowohl auf interorthodoxer Ebene als auch im Rahmen des weltkirchlichen Rates.

Der Unterzeichnung dieses wegweisenden Vertrags in den bilateralen Beziehungen zwischen Griechenland und Bulgarien folgte eine spezielle Vereinbarung auf dem Gebiet der Zusammenarbeit der Verteidigungsministerien. Gemeint ist der Vertrag, der während des Besuchs des bulgarischen Verteidigungsministers, D. Ludshev vom 27. bis 30. November in Athen unterzeichnet wurde¹³. Die Hauptpunkte des Vertrags sind folgende:

- a) Meinungs- und Erfahrungsaustausch bezüglich der militärischen Strategien und nationalen Verteidigungspolitik, der Organisationsstruktur der Streitkräfte, der militärischen Ausbildung, der Logistik, des Gesundheitssystems

13. Vgl. *Bŭlgarska Armija*, 26.11.1991; *Otechestven Vestnik*, 26.11.1991; *Fax*, 29.11.1991; *Demokratsija*, 28.11.1991; *Duma*, 28.11.1991; *To Wima*, 1.12.1991; *Eleftherotypia* 29.11.1991.

der Streitkräfte, der Ausbau militärischer Werke, der religiösen Ausbildung und der sportlichen Tätigkeiten der Streitkräfte.

- b) Zusammenarbeit der drei Waffengattungen (Heer, Marine, Luftwaffe) beider Länder bezüglich Maßnahmen für die Sicherheit in der Region.

Seit langem sind wir daran gewöhnt, die Lage in den benachbarten-Ländern Griechenlands als "labil" zu charakterisieren. In dieser labilen Atmosphäre könnte man die Ansicht vertreten, daß Bulgarien im Vergleich zu den anderen Staaten auf der Balkan-Halbinsel — was seine Beziehungen mit Griechenland betrifft — mehrere Stabilitätselemente besitzt:

- Beide Länder teilen die Ansichten zu Minderheitsfragen. Auf ihrem Territorium leben nur religiöse und kulturelle Minderheiten, keine ethnischen.
- Die Türkei erhebt Ansprüche sowohl auf Griechenland als auch auf Bulgarien; beide Staaten haben also einen gemeinsamen, mächtigen Gegner.
- Griechenland ist im Vergleich zu den übrigen Nachbarn Bulgariens das einzige Mitglied in der EG und folgerichtig dasjenige, das das Verhältnis Bulgariens zur Gemeinschaft unterstützen könnte.
- Sowohl in Bulgarien als auch in Griechenland ist die Orthodoxie das verbreitetste Glaubensbekenntnis.

Review Essays

CONSTANTINE PAPOULIDIS

GREEK MANUSCRIPTS IN MOSCOW

B. L. Fonkič (sostavitel'), *Grečesko-russkie svjazi serediny XVI-načala XVIII vv., Grečeskie dokumenti moskovskih hranilišč, Katalog vystavki*, Moskva, 1991, str. 65, ris. 31, (XVIII Meždunarodnyj kongress vizantinistov).

B. L. Fonkič (Compil.), *Graeco-Russian Contacts from the middle of the XVth. century up to the beginning of the XVIIIth century, The Greek documents in Moscow archives, Catalogue of exhibition*, Moscow, 1991, pp. 69, fig. 31, (XVIII International Congress of Byzantine Studies).

As it is evident from the title of the article, the catalogue was published in two languages, english and russian. Editor of this catalogue was B. L. Fonkič, responsible for the exhibition. B. L. Fonkič was the most suitable paleographer and codex researcher in Russia who could present such an important and significant collection of Greek manuscripts. These manuscripts are to be found in the Russian archives and consist the best proof of graeco-russian relations in 16th-18th centuries.

During the 18th International Congress for Byzantine Studies, Moscow, several exhibitions took place, but the exhibition of the Greek manuscripts was of the greatest interest.

Hereafter we are giving the titles of the manuscripts as they appear in the english catalogue. In addition to the title, we are going to give the place and the date each document was written.

1. The Charter of Patriarch Ioasaph of Constantinople to Tsar Ivan IVth, Constantinople, 1557.
2. The Charter of Patriarch Ioasaph of Constantinople and the Council of the Eastern Church confirming the title of Tsar on Ivan IVth, Constantinople, 1560.

3. The Charter of Patriarch Ioasaph of Constantinople to Tsar Ivan IVth, Constantinople, 1561.
4. The Charter of the Council of Constantinople, 1590, concerning the Establishment of the Moscow Patriarchate, Constantinople, May 1590.
5. The Statement of the Council of Constantinople, 1593, concerning the Establishment of the Moscow Patriarchate, Constantinople, February 12, 1593.
6. The Charter of Patriarch Sophronios of Jerusalem to Tsar Boris Godunov, Jerusalem, September 6, 1602.
7. The Charter of Patriarch Sophronios of Jerusalem to "the Grand Prince Dimitrij Ivanovich" (the False Dimitrij I), Jerusalem, 1605.
8. The Charter of Patriarch Theophanes of Jerusalem concerning the Confirmation of Filaret Nikitich as Patriarch of Moscow, Moscow/Iasi, 1619, July 5, 1629.
9. The Letter of the Priest Nikiphoros Xenakios to the Novospasski Monastery Cellarer Ioannikios, Jaroslavl, February 27, 1623.
10. The Charter of Thomas Cantacuzenos to Patriarch Filaret Nikitich of Moscow, Constantinople, July 16, 1624.
11. The Charter of Patriarch Kyrillos of Constantinople to Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich, Constantinople, 1625.
12. The Charter of Patriarch Gerasimos of Alexandria to Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich, The Patriarchate of Alexandria, September 16, 1625.
13. The Charter of Father-Superior of the Dionysiou Monastery to Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich, Athos, Dionysiou Monastery, October 13, 1625.
14. The Petition of the priest Laskarakis, Exarch of the Great Church, the son of Lascaris Mavromatis, to Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich, Moscow, October 1626.
15. The Charter of the Kathegumenos Iezekiel and the community of the Iveron Monastery to Patriarch Filaret Nikitich of Moscow, Athos, the Iveron Monastery, 1627.
16. The Charter of Archimandrite Kyrillos of Jerusalem to the Secretary (Djak) of the Duma Ivan Gramotin, England, 1627.

17. The Charter of Metropolitan Christophoros of Ankhial to Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich,
Iasi, January 15, 1628.
18. The Charter of Dikaïos Hieromonakh Veniamin and the community of the Monastery of the Holy Mother of God of Kozinitsa to Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich,
The Monastery of the Mother of God of Kozinitsa, 1629.
19. The Charter of Patriarch Theophanes of Jerusalem to Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich,
Constantinople, January 4, 1630.
20. The Charter of Metropolitan Athanasios of Thessaloniki to Patriarch Filaret Nikitich of Moscow,
Constantinople, May 20, 1631.
21. The Charter of Patriarch Theophanes of Jerusalem to Patriarch Filaret Nikitich of Moscow,
Constantinople, 1631.
22. The Charter of Patriarch Kyrillos (Lukaris) of Constantinople to Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich and Patriarch Filaret Nikitich of Moscow,
Constantinople, June 30, 1633.
23. The Charter of Patriarch Gerasimos of Alexandria to Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich,
The Patriarchate of Alexandria, January 1635.
24. The Charter of Patriarch Theophanes of Jerusalem to Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich,
Constantinople, September 21 - October 20, 1638.
25. The Charter of the Alexandrian Patriarch Metrophanes to Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich,
Constantinople, October 3, 1638.
26. The Letter of Ivan Petrov to Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich,
Iasi, December 4, 1638.
27. The Charter of the Didaskalos and Theologian of the Great Church Gabriel Vlasios to Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich,
Iasi, January 17, 1641.
28. The Charter of Metropolitanate of Palaeopatrass to Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich,
The Metropolitanate of Palaeopatrass, October 12, 1644.
29. The Charter of Dikaïos Parthenios and the community of the Monastery of Saint Anastasia Pharmakolytria to Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich,
The Monastery of Saint Anastasia Pharmakolytria, 1644.

30. The Charter of Patriarch Nikiphoros of Alexandria to Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich,
Iasi, February 18, 1645.
31. The Petition of Metropolitan Theophanes of Palaeopatrass to Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich,
Moscow, June 25, 1645.
32. The Charter of Patriarch Paisios of Jerusalem to Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich,
Constantinople, July 18, 1645.
33. The Charter of the Bailiff of the town Krasny Kondrat Georgiev to Tsar Alexei Mihailovich,
Krasny, October 11, 1645.
34. The Charter of the Archbishop of Thessaly to Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich,
Constantinople, August 14, 1646.
35. The Charter of Didaskalos of the Great Church and Preacher of the Gospel Gabriel Vlasios to Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich,
Iasi, October 21, 1646.
36. The Charter of the former Patriarch of Constantinople Athanasios (Pataros) to Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich,
Iasi, October 1646.
37. The Charter of Patriarch Ioannikios of Alexandria to Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich,
Constantinople, 1647.
38. The Charter of Archimandrite Pachomios and the community of the Iveron Monastery to Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich,
Mt Athos, the Iveron Monastery, June 15, 1648.
39. The Charter of Archimandrite Pachomios of the Iveron Monastery to Archimandrite Nikon of the Novospassky Monastery in Moscow,
Mt Athos, the Iveron Monastery, June 15, 1648.
40. The Charter of Patriarch Parthenios of Constantinople to Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich,
Constantinople, March 1860.
41. The Charter of Patriarch Paisios of Jerusalem to Hetman Bogdan Khmelnitskii,
Targoviste, September 29, 1650.
42. The Charter of Patriarch Ioannikios of Constantinople to Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich,
Constantinople, November 1651.

43. The Charter of Kathegumenos Makarios and the community of the Monastery to Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich,
Crete, April 25, 1652.
44. The Charter of Protosynkellos Gabriel of Jerusalem to Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich,
Constantinople, August 1652.
45. The Charter of Patriarch Makarios of Antioch to Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich,
Constantinople, November 22, 1652.
46. The Charter of Patriarch Paisios of Constantinople to Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich,
Constantinople, November 24, 1652.
47. The Charter of Authentication from Patriarch Paisios of Constantinople concerning the head of St. Gregory the Theologian,
Constantinople, 1652.
48. The Charter of Patriarch Paisios of Constantinople and the Synod, which confirms the Authenticity of the Icon of the Holy Mother of God Vlakhernitissa, belonging to Protosynkellos Gabriel,
Constantinople, March 1653.
49. The Letter of Metropolitan Gabriel of Thessaly to Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich,
Constantinople, March-June 1653.
50. The Charter of Patriarch Icannikios of Constantinople to Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich,
Constantinople, October 1653.
51. A copy of a Charter of Authentication of the Relics carried from Crete to Constantinople, written on July 20, 1648,
Constantinople, 1653.
52. An Account of Crete by Archimandrite Neophytos of the Monastery of The Holy Mother of God της Ἀκροτηριανῆς [sic],
Moscow, 1653.
53. The Charter of the former Patriarch Athanasios (Patelaros) of Constantinople to Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich,
The Monastery of Mgar, March 22, 1654.
54. The Charter of Patriarch Paisios of Constantinople to Patriarch Nikon of Moscow,
Constantinople, June 1654.
55. The Charter of Patriarch Paisios of Constantinople to Hetman Bogdan Khmelnitsky,
Constantinople, July 29, 1654.

56. The Charter of Protosynkellos Gabriel of Jerusalem to Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich,
Constantinople, December 10, 1654.
57. The Letter of the Painters, the Brothers Ioannes and Georgios, to Patriarch Nikon of Moscow,
Constantinople, July 25, 1655.
58. The Charter of Patriarch Paisios of Constantinople to Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich,
Iasi (?), August 1655.
59. The Charter of the Kathegumen of the New Monastery Makarios and the community to Patriarch Nikon of Moscow,
Chios, November 1657.
60. The Charter of Archimandrite Simeon, the Hieromonach of the Monastery of St. Gregory in the Diocese of Ardameriu and Galatista, to Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich,
Putivl', January 28, 1658.
61. The Charter of Archbishop Kyrillos of the New Monastery on Chios to Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich,
Moscow, May 14, 1660.
62. The Charter of Archbishop Kyrillos of the New Monastery on Chios to Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich,
Moscow, May 14, 1660.
63. The Charter of the Monks of the Iveron Monastery to Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich,
Mt Athos, 1660.
64. The Charter of the Epitropoi of the Church of the Holy Mother of God of Chrysospege to Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich,
Galata, February 2, 1661.
65. The Answers of the four Oecumenic [sic] Patriarchs concerning the Power of the Tsar and the Patriarch,
Constantinople, May 1663.
66. The Charter of Patriarch Nektarios of Jerusalem to Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich,
Iasi, March 20, 1664.
67. The Act of the Council of Moscow concerning the Deposition of Patriarch Nikon,
Moscow, December 12, 1666.
68. The Charter of Patriarch Methodios of Constantinople to Patriarch Ioasaph of Moscow,
Constantinople, May 1668.

69. The Charter of Patriarch Dositheos of Jerusalem to Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich,
Philippopolis, November 1, 1669.
70. The Letter of Dionysios Iviritis to Metropolitan Paisios Liganides of Caza, Bucharest, April 11, 1670.
71. The Charter of Patriarch Jakob of Constantinople concerning the Remission of Punishment of Patriarch Nikon of Moscow,
Constantinople, May 1682.
72. The Charter of Patriarch Dositheos of Jerusalem concerning the Remission of Punishment of Patriarch Nikon of Moscow,
Constantinople, May 1682.
73. The Charter of Patriarch Dositheos of Jerusalem to Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich,
Constantinople, May 1682.
74. The Peace Treaty of Turkey and Russia concerning their borders translated into Greek by Alexander Mavrocordato,
Constantinople, 1682.
75. Archbishop Ioannikios; A description of Mount Sinai,
Sinai, April 1688.
76. The Charter of the former Patriarch Dionysios of Constantinople to Tsar Ioannes, Peter and the Tsarevna Sofia,
Bucharest, December 1688.
77. The Charter of Patriarch Dositheos of Jerusalem to Patriarch Adrian of Moscow,
Wallachia, August 10, 1693.
78. The List of Icons and Church-vessels, which have been sent by the Russian Tsars as a gift to the Great Church and were destroyed during the fire,
Constantinople, not later than April 1694.
79. The Charter of Hegumen Jacob and the community of the Monastery of St. John the Baptist in Patmos to Tsar Peter I,
Patmos, April 1696.
80. The Charter of Patriarch Kallinikos of Constantinople to Tsar Peter I,
Constantinople, August 1, 1700.
81. The Charter of the Monastery of St. John the Baptist in Patmos to Tsar Peter I,
Patmos, March 1704.
82. The Charter of the Monastery of the Assumption at Mavromol to Tsar Peter I,
The Monastery of the Assumption at Mavromol, December 10, 1704.

Book Reviews

J. Zaimov, *Bǎlgarski Imennik (Pǎrva čast: Lični imena u Bǎlgarite ot VI do XX vek. Vtora čast: Familni imena ot čužd protizhod)*, Sofia [Verlag der Bulgarischen Akademie der Wissenschaften] 1988, 310 S.

Nach den diesbezüglichen Arbeiten von G. Weigand [Die bulgarischen Rufnamen, ihre Herkunft, Kürzungen und Neubildungen, Jahresbericht des Instituts für rumänische Sprache zu Leipzig, Band 26-29 (1921), 104-192] und St. Ilčev [Rečnik na ličnite i familni imena u Bǎlgarite, Sofia 1969] haben wir eine neue umfangreiche Arbeit zu den bulgarischen Ruf- und Eigennamen. Die Arbeit besteht aus zwei Teilen. Der erste Teil (S. 9-253) untersucht die gegenwärtigen bulgarischen Rufnamen, von denen die ältesten im 6. und 7. Jhd. bezeugt werden. Im zweiten Teil (S. 257-309) werden bulgarische Familiennamen fremden Ursprungs behandelt. Nun zu den zwei Teilen im einzelnen.

Die Rufnamen des ersten Teils werden nach Bedeutung und Herkunft untersucht. Bei den wenigen protobulgarischen und den älteren slawischen Namen bemüht sich der Verf., ihre älteren Belege anzugeben und dann ihre Form und Bedeutung zu erklären. Diese Aufgabe ist für die altslawischen Namen, die mit entsprechenden altkirchenslawischen Wörtern verbunden werden können, relativ leicht, für die protobulgarischen Namen aber, die auf nicht identifizierbarem Wortmaterial beruhen, äußerst schwer. Das Interesse des Buches besteht jedoch unserer Meinung nach an den fremden Namen. Die bulgarischen Namen fremden Ursprungs werden einfach als fremd bezeichnet und ins Bulgarische übersetzt; die Form des fremden Namens wird nicht angegeben.

Bei den Namen fremden Ursprungs ist der griechische Anteil, wie zu erwarten war, bedeutend; es geht meistens um byzantinisch-neugriechische Namen, deren größter Teil der griechisch-orthodoxen Kirche angehört. Griechische christliche Namen hebräischen Ursprungs, die mit ihrer griechischen Form ins Bulgarische eingedrungen sind (*Avram* < 'Αβραάμ, *'Ana* < 'Αννα, *Gavril/Gavrail* < Γαβριήλ, *Daniél* < Δανιήλ usw.) werden schlechthin als direkte Entlehnungen aus dem Hebräischen betrachtet. Griechische Kurzformen von rein griechischen Namen werden als bulgarische Ableitungen aus den entsprechenden vollen Formen betrachtet, die sowieso griechisch sind: *Váso* (Βάσος < Βασίλειος), *Dlmo* (Δήμος < Δημήτριος oder Δημοσθένης), *Dlno* (Ντίνος < Κωνσταντίνος), *Vángo* (Βάγγος < Εὐάγγελος), *Kózo/Kódo* (Κώστος < Κωνσταντίνος), *Lázo* (Λάζος < Λάζαρος), *Máno* (Μάνος < Μανόλης), *Mlco* (Μήτσος < Δημήτριος), *Nlko* (Νίκος < Νικόλαος), *Páno* (Πάνος < Παναγιώτης), *Slmo* (Σίμος < Συμεών), *Sóto* (Σώτος < Σωτήριος), *Stámo* (Στάμος < Σταμάτης), *Stása* (Στάσα < Αναστασία), *Stéfo* (Στέφος < Στέφανος), *Táso* (Τάσος < Αναστάσιος), *Fóta* (Φότα < Φωτεινή) usw. Wenn sich manche von diesen Formen auch innerhalb des Bulgarischen erklären lassen, darf man die Tatsache, daß es sich um griechische Namen und Formen handelt, die im Griechischen sehr früh bezeugt werden, nicht außer Acht lassen. Auch in komplizierteren Fällen, wo Laut und Form der Namen eventuell

einen fremden Eindruck machen, ist die Ableitung von Kurzformen griechischer Namen zuerst im Griechischen und seinen Dialekten zu suchen: *Gádo* (Γκάτσος < Γεωργάτσος), *Gédo* (Γεωργίτσος), *Géko* (Γεωργάκος, vgl. Γάκος < Γεωργάκος und Γέρος < Γεώργιος), *Gerúš* (Γεωργούσης), *Gjurlja* (Γεωργία, vgl. Γιουρίκας < Γεωργίτικας), *Pándo* (Πάντσος < Πανίτσος, Demin. zu Πάνος). Griechische Ableitungen stellen ferner dar: *Djádko* (Διάκος < διάκονος), *Lásko* (Λάσκος < Λάσκαρης), *Pásko* (Πάσχος < Πασχάλης), *Páska* (Πασκαλιά/Πασχαλιά), *Mílto* (Μίλτος < Μιλτιάδης), *Čéllo/Čéliu* (Τσέλιος < Στέλιος), *Cills* (Τσίλης < Βασίλης), *Vájo, Vaján, Valján* (Βάιος, Βαιανός < (Κυριακή) των Βατών), *Tašúl, Tašúla* (Τάσιος, Τασιούλα < Αναστάσιος, durch š < -σι), *Manúš* (Μανούσος,-ης). *Vláho* kann nur griechisch (Βλάχος, -ο) sein, *Bíco* kann Μπίτσος (<Χαραλαμπίτσος) wiedergeben, *Dókja* kann eine Kurzform von Ευδοκία sein usw. usf. Bei den griechischen femininen Namen auf -ίτσα, die ins Bulgarische eindringen, wie *Elenica* (Ελενίτσα), *Evgenica* (Ευγενίτσα), *Vangelica* (Βαγγελίτσα), *Marica* (Μαρίτσα), *Todorica* (Θοδωρίτσα), *Fanica* (Φανίτσα) usw., ist die Analyse des Verf., der beide Elemente als bulgarisch bzw. slawisch (*Eléna* + *-ica*) betrachtet, nicht berechtigt, zumal Stamm und Betonung derartiger Namen rein griechisch sind und gr. -ίτσα hier unabhängig von sl. *-ica* (vgl. Ch. Symeonidis, Eine letzte Betrachtung der Suffixe *-itsin, -itsa, -útsikos*, Proceedings of the 8th annual meeting of Depart. of Linguistics, Univ. of Thessaloniki, 1987, 251ff.) erscheint. Aus demselben Grund scheint mir auch *Kirica* nicht aus **Kirilica*, sondern aus gr. Κυριακίτσα < Κυριακή entstanden zu sein; eine weitere Verkürzung von *Kirica* ist in *Kica* (Κίτσα) zu erkennen. So ist auch die Erklärung von *Kíco* (nach dem Verf. < *Klto*, Mask. zu fem. *Klta* < *kita* = *kltka* "Strauß") einfacher, wenn man annimmt, daß *Kíco* das gr. Κίτσος < Κυριακίτσος wiedergibt.

Dem Onomatologen ist gut bekannt, daß auf eine konkrete Kurzform mehrere Namen zusammenfallen können. Man braucht mehrmals eine unmittelbare Information von Trägern der Namen, um zu entscheiden, auf welchen Namen eine Kurzform jedesmal zurückgeht; dieser Prozeß wird in Fällen von fremden Namen natürlich noch schwieriger. Wir wollen hier am Beispiel des Namens Μιχαήλ unsere Gedanken erläutern. Der Verf. leitet eine Menge von über 40 Namenformen auf Grund von bulg. *mal* = *malǎk* "klein" ab. Es ist aber sehr zweifelhaft, ob das Adjektiv für "klein" so vielen Kurznamenformen den Bildungsgrund geben konnte, und es fragt sich, ob es nicht um einen anderen Namen geht, der eine große Verbreitung genoß und äußerlich mit *malǎk* zusammengefallen ist. Es geht um den christlichen Namen Μιχαήλ, der bis heute unter den verschiedensten Formen (wegen der schwachen Artikulation des Namens: Μιχάλης, Μουχάλης, Μουάλης, Μάλης usw.), die als Tauf- oder Nachnamen vorkommen, sehr gebräuchlich ist: Μιχαήλα/Μιχάλα > *Mála*, Μιχαλιάνα > *Malána*, Μιχαλάς > *Malás*, Μιχαηλίνης/Μιχαηλίνα > *Malén/Maléna*, Μιχαηλίτσης/Μιχαηλίτσα > *Mališ/Mališa*, *Mališ/Mališa*, Μιχαηλίτσης + Μιχαηλίσκος > *Maléčko*, *Maléško*, Μιχαλινός, -ιά + Μιχαλίκος, -α > *Malínko*, *Malínka*, Μιχαλίνης > *Malín*, Μιχαλινούδι "Kind eines Μιχαλινός" + Μιχαλακούδι "Kind eines Μιχάλακας" > *Malinkúd*, Μιχαλάκος > *Mihálko*, *Málko*, fem. *Málka*, Μιχαλικάνος > *Malkán*, fem. *Malkána*, Μιχαλούδα > *Malúda*, Μιχαλούδης > *Malút*, Μιχαλικούσης > *Malkúš*, Μιχαλιτσιάνος > *Malčán*, *Málčán*, Μιχάλτσος (<Μιχαλίτσος) > *Mihálčo*, *Málčo*, *Málčo*, *Málšo*, fem. *Málša*, Μάλιος (< *Μιχάλιος < Μιχαλιός) > *Mállo*, *Málju*, Μιχαλιάνος > *Malián*, Μιχαλούσης > *Mihálúš*, *Malúš*, Μιχέλης (vgl. ital. *Michele*) + Μιχελιός > *Mélio*, *Mélju*, *Mélo*, Μιχελίτσης > *Mélčo*, Μιχαλίτσος > *Milčo*, Μιχαλιάνος > *Milján* usw.

Auch bei den griechischen Namen lateinischen Ursprungs ist die Tendenz des Verf., möglichst mehrere Fremdnamen durch bulgarische Mittel zu erklären, evident; so werden z.B. folgende griechische Namen lateinischer Herkunft für bulgarische Bildungen gehalten:

Dometján < PN *Dometa* < PN *Domo* (Δομητιανός), *Kládlo*, *Kládju* (Κλαύδιος), *Petrún* (Πετρόνιος), *Palján* (Παυλιανός), *Traján* (Τραϊανός, vgl. Weigand 149), *Késar* (Καίσαρ) usw. Obwohl türkische Rufnamen nicht behandelt werden, scheint mir, daß einige unter den angeführten bulgarischen RN unter Umständen türkisch sein können: *Ilván* < tü. *ulvan* "Großtun, Großartig", dialektisch *ilvan*, *Kavún* (*Kavúna*, *Kavúnko*) < tü. *kavun* "Melone", *Kalún* (*Kalúna*) < tü. *kalan* "dick, voll" usw.

Neben den direkten Namenentlehnungen aus dem Griechischen gibt es zahlreiche bulgarische bzw. slawische Namen, die Bedeutungsübersetzungen (calques) von Griechischem sind und gewöhnlich griechische christliche Namen oder kirchliche Termini wörtlich wiedergeben; die meisten von diesen Namen werden schon in den ersten Jhd. der Verbreitung des Christentums in der slawischen Welt belegt. Der Verf. weist zwar auf einige solche Namen (z.B. *Božidar* "Geschenk Gottes" < Θεόδωρος, *Blagovést* "der gute Nachricht Bringende" < Εὐάγγελος) hin, die aus der vorläufigen slawistischen Literatur sehr bekannt sind, verfolgt aber diesen Prozeß nicht konsequent. Wir werden uns hier nur auf einige bulgarische bzw. slawische Komposita mit erstem Kompositionsglied bulg. bzw. slaw. *blag* und *bog* beschränken, um zu zeigen, wie tief der griechische Einfluß auf die Bildung der bulgarischen/slawischen Eigennamen ist. (a) *blag* "angenehm, mild usw.": *Blagovér* < Εὐσέβιος, *Blagoddán*/*Blagdán*/*Blagoddát* < *Εὐδοτος, d.h. Θεόδοτος, vgl. agr. Διόδοτος, *Blagdén* < Εὐήμερος (vgl. εὐήμερῳ), *Blagija* Mask. < Ἀγάθων/Ἀγαθίας, *Blagój* < Ἀγάθων, *Blagoljub* < Φιλάγαθος, *Blagoród* < Εὐγένιος, *Blagoródka*/*Blagoródna* < Εὐγενία, *Blagosláv* < Εὐδοξος, *Blagoslávna* < Εὐδοξία (vgl. Weigand 150, wonach *Blagosláv* dem Εὐδόξιος entspricht), *Blagoslón* < Εὐλόγιος, *Blagoslóna* < Εὐλογία, *Blagóta* Mask. < Ἀγάθων/Ἀγαθίας, *Blagocréta* < Εὐανθία usw. (b) *bog* "Gott": *Bogdán*/*Bogodán* (10. Jhd.) < Θεόδοτος, *Bogdát*/*Bogoddát* < Θεόδοτος, *Bogodál* < Θεόδοτος, *Bogoljub* < Θεόφιλος *Bogomil* (10. Jhd.) < Θεοχάρης, *Bogomir* < Θεόκοσμος oder Εἰρηναῖος, *Bogomól* < Παράκλητος, *Bogorád* < Θεοχάρης, *Bogosláv*/*Bogoslón* < *Θεόδοξος (ὁ δοξάζων τὸν θεόν), *Bogotvór* < Εὐσέβιος.

Eine weitere Kategorie von bulgarischen bzw. altkirchenslawischen Namen geht auf griechische kirchliche Ausdrücke und Termini zurück; hier seien nur einige Beispiele erwähnt: *Vsédal* (11. Jhd.) "Der überall präsent ist" = ὁ πανταχοῦ παρὼν καὶ τὰ πάντα πληρῶν, *Vseslón* = ὁ πᾶσιν κηρύττων τὸν λόγον τοῦ θεοῦ, *Dobrovést* = ὁ καλὴν/χαρμόσυνον ἀγγελίαν ἀναγγέλλων, vgl. *Blagovést*, *Dobroslán* "mit guter Statur" = εὐσχημος, vgl. εὐσχήμων Ἰωσήφ, *Dobrosád* "der gute, gerechte Richter" (11. Jhd.) = ὁ καλὸς κριτής, ὁ δίκαιος κριτής, *Dobrotéh* "der gut Tröstende" = εὐπαρήγορος, ὁ καλῶς, ἐπαρκῶς παρηγορῶν, *Dragomúz* "der gute Mann" (10. Jhd.) = ὁ καλὸς ἀνὴρ, d.h. ὁ φιλόανθρωπος, vgl. "ὅτι σὺ ἀγαθὸς καὶ φιλόανθρωπος θεὸς ὑπάρχεις". *Žhodár* = ζῳῆς δῶρον oder ὁ τὴν ζῳὴν δωρούμενος (?), usw.

Auf bulgarische bzw. altkirchenslawische Namen, die nach griechischen Vorbildern gebildet worden sind, vermochte der Verf. nicht tiefer einzugehen; so erklärt er zwar *Soffja* "Weisheit" aus gr. Σοφία, weist aber bei *Véra*/*Vjára* "Treue" und *Nadézda* "Hoffnung" nicht auf die entsprechenden Heiligen Πίστις und Ἐλπίς hin. Eine bloße Verbindung des Names mit einer entsprechenden bulgarischen Wurzel vermag nicht die tieferen Gründe zur Bildung des Namens erklären; so genügt die Verbindung von *Dúmo* und *Dúma* mit bulg. *dúma* "Gedanke" zur Deutung der Namen nicht, wenn man den griechischen kirchlichen Terminus Λόγος "Wort, Gedanke" (vgl. ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ Λόγος usw.), auf den das bulg. *dúma* zurückgeht, nicht mitberücksichtigt. *Kámen* und *Krémen* lassen sich als bulgarische Bildungen nur als Übersetzung von gr. Πέτρος (vgl. σὺ εἶ Πέτρος καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτην τὴν πέτραν οἰκοδομήσω μου τὴν ἐκκλησίαν) richtig erklären, das sonst als *Petăr* und *Petre*

($\langle$ wohl gr. Πέτρε) im Bulgarischen erscheint. *Vellk* (13. Jhd.) könnte als "groß" auf *Velimir*, *Velislav* zurückgehen; Weigands (S. 153) Vermutung jedoch, daß auch *Velliden* "Ostern" in Betracht komme, wird durch das Vorkommen von Βελίκης in Nordgriechenland, das dem gr. Πασχάλης [f. Πασχαλιά ($\langle$ Πασχάλιος, Adj. zu Πάσχα)] gleichgesetzt wird, bestätigt. Weigands richtige Ansichten hat der Verf. in vielen Fällen außer Acht gelassen; *Kóna* beruht nach Weigand 163 auf bulg. *kokóna* "Anrede an eine Frau, besonders an eine Griechin" und *Kalimána* auf bulg. *kalmána* "Anrede an die Taufpatin". Wir wollen hier bemerken, daß bulg. *kokóna* auf dem entsprechenden gr. oder rumänischen Wort (gr. κοκóna / kóna, rum. *cocoána*) beruht, das höchstwahrscheinlich als Bezeichnung der Griechinnen aus Konstantinopel ($\langle$ Κωνσταντινοπολίτισσα / *Constantinopolitana*) gebraucht worden ist; Bulg. *kalmána* läßt sich aus gr. καλή μάννα "Gute Mutter" (vgl. pontisch καλομάννα "Oma") leicht erklären.

Auch in der Terminologie für ausgesetzte, gefundene Kinder usw., die den Anlaß zur Bildung von entsprechenden Namen gegeben hat, gibt das Bulgarische die griechischen Termini wieder: *Náiden* "gefunden" = *Obréien* "gefunden" = *Vréto* ($\langle$ Βρετός "gefundenes oder angenommenes Kind"; *Kúpen* "gekauft" (14. Jhd.) = Αγοραστός "gekauft Kind"; *Pródan* "verkauft" (14. Jhd.), *Prójo* (davon gr. Πρόιος/Πρόγιος/Πρώιος) = Πουλημένος "verkauft Kind". Ähnlich sind auf Grund von Σταμάτης, das den Wunsch der Eltern ausdrückt, daß es mit der Sterblichkeit der neugeborenen Kinder aufhört (= να σταματήσει), zuerst *Stamát* und dann *Zapriján*, *Spren* und vielleicht noch *Stójko* ($\langle$ stoj "hör auf", vgl. *Dósta* [16. Jhd.] $\langle$ dósta "genug" in der Bedeutung von gr. Σταμάτης) gebildet worden. Noch ist das Vorbild für Bildungen, wie *Dablživ* (13. Jhd. $\langle$ da bi živ "er möge leben"), im Griechischen zu finden: Ζήσης ($\langle$ να ζήσει "er möge leben", vgl. agr. Πολύβιος ($\langle$ ძე πολύν βίον *exoi* usw.

Der zweite Teil enthält fremde Familiennamen, von denen die meisten aus dem Türkischen, aber auch aus dem Griechischen stammen. Alle diese fremden Namen werden in der Regel aus bulg. Dialektwörtern (z.B. *Kardásev* ($\langle$ bulg. *kardás* "Bruder", *Kandiláftov* ($\langle$ bulg. *kandiláft* "kirchlicher Beamte, der mit dem Anzünden von Kerzen beauftragt ist") abgeleitet, die als Lehnwörter vom Türkischen (*kardeş*, *kardaş*) oder vom Griechischen (κανδηλάπτης, κανδηλανάπτης) ins Bulgarische eingedrungen sind. Dies bedeutet, daß es sich um mittelbare Fremdnamen handelt. Die Möglichkeit, daß manche Fremdnamen schon im Türkischen oder im Griechischen gebildet worden sein können, interessiert den Verf. nicht (vgl. unten). Es folgen einige Bemerkungen zu diesem Teil des Buches. S. 260: *Araslanov* beruht auf tü. *harb a(r)slan* "Löwe des Krieges". *Arpadžikov* ist mit tü. *arpacık* "Gerstenkorn (am Auge)" zu verbinden. S. 261: *Baballev* ist doch das tü. *babalı* "dick, stark". S. 273: *Diamandiev* ist der gr. EN Διαμαντής + -ev. S. 274: *Drákov* beruht auf dem gr. FN Δράκος. *Dudakliev* (*dudaklija* ($\langle$ tü. *dudaklı*)) bedeutet eher "mit großen Lippen" als "mit großem Schnurrbart". S. 277: *Iribóinov* beruht eher auf tü. *igri boyun* und bezeichnet einen Menschen mit schiefem Hals. S. 288: *Mandžárov* bezeichnet den Ungarn (vgl. ngr. FN Μαντζάρης, Μαντζαρος, tü. *Macar* usw.). S. 291: bulg. (dial.) *palamida* "Dorn der Äcker" beruht auf ngr. καλαμίδα "ds." ($\langle$ agr. κάλαμος. S. 298 (*Tepegjózov*): *tepegöz* bezeichnet in den tu. Dialekten den Zyklopen. S. 300: *Fránkov* ist mit mittel- und ngr. Φράγκος "Franke" zu verbinden. S. 301 (*Harizánov*): *Harizán* kann auf ein gr. *Χαρισαμένης (zu χαρισάμενος [vgl. καὶ τοῖς ἐν τοῖς μνήμασιν ζῶν χαρισάμενος]) $\langle$ Χαρίζανης (Wandel s) mit Anlehnung an χαρίζω zurückgehen. S. 307: *Šteriov*, *Šterjánov* beruhen auf Στέργιος, Στεργιανός, die Ableitungen aus Στυλιανός mit Anlehnung an στέργω oder στερεώνω sind. Die meisten ngr. Entsprechungen von bulg. Dialektwörtern, die bulgarischen FN zugrunde-

liegen, haben schon im Griechischen FN gebildet, die dann als Lehnnamen auch im Bulgarischen erscheinen: Επίτροπος, Ιερέας, Ορφανός, Ζαφείρης, Σγούρος, Ζωγράφος, Καλαμάρας, Καρύδας, Κεφάλας, Κόρακας, Κουντουράς, Λαμπρινός, Μάλαμας, Μαργαρίτης, Μυγδάλης, Μουστάκας, Πάγκαλος, Πεταλάς usw. Manche sogar bezeichnen byzantinische Ausdrücke und Termini des staatlichen und kirchlichen Lebens: Ζωγράφος, Εικονογράφος, Εικονάρης «Maler von Ikonen», Ασκητής, Οικονόμος, Κτήτωρ, Κανδηλάπτης, Λογοθέτης, Σπαθάριος usw.

Es hätte keinen Sinn, hier weitere Bemerkungen zu Zaimovs Buch zu machen, das onomatologische Fragen des weiteren Balkanraums stellt, die noch zu klären sind. Die Klärung von vielen Fragen auf diesem Gebiet ist jedoch mit dem Griechischen verbunden, das den übrigen Balkansprachen in vielen Fällen das Vorbild zur Namenbildung gegeben hat. Zaimovs "Imennik", das die lebenslängliche onomatologische Erfahrung eines bedeutenden Onomatologen enthält und Ilčevs Rečnik in mancher Hinsicht ergänzt, wird lange Zeit ein unerlässliches Hilfsmittel zur bulgarischen und balkanischen Onomatologie bleiben.

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CH. SYMEONIDIS

Paskhalis M. Kitromilidis, *Η Γαλλική Επανάσταση και η Νοτιοανατολική Ευρώπη* (The French Revolution and South-Eastern Europe). Diatton. Athens 1990, pp. 182.

The bicentenary of the outbreak of the French Revolution was marked not only by festivities and celebrations, but also by a variety of events of a more academic nature: conferences were organised, history periodicals issued special editions, and a number of independent studies of this historic event were published. The most important scholarly event in Greece was the conference organised by the National Research Institute's Centre for Modern Greek Research, the proceedings of which were published in a weighty volume entitled *La Révolution française et l'Hellénisme moderne*, Athens 1989.

So Professor Kitromilidis' book is a timely one, though, needless to say, by no means merely opportune. Despite his youth, he has conducted fruitful research into a variety of subjects, notably theoretical ones, relating to the modern Greek Enlightenment. Having specialised in political science and subsequently researched and taught the history of political theory, he is in an excellent position to deal with the many and varied aspects of the profound social and cultural changes which transformed the Hellenic world between 1750 and 1821, and which we usually refer to as the modern Greek Enlightenment. However, as the title indicates, the purely Greek aspect of his book is far outweighed by the historical dimension: the study embraces the whole of South-Eastern Europe, including the Serbian provinces of Austro-Hungary, western Asian Minor, Cyprus, and the Orthodox communities of Venice and Trieste.

The author has organised his material, his comments, and his conclusions in three chapters: 'The Forging of the Revolutionary Mentality' (pp. 17-69), 'Liberal Criticism of the French Revolution' (pp. 71-108), and 'Balkan Radicalism' (pp. 109-38).

The first chapter pinpoints the main centres from which democratic and revolutionary ideas were disseminated eastwards: the French-occupied Ionian Islands and Illyrian provin-

ces' mainly, but also various urban centres in the Balkans where French consular officials, merchants, and special agents engaged in considerable propaganda activity (Gaudin, Hortolan, Parant, Konstantinos Stamatis, the Stephanopoli brothers, and others). Their call to revolution met with no response from the masses (to whom, anyway, it was not directed), but it did strike a chord with small dynamic groups of merchants, scholars, and students, and even a number of restive boyars. Objectively, the situation held little to alarm the political establishment; but in the long run, as Professor Kitromilidis observes, the replacement of political and religious values and symbols (which had hitherto held the multinational Orthodox flock together) by new secular ideals and models shook the foundations of both the Ottoman state and the Orthodox Church. Hence the Oecumenical Patriarchate's unexpectedly violent reaction, which was much more violent, indeed, than that of the Turkish authorities.

The second chapter presents an in-depth analysis of Korais' critical attitude to the successive phases of the French Revolution. Following, on this, as on so many other issues, a *via media*, Korais' sympathies lay initially with the Girondins and later with the Idéologues. As Professor Kitromilidis points out, his divergences from this moderate line in more radical directions were occasional and short-lived. But it is also worth noting that: i) Korais never expressed his censure of Jacobinism, the Terror, and, later, Bonapartism publicly, but only in private letters; and ii) he published his militant pro-democracy and pro-French texts under a pseudonym.

The 'Balkan Radicalism' of Chapter Three is represented mainly by Rigas Velestinlis and the anonymous author of the *Elliniki Nomarkhia*, but also by a number of lesser scholars, aspiring revolutionaries, and members of various secret societies. Translating Montesquieu and Rousseau, repudiating kings and sultans as tyrants, and issuing calls both timely and inopportune to their enslaved compatriots to rise up and take arms, these romantic revolutionaries may have remained in the margins of history; yet in a way they marked the historic transition between the political, social, and cultural prolonged Middle Ages in which the Balkan societies had hitherto lived and the cosmogony of the nineteenth century, the century of liberation struggles and nation states.

As he himself explains, it is not Professor Kitromilidis' intention to collect in this book all the evidence of the French Revolution's repercussions in South-Eastern Europe. He merely wishes to describe and discuss the main channels, the transmitters, and the receivers of the revolutionary message and the democratic ideas and symbols issuing from France from 1789 onwards. Though the new teachings met with little response in the Balkan societies of the time, they filtered through nonetheless, and were later embodied in the constitutions, the legislation, and the organisation of the newly-established Balkan states.

CHRISTOS G. PATRINELIS

M. Stojanović, *Antologija Novogrčkog Narodnog Pesništva* (An Antology of Modern Greek Folk Poetry), Srpska Književna Zadruga, Beograd 1991.

Srpska Književna Zadruga (The Serbian Literary Community) published in its series of anthologies a collection of poems in modern Greek, selected and translated by the Serbian

neo-hellenist M. Stojanović, associate counselor of the Balkanological Institute in Belgrade. Stojanović has been engaged in comparative studies in the field of the history of literatures of the Balkan peoples for nearly twenty years with remarkable success. His research is directed in particular towards the Serbian and Greek folk poetry. Centuries had, therefore, to pass before such an Anthology of Greek folk poetry appeared among the Serbs, whereas Greek readers still have to wait for a translator who will present the Serbian folk poetry to them.

The composition of this Anthology has all the features of a thoughtfully conceived collection modelled on the works of Greek laographers N. G. Politis, D. Petropoulos, G. Spyridakis and others. The translations occupy the central part of the book; they are preceded by a clear presentation of two themes — *The modern Greek oral poetry and the discipline about folk-lore — laography*; they are followed by a very remarkable epilogue entitled *The Greek folk poems in Serbian translation*. It is also important to say that the author has provided the necessary explanations of certain things relating to personal names, geographical data, and of the words which are not generally known, such as archaisms, neo-hellenisms and turcisms in order to help the reader to understand better the Greek folk culture.

In his introduction, Stojanović does not present exclusively his own views on Greek folk poetry, on the place and time of its origin or on its poetic and aesthetic qualities as is usually done. He had a very strong and original reason for wishing, apart from expressing his own ideas in the presentation of Greek folk poetry, to show above all the achievements of the discipline concerning Greek folk-lore and its best representatives, although he did not omit to mention other experts writing or speculating about the muse of Greek folk-lore. The comparative study of the subject-matters and motifs of Serbian and Greek folk-poetry emphasizes the similarity and mutual interaction between them. As for the morphology of the neo-hellenic iambic verse, its complexity in transposing it into the trochaic nature of Serbian language is successfully shown and achieved by the author.

In contrast to the earlier, mostly mixed basis of classification, Stojanović decided, "giving precedence to the themes and subject-matters as well as to the sequence of events in the poems, to carry out the following order in this selection of Greek oral poetic tradition: akritic poems, ballads (paralogues), historical, klephtic, love poems and songs accompanying folk dances (*distisi*), wedding songs, lullabies, songs of the migrant workers and dirges (laments)".

The poems of each of these cycles offer the reader many interesting things, beginning from their literary and motif features up to the poetic presentation of historical personages and movements for national liberation. Thus the akritic poems sing also of Serbs, the ballads speak about a bride who had been sold and walled inside the bridge which was being built (the motif of the immurement); among the historical poems the reader will find the one about Hajduk (Outlaw) Veljko's fellow, the soldier "Jorgač"; in one of the group of klephtic — hajduk (outlaw) poems, Karageorge (Black George) — the leader of the first Serbian uprising in 1804 — is mentioned along with Odiseus Androutsos, one of the leaders of the Greek uprising for the liberation of his country (1821). Lyrical and sad moods are, of course, prevailing in other poems, beginning with love songs, up to the dirges. Briefly, all that the Greek folk poems contain has been reproduced in the metrics of the original verse, mainly in the Greek iambic lines of fifteen syllables (dekapentasyllabus). That is, no doubt, the highest achievement of this book and its translator.

Paul Mihail, *Jurnalul călătoriei de studii în sud-estul Europei (1931)*, Editura Institutului Biblic și de Misiune al Bisericii Ortodoxe Române, București, 1991, 136 p.

En ce temps d'étroite et de jalouse spécialisation qui est le nôtre, la race-généreuse des érudits devient de plus en plus rare. De même, les savants qui sont à la fois des modèles d'humanité. On est donc heureux de pouvoir lire le *Bildungsroman*, le journal du voyage de formation scientifique du Père Paul Mihail. Au fil des rencontres, des expériences et des découvertes, on entrevoit un homme vraiment évangélique qui n'a rien d'un technocrate du savoir, un homme dont les recherches sont fondées sur l'amour de son Eglise et de son peuple.

Issu de cette noble souche paysanne, à l'intelligence hardie et au cœur doux, sur laquelle repose l'histoire de la Moldavie, le jeune Paul Mihail, théologien et historien, descend en 1931 dans une Europe du sud-est dominée par les barons de la science: Nikolai Glubokovski, Bogdan Filov, Vasil Zlatarski, le métropolite Chrysostome d'Athènes, A. Keramopoulos, N. Bees etc. Il veut les approcher tous, apprendre tant et plus, fouiller partout. Il veut, surtout, recueillir la moindre trace d'une présence roumaine dans les Balkans. Pour lui, le bonheur d'être Roumain semble toujours s'accomplir dans la fierté d'appartenir à l'Orthodoxie.

Suivons-le au Mont Athos et à Constantinople. Au monastère de Grigoriou, Paul Mihail travaille sur des chartes moldaves du XVIII^e siècle et sur les registres des monastères roumains St. Spiridon de Bucarest et Vizantea; à Zographou il ajoute de nouvelles chartes moldaves, cette fois-ci du XVIII^e siècle; l'enquête continue à Vatopède, Pantocrator ou Xéropotame. La moisson la plus riche est ramassée à Constantinople, au métrochion du Saint Sépulcre, dont les archives lui sont ouvertes de 8 au 28 septembre 1931. Le laboureur remplit sa tâche sans épargner son temps et ses efforts. Il transcrit sept cents documents roumains des XVe-XIX^e siècles. Il les avait trouvés enfouis dans les recoins les plus sombres, pleins de poussière, déchirés, jetés, oubliés. Il les a inventoriés, classés, nettoyés, caressés. Qui les a revus depuis?

Ici, le journal du Père Mihail révèle toute sa valeur scientifique: il porte non seulement sur la formation intellectuelle de son auteur, mais il représente aussi un témoignage de première main sur un patrimoine documentaire sud-est européen qui n'est plus notre contemporain.

Mise à part son importance "archéologique", quelle est, en fin de compte, la leçon dégagée par ce journal d'un voyage entrepris dans le sud-est européen il y a soixante ans?

La matière première de toute recherche authentique devrait être la personnalité même du chercheur. On s'est trop habitué aujourd'hui à confondre l'esprit scientifique avec le regard froid et professionnel. L'ouvrage du Père Mihail nous rappelle qu'on n'a pas le droit de se passer de l'enthousiasme, de l'émotion et de la joie, que l'érudit découvre, dans les documents et les monuments qu'il interroge, sa propre identité historique, son véritable visage d'homme et d'intellectuel.

DANIEL BARBU

Abstracts

ATHANASSIOS E. KARATHANASSIS

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE EUROPEAN CARTOGRAPHERS WITH REGARD TO 15th-18th CENTURY MACEDONIA

This is a survey of the main contributions to the cartography of Greece and Macedonia in particular by European and Greek cartographers. It points out the characteristics and shortcomings of the early publications, and stresses the important contribution of cartography to the preservation of the *Hellenic identity* of this region through the dark Ottoman centuries.

E. MAVROUDIS

PHILHELLENISM IN POLAND DURING THE GREEK REVOLUTION 1821-1828

This is a brief but informative commentary on Polish Philhellenism during the Greek War of Independence, a movement which was reflected in the press, literature and in the participation of Polish patriots in the Greek struggle against Ottoman domination.

ATHANASSIOS CHRISTOU

SUBJECT: THE ARCHIVE OF FRIEDRICH VON THIERSCH AND ITS IMPORTANCE FOR GREEK HISTORIOGRAPHY

The archive of Friedrich von Thiersch may be regarded as the proper starting point for a historian who wishes to study the Othonian period in

Greece, as well as Bavarian History of the 19th century. It is well known that this archive exists in the Manuscript Department of the "Bayerische Staatsbibliothek" in Munich under the name "Thierschiana I".

The significance and value of Thiersch's work for Germany and especially for Bavaria — hence he has been called "Praeceptor Bavariae" — is unique. Therefore, it is not surprising that some aspects of his great contribution to history have been incorporated into German historiography.

Thiersch's contribution becomes even more valuable since his study is also extended to Greek affairs, and particularly to the Greek War of Independence in 1821, as well as to the way the new Greek state was formed after that war. Unfortunately, Greek historiography has not been concerned very seriously so far in analysing the various aspects of the major contribution of this Bavarian scholar.

Therefore, in this study, an effort is made to distinguish those record files related to Greek affairs and preserved in "Thierschiana I". Furthermore, this study attempts to write a critical evaluation of the sources pertaining to the Othonian period.

PAUL D. QUINLAN

THE IMPORTANCE OF QUEEN MARIE IN ROMANIAN HISTORY

Who was the real Queen Marie of Romania? The overall purpose of this article is to take a fresh look at this enigmatic twentieth century Queen now that the archives in Romania are finally open to Western scholars and a definitive biography can be written.

On the one hand, during her own lifetime Marie was one of the best known and admired royal figures in the Western world. Her selfless determination to provide aid and comfort to countless numbers of wounded and dying Romanian soldiers, as well as her dogged support to the Allies during World War I are well known. Reflecting this view, the most recent biography of the Queen by Hannah Pakula is aptly titled *The Last Romantic*.

On the other hand, Marie has had her critics. She was vain, highly ambitious, and during her day rumors abounded throughout the courts of Europe about her having extramarital affairs. Perhaps she was, as many people including herself saw her, a modern Theodora, Empress of Byzantium.

*SONIA VATEVA*THE POSITIONS OF THE MAIN POLITICAL PARTIES OF YUGOSLAVIA
AND GREECE WITH RESPECT TO THE AGRARIAN QUESTION
AFTER THE FIRST WORLD WAR

As indicated by the title, the article examines the policies of the main political formations in the newly established Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and in Greece during the early years following the First World War. Under the exceptional conditions generated by the "Great War" —and, in the case of Greece, by the Asia Minor disaster and the subsequent influx of refugees— the issue of land reform came to the fore. Although economic factors were in play too, it was primarily political considerations, chiefly the desire to stabilise the existing social order, that compelled the parties in power in both Belgrade and Athens to initiate reform in the early 1920s. Of course, land redistribution proceeded at a different pace —much more inconsistently in Yugoslavia, where loyalties within the ranks of the dominant political groups were divided, whereas in Greece Venizelos' Liberal Party and its offshoots adopted a more radical approach.

*IOANNIS KAKOULIDIS*THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE JEWS TO THE HISTORY OF THE SOCIALIST-
LABOUR PARTY OF GREECE (1918-1924)

This article examines the contribution of the Jewish socialists of Saloniki, organised in the Socialist-Labour Federation (FOS), to the history of the Socialist-Labour Party of Greece (SEKE). The FOS — a social-democratic organisation, influenced by the pre-war 2nd International — participated in the founding Congress of the SEKE (1918), and greatly determined its political identity. After the period of the "Red Years" (1919-1921), when the Jewish socialists, like the rest of the party members, split into partisans and opponents of the affiliation to the Communist International (C.I.), they unanimously supported a relative political independence of the party from the C.I. and a social-democratic policy. However new party cadres finally succeeded, with the active assistance of the C.I. and through a hard war of factions, to enforce a bolshevik ideology and leadership and to rename the party to Communist Party of Greece in its 3rd Extraordinary Congress (1924).

*VLASIS VLASIDIS*THE "MACEDONIAN QUESTION" ON THE BULGARIAN POLITICAL SCENE
(1919-23)

This study examines the effect of the "Macedonian Question" on the Bulgarian political scene shortly after WW I, each party's policy towards the issue, and the effects of this policy on the issue's progress. Particular attention is also paid to such extraparlimentary forces as the Macedonian refugee organisations in Bulgaria, the Macedonian Committees, the armed forces, and the royal family, in an endeavour to present the "Macedonian Question" not only as an issue of Balkan diplomacy but also as a focal point of the internal political developments in the Bulgarian kingdom. It is argued that BANU's foreign policy, although supported by the majority of the Bulgarian population, was not generally accepted by the political world. Conservative and Liberal parties, powerful Macedonian refugee organizations, the Army, even the royal house were all against BANU's Macedonian policy. The rapprochement of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia accelerated the co-ordination of all these forces and led to the fall of Stamboliiski's government.

*IRENA STAWOWY-KAWKA*SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE IN ECONOMIC POLITICS OF THE THIRD REICH
(1933-1939)

The Third Reich started since 1933 its economic expansion in the countries of South Eastern Europe, aiming at obtaining raw materials (first of all strategic minerals) and agricultural products in exchange for German industrial goods. Germany could not pay in hard currency but such countries as Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria accepted the advantageous commercial conditions offered by Berlin. Although the rate of exchange of the German Mark was certainly too high in comparison with its real value, the governments of the above mentioned countries had little choice. Western European powers were not particularly interested in trade with Hungary, Romania or Yugoslavia and declined such economic agreements as those which were offered and concluded by Germany. In particular after 1936 the

German economic offensive was strengthened and nearly removed British, French or Italian presence in South Eastern Europe. Germany succeeded in obtaining in that area a position of true economic domination. Wheat from Hungary, fuel from Romania or strategic minerals from Yugoslavia were exported first of all to Germany even when the latter did not fulfil for some time her financial obligations. When the Second World War approached, countries of East - Central Europe became some kind of German economic colony. The economic agreements with Romania in 1939 and later also with Yugoslavia aided Germany's industry for war purposes very efficiently.

N. G. L. HAMMOND

THE ALLIED MILITARY MISSION IN NORTHWEST MACEDONIA 1943-44

The activities of the Allied Military Mission in Northwest Macedonia in 1943-44 and especially those of the unit based on Mt Vitsi which was commanded by Captain (later Major) P. H. Evans are reported from a series of wireless signals and situation reports. The author who was in command of the Mission in Macedonia for most of the period has added comments and explanation. The article provides firsthand, primary evidence for the happenings of those two troubled years.

EVANTHIS HATZIVASSILIOU

THE LAUSANNE TREATY MINORITIES IN GREECE AND TURKEY AND THE CYPRUS QUESTION, 1954-9

The Christian minority in Turkey and the Muslim minority in Greece became part of the Cyprus dispute between Athens and Ankara. In 1955, government-organised riots took place in Turkey against the Christians of Istanbul. In the following years, this minority faced strong pressures by the Turkish state, whenever Greek-Turkish relations deteriorated. From 1956 onwards, the Turks started claiming that the Muslims of Greece were being oppressed. This Turkish argument was used to strengthen Ankara's claim

for the partition of Cyprus. Yet both the British and the Americans disclaimed this Turkish line with regard to the Muslim minority of Greece. After the 1959 Cyprus agreements, Turkey and Greece agreed to re-examine the issues of the minorities, but this process collapsed in the mid-1960's, when the second Cyprus crisis erupted and when Turkey expelled the Christian minority from Istanbul.

KYRIAKOS D. KENTROTIS

THE COURSE OF GREEK-BULGARIAN RELATIONS, 1989-1991

Following the fall of the military dictatorship in Greece, Greek-Bulgarian relations steadily developed to a remarkable level within the context of the post-War bipolar system in Europe.

The revolutionary changes in the countries of Eastern Europe and the Balkans since 1989 have signalled a new course for relations between Athens and Sofia, which, however, still appears ill-defined. The re-emergence of various "forgotten" nationalistic issues constitutes a crucial factor for future developments in the sensitive region of the Balkans.

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